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Abstract
In this dissertation I jSrst motivate the need for the constitution relation by raising 
Wiat Michael C. Rea has called the problem of material constitution and arguing that 
many of the so-called solutions of the problem do not in 6ct resolve it. I  then look to 
recent accounts of constitution in the literature and focus on Sve for a thorough statement 
and critical appraisal: Frederick Doepke, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Lynne Rudder Baker, 
Samuel Levey, and Michael C. Rea. In each case I argue that the view is either 
incomplete, commits one to dubious entities and/or other consequences (e.g., top-down 
property borrowing) that are themselves unwarranted, or is incapable of accounting for 
paradigm cases of constitutionally related objects. Finally, I oSer my own view of the 
constitution relation which accoimts for an object's extrinsic rdadons as well as its 
intrinsic features, fully explains both the similarity and the dissimilarity among 
constitutionally related objects (without multiplying kinds), and is consistent with 
supervenience. In the end, I of&r a view that is sufBciently robust to account 6)r all 
constitutionally related phenomena in the world.
vn
Chapter 1
When the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle asked whether or not Socrates and 
Socrates-seated were the same thing, he did not ask an idle question.^ Nor was his 
question simply about the identity of objects, in this case persons, over time. It was a 
much deeper question, one that raised a number of philosophical issues that have haunted 
philosophers across the centuries since Aristotle Grst penned those words. It is with one 
of those issues-in particular, the relaüonship that obtains between Socrates and Socrates- 
seated—that I am concerned in this dissertation. More to the point, I intend to determine 
just what manner of the "sameness" relation Socrates bears to Socrates-seated. Is 
Socrates identical to Socrates-seated in the strict sense, in some dehnable non-strict sense, 
or is there some other relation, similar to identity in some respects but dissimilar to 
identity in other respects, that is better suited to make sense of the relation in question? 
While others have formulated interesting interpretations of Aristotle on just this matter^, I
 ^ 7F(1004b2) in McKeon, Richard. The Basic Works of Aristotle.
(New York, NY: Random House, 1941).
 ^For example, see Gareth Matthews, "Accidental Unities" in Laneuaee and Loeos. 
ed. by Malcolm SchoGeld and Martha Nussbaum (New York, NY : Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 223-240, and "On Knowing how to Take Aristotle's Kooky Objects 
Seriously" presented at the Pacihc Division Meeting of the APA in Portland, Oregon; 
Nicholas White, "Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness", P/nZbfqp/ucaZ ew, 80 (1971); 
David Bostock, "Aristotle on the Principles of Change", in Language and Loeos. ed. by 
Malcolm Schoheld and Martha Nussbaum (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 179-196; Michael C. Rea, "An Aristotelian Solution to the Problem of Material 
Constitution", presented at the Eastern Division Meeting of the APA in New York, NY,
am not especially concerned with Aristotle here. Indeed, while his is an interesting 
formulation of the puzzle that I address, there are other more contemporary formulations 
of the issue that have gained notoriety in the past half century, and it is to these treatments 
that I turn to explore, in the succeeding chapters, the puzzle that Aristotle Srst envisaged.
Although I provide an extended statement and initial treatment of the problem in 
the next chapter, it is important that I give a brief statement here in order to provide initial 
motivation for the rest of the dissertation. The Srst order of business is to address the 
p r i m a relationship that exists between, say, a statue and its compositional matter: 
namely, numerical identity.
The identity relation is a technical notion in philosophy. In common, everyday 
sorts of expression, 'identity' very oAen means something like 'the same as' or 'very 
similar to'. For example, we often refer to twins as identical, or to two cars of the same 
make, model, year, and color as identical. But this kind of identity, called qualitative 
identity, is not the relevant identity being re&rred to here. The identity relationship we are 
concerned with is one of numerical identity. That is, we are concerned with the 
relationship between x and y that says that there is only one f/zing present and x and y are 
both ft. For example, the Morning Star and the Evening Star are said to be identical in this 
sense. Both 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star' refer to Venus, so they are the 
same thing.
and "Introduction" in Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C Rea (New York, 
NY: Rowman and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997b): pp. xv-lvii; and Ernst Sosa, 
"Subjects among other Things" Pgrjpectivef, 7, 7P&7;
reprinted in and cited &om Material Constitution: a Reader ed. h&chael C. Rea (New 
York, NY: Rowman and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 63-92.
A look at the formal properties of numerical identity will make the relation more 
dear. Briefly, numerical identity is symmetrical (x = y if and only if y = x), transitive (x = 
y and y = z only if x = z), and reûexive (for any x, x = x). Further, common among 
philosophers is the view that numerical identity satisûes Leibniz's Law. Leibniz's Law is 
taken to be either:
(1) (x)(y)((F)(Fx « Fy) (x = y)): the principle of the identity of indiscemibles. 
That is, if X has a property if and only if); has the same property, then x is identical 
toy, or
(2) (xXyX(x = y) (F)(Fx ** Fy)): the prindple of the indiscemibility of identicals. 
That is, if X and y are identical, then x has a property if and only ify has the same 
property, or
(3) (x)(y)((F)(Fx -  Fy) « (x = y)): both (1) and (2).
Although one will &nd diSerent tags associated with diSerent logical fbrmulahons, and 
there is some disagreement as to which formulation (1-3) Leibniz held, Leibniz's Law is 
generally assodated with the indiscemibility of identicals, or (2), in the literature. 
Henceforth, then, I will refer to (2) as Leibniz' Law (LL). Further, the contrapositive of 
(LL) can be used to show that two objects are not identical:
(4) (x)(y)((F)((Fx & -Fy) V (-Fx & Fy)) (x y)): contrapositive of Leibniz's 
Law (CLL). That is, if there is some feature that diSers between x andy, then x 
and y are not identical.
So, if any x or y  diSer with respect to any property, they are not numerically identical. We 
are now prepared to ascertain whether or not the relation between a statue and its 
compositional matter is one of numerical identity.
Take Michelangelo's Now, suppose that Dmwf is composed of a slab of
marble (I actually do not know the physical make-up ofDm/wf, but it could be marble) 
which I will call 'Slab'. The question before us is this: is Slab identical to that is, 
are Slab and the same thing? T h e a n s w e r  is, "yes". It looks like 'Slab' 
and 'Davfff both re&r to the same object, and so are the same thing. Nevertheless, if we 
can Snd some Mature that diSers between Slab and Doviff, if we can hnd something that is 
true of Slab that is not also true ofDmwf (or vice veraz), then we will be forced to 
conclude that Slab and Zkzwff are not identical, by (CLL), and so are two dif&rent objects.
In 6ct, I think that Slab and Daw/f are not identical. I think this because there are 
things that are true of Slab that are not true of and wee verj». Suppose, for 
instance, that Michelangelo took the as yet unformed Slab and set it on his table at time r. 
Then, at Michelangelo shaped Slab in a particular 6shion, and created Dawcf. It is true, 
then, that Slab existed at t, but Dowel did not exist at t. Furtha:, suppose at that a piece 
of Dowel 611s to the floor and is swept into a garbage bin, say, the right arm. It looks like 
Dowel still exists, after all, this very thing happens to many statues but the identity of the 
statue itself continues through the change, e.g., the Ferma ek AAlb; however, Slab no 
longer exists. Slab is a particular piece of marble, and cannot survive a loss, or likewise an 
addition, of such an extent. After the loss of the piece 6om Slab, we now have a diGlerent 
slab of marble, which we could call 'Slab*', but the same s6tue, Dovr f^. It looks, then, 
like Dowd and Slab have diSerent persistence criteria, and so are diSerent objects. But 
these difkring features are temporally tainted, and some argue that identity is itself a
temporally relative notion, so I will of&r some non-tanporally relative features that diSer 
between Slab and
One such example concerns the dif&roit origins of Slab and It is true of
that it was created by Michelangelo, but this is not true of Slab. Slab was created 
by some complex geological process. One might argue, however, that this example sneaks 
temporally tainted concerns back into the picture. While I admit that I do not hnd 
temporally relative identity very satisi^nng, this example is consistent with such a picture. 
For we can simply stipulate that, under some very extraordinary conditions, Michelangelo 
was present at the "accelerated" creation of Slab, and that, simultaneous to Slab's 
creation, he fashioned With this stipulation, then, we can see that while both Slab
and Dawf were created at the same time, both came into being as a result of a diSerent 
creative process, i.e., had dif&rent origins.
Slab and Davzff also diSer in terms of their modal properties. For example, if Slab 
were to be shot with a morphing ray such that it took on very diSerent characteristics of 
shape, it would still exist; however, would not survive such a change. It would 
appear, then, that by using (CLL) we can show that Slab and Dmvff, though they co-exist 
both spatially and temporally at t, are not identical. Instead, the relation that obtains 
between Slab and and Socrates and Socrates-seated, is constitution.
^For example, I take it that George Myro is arguing for something like a 
temporally relative account of identic in "Identity and Time" in The Philosophical 
Grounds of Rationalitv. edited by Richard E. Grandy and Richard Wagner (New York, 
NY: Clarendon Press, 1986); reprinted in Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C. 
Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 148-174. 
Though I think any such qualihcation fails to c^ture identity, for Leibniz Law reasons, I 
will offer other diSerentiating features so as not to beg any questions here.
When one surveys the rather large contanporary literature concerning the 
peculiarities that arise between objects like Socrates and Socrates-seated, one hnds a 
virtual cornucopia of stories about cats, ships, discs, and the like, that serve to motivate a 
similar concern to the one that Aristotle was addressing. On the 6ce of it, Socrates and 
Socrates-seated, like the statue and the marble, are identical—numerically the same 
thing-but part of what concerned Aristotle, and what these other stories also serve to 
point out, is that there appear to be peculiar features of the objects that call into question 
the identity of the objects in &ct. While there are quite a number of stories that give rise 
to the problem of material constitution in the literature-indeed, it seems that every 
philosopher must come up with his or her own original rendition-I make use of just a few 
of the more (in)famous examples in Chapter 2. Following Michael C. Rea, who has 
written several excellent essays on the issue at hand and has also collected some of the 
more important works into a reader dedicated to the subject, I address but three of the 
more prevalent accounts: the Ship of Theseus, Tibbies the Cat, and Lumpl and Goliath.* 
While I address all three to some extent, I focus on the hrst two, merely mentioning some 
of the more important issues related to the Lumpl-Goliath example toward the end of the 
chapter. After an extended treatment of the puzzles, I formally state the problem that each 
is said to rmse, and brieûy note some of the solutions that have been oSered to resolve the 
puzzle before moving to dismiss them in 6vor of my preferred solution: namely, the 
doctrine of material constitution.
* Cf., Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C. Rea (New York, NY: 
Rowman and Littleûeld Publishers, Inc., 1997c).
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 ,1 address some of the more important proponents of 
material constitution in the recent literature-Frederick Doepke and Judith Jarvis Thomson 
in the third chapter and an extended treatment of Lynne Rudder Baker in the fourth. In 
each case, I provide an exposition of the view along with a critical appraisal. In particular, 
I show why each either 6ils to sufhciently articulate a complete, workable view, argue 
that the view leads to unacc^table consequences, or indicate why the view 6ils to take 
into account important, prevailing intuitions concerning the relations among objects; 
which, in turn, serves to taint the formal properties of that version of the constitution 
relation.
In Chapter 5, prior to oSenng my account of the constitution relation, 16rst 
address two recent, intrinsic theories on o8er 6om Samuel Levey and Michael Rea. I 
argue that their views fail to provide a robust account of constitution and so are unable to 
explain all constitutionally relevant phenomena in the world. I then oGer my account of 
constitution and take care to show how it diSers &om the other contemporary approaches, 
in particular the intrinsic ones, and show why it is preferable to them. I argue that it 
makes allowance for an object's extrinsic relations, that it is consistent with supervenience, 
and that it hilly explains both the similarity and dissimilarity between constitutionally 
related objects. Finally, I explain how my version of the relation works relative to a 
paradigni case of a statue and its compositional matter, as well as some other cases in the 
social and religious realms.
In Chapter 6 ,1 summarize what I have accomplished in the dissertation and oSer 
cursory remarks concerning where one might go hrom here and specifically where
constitution might be helpful in resolving various philosophical puzzles. I indicate that my 
primary aim for the dissertation, however, was to motivate the need for the constitution 
relation, make room for an additional statement of the relation, and provide a robust 
account that possesses the requisite dq)th and breadth to cover the ubiquity of 
constitutionally related phenomena in the world.
Chapter 2
L Chapter Intro
In "The Problem of Material Constitution", Michael Rea notes various puzzles that 
give rise to competing intuitions concerning the composition and identity of objects. He 
focuses on four, but I will highlight only three: the Ship of Theseus, an oA-used example 
when dealing with cross-time identity concerns; the Body-minus argument, most 6mously 
put forward by Peter Geach in his story about Tibbies the cat; and Allan Gibbard's puzzle 
centered around a statue, Goliath, and its lump of constituent matter, Lumpl ^  While he 
admits that these puzzles have gained much attention of late, Rea claims that no one has 
taken the time to investigate how these puzzles are similar, and, if similar, how and why 
they are so closely related. Instead, they are simply taken to be dissimilar, and so are 
treated completely diAerently. Rea argues that not only are these puzzles similar, there is 
one meta-puzzle that undeihes each of them-<he problem of material constitution.
Further, Rea thinks it underlies each of the four puzzles in the following way: "... every 
solution to the problem of material constitution is equally a solution to each of these four 
puzzles, though not vice versa".^ If Rea is correct, what these stories suggest is that the
^Michael C. Rea. "The Problem of Material Constitution", TTze fWosqpA/cuZ 
Tkview 104 no. 4 (Oct. 1995). Rea addresses a Arurth puzzle, the Growing argument, as 
well, but it does not add anything novel to the issue at hand and so I will ignore it.
2 [95]: 525.
problem of material constitution, if there is a genuine problem at all, is ubiquitous. The 
problem af&cts not only natural kinds, like persons and cats, but also arti6cts, like ships 
and statues.
I follow, at least initially, Rea's treatment of the puzzles, his statement of the 
problem, and his taxonomy of possible solutions. Ultimately, I argue that two of the 
puzzles, the one centering on Tibbies the cat and the one centering on the statue Goliath, 
more clearly raise the issue at hand. The growing argument, which I do not address at ah, 
adds nothing to the Tibbies puzzle while the Tibbies puzzle is 6 r  more common in the 
relevant literature and also clearly indicates vdiat is at issue across a multitude of possible 
solutions. The Ship of Theseus puzzle, I argue, does not actually raise the problem, at 
least not as stated and developed by Rea.^ Finally, while Rea's taxonomy of possible 
solutions is helpful, I only address certain elements of his taxonomy for reasons that I 
make clear later. Now, on to the puzzles, 
n . The Ship of Theseus
The Ship of Theseus puzzle, used to tease out various philosophical conundrums, 
has a long and storied history within philosophy. While the puzzle has been used to 
address a number of different philosophical issues throughout its history, Thomas Hobbes 
is credited with 5rst presenting the puzzle as it is discussed today.* Hobbes added a twist
 ^In &. 40 ,1 of&r an alternate statement of the puzzle-one that raises the problem 
of material constitution without muddying the watas with other concerns, as I think Rea's 
statement of the puzzle is prone to do.
* Rea [95]: 532. See also The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. voL 1. 
"Concerning Body" ed. William Molesworth (England, John Bohn), pp. 135-138, cited in 
Rea [95]. The list of others who have made use of the puzzle, both historical and
10
to the story which sharpens certain troubling and counterintuitive features, some of which 
are relevant to our discussion. Indeed, Rea makes use of Hobbes' addition and I will note 
it as I present the story. The actual puzzle is familiar, and while certain license is generally 
taken in its exposition, the salient features remain largely the same across the literature.
The Ship of Theseus is a wooden ship with a long and legendary sailing career. As 
such, when Theseus is Gnished with sailing about the Grecian waterways, his ship is put in 
dry dock as a museum piece. Over time, of course, planks begin to 6il and they are 
replaced with other wooden planks which, we will suppose, are qualitatively identical with 
the planks that they replace. We will further suppose that the planks that are replaced are 
set aside in a pile, and by some feat that goes contrary to the physical laws of erosion, 
these planks remain in roughly the same physical shape that they were in vdien they were 
taken &om their ongmal position. Over time (the exact amount of time is unimportant) 
we can imagine that the wooden vessel in dry dock has undergone a change in all of its 
planks, indeed all of its wooden parts. That is to say, that every single plank Grom the 
original Ship of Theseus, and all of the other original wooden Gxtures (e.g., steering 
wheel, rudder, etc.) have been replaced by a new plank or wooden Gxture. Again, this has 
not occurred all at once; rather, it has taken place over the course of a signiGcant amount 
of time.
Now suppose that along comes a museum curator, perhaps one that is still bitter 
that her museum was not selected as the repository for the Ship of Theseus in the Grst 
place, and she stumbles upon the pile of replaced planks and Gxtures and decides to put
contemporary philosophers, is too long to include here.
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than together again in their onginal, relative positions to create another ship out of the 
discarded parts to feature in her own museum. This Aature, or one similar to it, is Hobbes 
addition to the story. Now, clearly the Grst ship, the ship that has entirely diSerent planks 
(and Gxtures) Som the original planks (and Gxtures) that the Ship of Theseus had when it 
was put into dry dock, has some claim to be the Ship of Theseus. But, as is equally clear, 
the new ship that has just been constructed (dare I say re-constructed?) out of all of the 
original planks and Gxtures-again, kept in their original, respective positions-and so has 
the same planks (and Gxtures) that the Ship of Theseus had when it was put into dry dock, 
also has claim to be the Ship of Theseus.^ But of course both carmot be the Ship of 
Theseus, so the question becomes which of these two ships is identical with the original, 
i.e., which of these two ships is the Ship of Theseus?
Hobbes' twist focuses on the relahonship between composition and idendty. The 
two ships vying for the title of Theseus' ship at the end of the story highlight our counter 
intuitions concerning the essential nature of the original compositional materials of the 
original ship and the ship itself. Just as soon as we think that the ship can have a diSerent 
composition, which might include a complete exchange of its parts, and yet remain the 
same ship-that is, that includes the possibility that all of the parts of the original ship could 
undergo change and yet the same ship remains-we end up with the continuously repaired
 ^One must be attentive when using deGnite descriptions to refer to the objects in 
this puzzle lest the issue(s) raised by the puzzle be obscured by carelessness. Thus, I will 
refer to the Grst ship, the ship that has entirely diSerent planks (and Gxtures) Som the 
original planks (and Gxtures) that the Ship of Theseus had when it was put into dry dock, 
as either the continuously repaired ship or STR. Further, I wül refer to the second ship, 
the ship that has the same planks (and Gxtures) that the Ship of Theseus had when it was 
put into dry dock, as either the reassembled (reconstructed) ship or STO.
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ship being the Ship ofTheseus. But we have conflicting intuitions with regard to the level 
of part replacement that is allowed without altering identity. Rea calls this issue the 
f  nncÿ/g (PACP).^ The principle itself simply
aGGrms the possibility of alternative compositional states, which means that the loss of one
plank, or the replacement of one plank, without a corresponding loss of identity would
'
serve to entail the PACP. For the Ship ofTheseus puzzle, the PACP has to be construed 
so as to allow for the complete exchange of the planks. We have a sense on the one hand 
that it can go that way-that is, that ships, and other such objects, can survive the complete 
replacement of their constituent parts-^hUe, on the other hand, the counter intuition is to 
deny that particular interpretation of the PACP. This, in turn, pushes us in the direction of 
holding that the recently reassembled ship is in fact the Ship ofTheseus. Thus, Hobbes' 
twist teases out the heart of the issue which is, as Rea presents it, whether or not we 
aGGrm or deny the most extreme version of the PACP. We have countering intuitions just 
on this issue and that is where and why the puzzle arises.^
The most common use of the Ship of Theseus puzzle in the literature is to use it to 
tease out intuitions concerning the problem of identity through time. In such cases, the 
puzzle is generally resolved in such a way as to emphasize continuity of matter over 
against continuity of form, or vice versa, depending on the prevailing intuition. But Rea 
argues that the real issue that is at the heart of the Ship ofTheseus puzzle is instead how
 ^Rea [95]: 528Æ See also Rea [97b]. I will address this principle, as well as the 
rest of Rea's statement of the problem of material constitution, shortly.
^See Rea [95]: 537, for more on this score.
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the ship is related to its parts * In other words, he thinks that the answer to the identity 
concern, whether to emphasize continuity of matter or continuity of form, is dependent on 
how one views the ship's relation to its parts. For example, if^  on the one hand, one thinks 
that the ship cannot survive a change in its parts, then clearly continuity of matter is the 
emphasis. If) on the other hand, the ship can survive a change in parts (importantly, for 
the Sh^ ofTheseus puzzle, all of its parts), then the continuity of form is the appropriate 
emphasis. In either case, the emphasis is dependent on the relationship of ship to parts.^
1. The Ship ofTheseus and Material Constitution
Interestingly, however, Rea does not think that the Ship ofTheseus story is 
primarily a puzzle about the relationship between the ship and the aggregate of planks; 
rather, the relationship in question, the one that is relevant to the problem of constitution, 
is that between the two ships-and not, I think, the two ships at the end of the puzzle. As 
we will soon see, Rea holds that the problem of material constitution arises vdien we 
consider two objects that share all the same parts and yet are related to those parts in 
diSerent ways-one object is essentially related to the parts whereas the other is not.^° 
Now, the two ships at the end of the story, the ship hnally fully constituted by replacement 
planks and hxtures (STR) and the ship hnally fully constituted by the original planks and
*Rea [95]: 532.
%ea [95]: 532. One wonders why the emphasis could not go the other way: 
namely, why emphasis on matter might not lead one to hold a particular view of the ship's 
relationdiip to its parts (one that denies PACP) and emphasis on form might not lead one 
to hold that the ship might survive a complete change in parts (afGrmation of PACP). Rea 
does not address this issue.
^'Rea [95]: 527.
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Gxtures (STO), are p r i / M a obvious contenders &>r the objects in question. However, 
since Rea construes the problem of material constitution in the way that he does, this will 
not work, for STR and STO do not share any parts at the end of the story and, further, 
there is no reason to think that they might not be similarly related to their parts."
We have seen, now, one of the essential components that Rea thinks must hold for 
any situation that raises the problem of material constitution. In order for the problem to 
arise, there must be two objects present that share all of their parts and yet are differently 
related to their parts-one essentially and one non-essentially. He Girther thinks that any 
philosophical puzzle which raises the issue will make Gve general assumptions. We have 
already seen one of the Gve assumptions, the PACP. Rea thinks that this assumption, 
along with what he calls the existence assumption and the essentialist assumption, are 
responsible for the problem being raised." The exifteucg is straightforward:
there is an F and there are ps that compose it." In other words, this assumption supposes
"  I will address this concern, and Rea's response, later. Prior to doing so, it is 
necessary to more fully explicate Rea's understanding of the problem of material 
constitution.
"  Rea [97b]: xxi. While I do not fully understand Rea's point here, since the 
problem is not Gnally raised until some formal contradiction, which relies on the other two 
assumptions (identity and necessity) according to him, comes to the fore, he appears to 
mean that the Grst three assumpGons serve to raise our counter intuiGons. Of course, 
strictly speaking, our counter intuiGons are not raised without the idenGty assumpGon-at 
least not in the Ship ofTheseus puzzle. In any event, the epistemic quandary that arises 
out of the Grst three assumpGons is not sufGcient to generate the problem of material 
consGtuGon as it is normally stated, and Rea appears to embrace this later (cf [97b]: 
xxif^.
13 stands in for sortal or kind terms, so dogs, cats, trees, etc. The "ps" stands 
for those things that are said to compose some object. One can think of parGcles, 
cellulose molecules, wood planks, etc., here. R" stands in for relaGons such as "is
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the existence of at least one object. The esagMAa/wf ûKwmptzo» is related to the existence 
assumption such that the ps that compose the F compose an object which essentially bears 
R to its parts. In other words, it supposes that whenever there is at least one object of the 
kind found in the existence assumption, there is an object which essentially bears the 
relation R to its parts. Concerning the essentialist assumption, the relation R for the 
relevant puzzle is of extreme importance to determine whether or not the puzzle does 
make an essentialist assumption. Rea is not suggesting that there is an essentialist 
assumption that holds true for all of the puzzles, because for each puzzle the relevant 
relation R may be diSerent, though it would remain the same throughout the assumptions 
for that puzzle. The essentialist assumption is in obvious tension with the PACP which 
holds that given some F composed by the ps, the ps compose an object that can exist and 
not bear R to its parts.
The remaining two assumptions, the identity assumption and the necessity 
assumption, generate the contradiction that is found in every puzzle that raises the 
problem of material constitution. Rea's statement of the borders on
the Principle of Mereological Extensionality and only diSers insofar as its antecedent is
composed by" or "is at all times composed by", etc. It is important to note that each of 
these are understood to be story relative, including the relations. This is sometimes very 
important for Rea's discussion, though it will not be important far our discussion here.
For Rea's account of these terms, the 6ve assumptions (both formally and informally), and 
his statement of the problem of material constitution, see [95]: 526-528, or [97b]: xx- 
xxvii. In what follows, I will stick closely to Rea's informal account and will only make 
use of formal statements where the argument, or my critique, turns on krmal concerns.
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temporally indexed/^ In other words, for all objects, if any two share all of the same parts 
at the same time, then they are id^itical (they are the same F), according to the identity 
assumption. The nece&Mfy a&Mwyüon simply adds the modal quantiser ranging over the 
consequent, so if any two objects are identical, then necessarily they are identicaL Both of 
these assumptions will come into question a bit later.
It is best to see how these assumptions, when taken together, lead to contradiction 
and so raise the problem of material constitution by looking at a spedhc puzzle, like the 
Ship ofTheseus. That the Ship ofTheseus makes the existence assumption is obvious. If 
there are no ships and no ps, or planks and Gxtures, that compose ships, there is no puzzle 
at all. The essentialist assumption in the puzzle is not surprisingly tied closely to the 
PACP. Both are at the heart of the Ship ofTheseus puzzle. If we affirm the PACP, then 
it looks like the STR should be the obvious choice for being the Ship ofTheseus. With 
the most radical version of the PACP, there is no reason to think that the ship has to 
contain any of the original parts, and since the STR is the one that is continuously related 
to the Ship ofTheseus, it ought to be the obvious choice for claims of identity with the 
original ship, and this is precisely why we tend to have an intuition that the STR is.
"  Following Peter Simons Parts: A Studv in Ontoloev (Oxford, England: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), this principle holds that "if individuals have the same [proper] 
parts, they are identical" so long as they are not atoms (28). See also Mark Johnston 
"Constitution Is Not Identity" 101 (1992): 89-105; reprinted in and cited j&om 
Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and 
LittleGeld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 44-62., and Rea [97b]: liii, Gi. 16, and Judith Jarvis 
Thomson "The Statue and the Clay", JVo&s 32 (1998): pp. 149-173. Rea does not make 
Simons' distinction between parts and proper parts. In addiGon, whüe the antecedent is 
temporally indexed the consequent is not. In other words, if there is any time when x and 
y have all of their parts in common, then they are idenGcal at every Gme ([97b]: xlix).
17
potaiüaDy, at the very least, the Sh^ of Theseus. But when our intuitions go contrary 
and suggest that the newly rebuilt ship, the STO, is the Ship ofTheseus, we deny the 
PACPandaËmm something like the essentialist assumption. He^e the essentialist 
assumption would not be so much that the original collection of planks is essential to the 
existence of the ship, for if that were the case, then the loss of any one plank or the 
replacement of any one plank, would entail that the STO was not the Ship of Theseus. 
Howeva^, if one denies the PACP and thinks that the STO is the Ship ofTheseus, it does 
look like one is committed to the &ct that thae is at least some portion of the original 
collection ofplanks-maybe an important hmctional part, maybe just a sense of the rough 
proportional percentage of the original planks still present, etc.-that is essential in orda 
for the Ship ofTheseus to be present. In any event, it is clear that, once we have replaced 
all of the planks, the STR is not identical with the Ship of Thesais and the STO is 
identical. This is clear because, since the STO has all of the original planks, it certainly has 
the relevant jwrtron of original planks that are required in orda for the Ship ofTheseus to 
be present. Once we deny the PACP, thereby afhrming something like an essentialist 
assumption, the STO is clearly the only ship at the aid of the story that has any claim to 
identity with the original ship.^^
Indeed, it would entail that neither of the two ships is identical to the Ship of
Theseus.
Thae may be anotha option hae, contra Rea. One can afSrm PACP, thereby 
denying the essentialist assumption, and still think that the recently rebuilt ship (STO) has 
a strong claim to being the Ship of Theseus. For if all of the original planks are there 
present unda diSaent circumstances, e.g., whae thae is not a continuously rebuilt ship, 
the STO would clearly be the Ship ofTheseus. If one w ae to disassemble the original 
ship, not replace any planks just simply disassemble it, and then at some future time, say,
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That the Ship ofThesais puzzle makes the identity and necessity assumptions is 
likewise obvious to Rea." First, there is an assumption at the beginning of the story that 
there is but one ship composed by the collection of planks, and it is integral to the puzzle 
toward the end of the story that there is tAe ship that is the Ship ofTheseus. There are 
two contenders for that title: one ofvdiich is tAai ship (le., the Ship ofTheseus) and the 
other of wMch is a diSerent ship. Now, were there more than one ship present at the 
story's beginning, which would be allowed were the identity assumption not assumed, then 
our counter intuitions concerning which ship at the end of the puzzle is identical with the 
earlier ship would be unmotivated for there would be no tAe Ship ofTheseus and so no 
ship at the end of the story could be identical with ft. In addition, the puzzle assumes 
cross time identity. Unless there is identity across time, it makes no sense to be concerned 
about tAg Ship ofTheseus. If there is no identity across time, then neither of the two ships
10 years hence, reassemble it, the reassembled ship would be the Ship of Thesais. If such 
is the case in our counterfactual scenario, the same should hold in the current case. If not, 
one needs to give an account of why the addition of another ship, the STR, makes the 
diSerence in terms of identity between STO and the Ship ofTheseus.
Apparently this critique was also noted by an anonymous referee &>r Rea's paper. 
Rea notes the critique ([95]: 534 6i. 21) and o8ers a reply. On his view, the route taken 
in the counter&ctual scenario is akin to endorsing an essentialist assumption and denying 
the PACP, with the following troubling implication. Namely, that when the STO is being 
rdmilt, what one has, say, halfway down the line when half of the planks are reassembled 
and half are yet in a pile, is one "vessel" where one half of it is the original Ship of 
Theseus-what remains-and the other half is the making of a new ship, so you really have 
two incomplete ships for the one "vessel", which is counterintuitive in the extreme. At 
least this is Rea's position.
"  Obvious to Rea, but by no means obvious to all. Indeed, I argue that it is not 
clear that Rea is consistent on this point as he sets out the problem of material constitution 
that is raised by the Ship ofTheseus. See below.
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at the end of the puzzle is the Ship of Theseu8-4:hat ship ceased to exist long ago. Thus, 
to rqect the identity assumption is to make the puzzle moot.^*
The necessity assumption is also made by the Ship ofTheseus puzzle. For if the 
necessity assumption is not made, then it is possible that the Ship ofTheseus be identical 
with something at the beginning of the story that either coulkf or ccwWrzot survive part 
replacement but is no longer identical with that thing. In which case, the concision at the 
end of the puzzle does not arise. Rea agrees.^ He holds that to deny the necessity 
assumption here is to embrace temporary identity, given the other four assumptions. He 
does recognize that a denial of the necessity assumption does not by itself entail temporary 
identity. For example, Allan Gibbard endorses contingent identity and fbur- 
dimensionalism^\ and four dimensionalism is a special case for Rea's account. On a 6)ur-
At least this is Rea's position. Cf. Rea [95]: 535 and Rea [97b]: xxvii. On my 
view, the puzzle is only moot if we think that the co-location that Rea is worried about 
involves the same kinds, in this case ships. There is no problem if the co-located objects 
are diSerent kinds. See Wiggins "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time" 77%e 
jP/nZofopAzcaf j^evzew 77 (1968): pp. 90-95; reprinted in and cited &om Material 
Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C. Rea (New York, NY : Rowman and Littleheld 
Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 3-9, for more on the issue of whether or not co-location entails 
diGkrence in kind or sameness in kind.
"  The claim here regards the modal diSerence with respect to relation to 
constituent parts-namely, an object. A, that is essoitially related to its parts and one, B, 
that is not essentially related to its parts-and whether or not some object x can be identical 
to A but possibly not essentially related to its parts (cf [97b]: xxii).
^  Cf. [95]: 536.
See Allan Gibbard "Contingent Identity" VbzzTTzaZ q f^/zzZayqpAzcaZZogzc 4 
(1975): pp. 187-221; reprinted in and cited &om Material Constitution: a Reader ed. 
Michael C. Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 93- 
125.
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dimensionalist account, the PACP, as Rea dehnes it, is 61se, and this means that the fbur- 
dimensionalist is not committed to tenqiorary identity.^ So in the present context, Rea 
thinks that to deny the necessity assumption, and to afBrm the other four, commits one to 
temporary identity. Further, once one is committed to temporary identity, then there is no 
reason to think that the recently reassembled ship is the Ship ofTheseus.^
2. Problems Wth the Ship ofTheseus
Even with the foregoing assumptions made, however, we still need a further 
element in order for the puzzle to clearly raise the problem of material constitution, and it 
is here that Rea's account founders. Recall that Rea holds that the problem of material 
constitudon arises when we consider two objects that share all the same parts and yet are 
related to those parts in diSerent ways-one object is essentially related to the parts 
whereas the other is not. In other words, in order &*r the problem to be raised at all, there 
must be an a  and a 6 such that they share all of their parts at some time, t, and yet 
essentially bear different relations to those parts (or portions of those parts, in this case). 
But what are the relevant objects in question, what are the relevant a  and 6?
On a quick reading, the relevant a  and 5 might appear to be the two ships at the 
end of the story: STR and STO. But as I have already stated, these two ships cannot 
possibly Gt the bill since they do not share all of the same parts. In 6ct, at the end of the 
story, the ship in dry dock has a collection of planks and Gxtures that is wholly distinct 
6om the collection of planks and Gxtures that composes the newly (re)fbrmed ship, STO,
^  Rea [95]: 5458  ^especially Gi. 22.
^  Strictly speaking, my point is diSerent than Rea's here.
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so they do not share of the same parts. One could argue that STO shares all of its 
parts with STR since STR had as parts (at one time) all of the parts that STO now has. 
However, while this might be true on certain renditions of the puzzle^, this would not 
resolve the concern because STR would still 6il to share all of its parts with STO and, 
even if it did somehow, the requirement is that the two objects have all their parts in 
common at t/K some ttme. Clearly, the two ships at the story's end fail this requirement.
Rea agrees that the relevant a  and 6 cannot be the recently reconstructed ship and 
the continuously repaired ship, since they do not share all of the same parts, but he further 
thinks that it is difhcult to see how the a and 6 could be either the recently reconstructed 
ship and the original ship, or the continuously repaired ship and the original ship. For it 
would appear that our intuitions are pushing us in the direction of determining which of 
the two, the recently reconstructed or the continuously repaired ship, is identical with the 
original ship. And if identity is what explains their relationship, then, again, we are not 
dealing with the problem of material constitution. For, if this were the case-that is, if a 
and 6 were identical-the objects would not be distinct and so their relationship would not
^*Though not all construals of the puzzle. For example, if we view the STO to 
have ceased to be at the change of a particular plank, like, the hrst plank, and then come 
back into being when it is returned to its original form and composition, then it has never 
had any of the parts that now compose the STR. Or if we think that the original ship goes 
out of being at some point, say the middle point, in the replacement of planks, and now 
comes back into being, it does not share at least some of its planks and Sxtures with the 
STR-unless we think tAot ship, the STO, existed prior to it being put back together. In 
such a case we would have two ships existing at the same time and place as the STR, and 
then suddenly the STR and the STO would change spatial locations-i.e., the STO would 
get instantiated at a diSerent location with wholly diSerent parts &om time t to tl. Of 
course, none of these construals is without its own set of problems and will not, 
ultimately, aid Rea's version of the Ship ofTheseus puzzle.
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be in further need of explanation. Hence, the problem of material constitution-namely, 
that two objects share all and only the same parts and yet are somehow distinct-^onld not 
aiise.^
Instead, Rea considers the possibility that the rdevant a  and 6 are both faund at 
the beginning of the story along with the original ship. The one, a, would refer to the ship 
that can survive complete part replacement, which is the ship that ultimately results in the 
continuously repaired ship later in the story and pushes our intuitions in the direction of 
claiming that the STR. is the Ship ofTheseus. The other, 6, would re&r to the ship that 
carmot survive complete part replacement, which, of course, pushes our intuitions in the 
direction of denying that the continuously repaired ship is the Ship ofTheseus and 
afBrming that the recently reconstructed ship, or STO, is the Ship ofTheseus. Rea thinks 
that these two objects exist at the beginning of the story and are the relevant a  and 6 under 
consideration-their parts, at that time, being shared.^ As the Ship ofTheseus begins its 
journey, these two ships-one of which is identical with the Ship ofTheseus vdiile the other 
is not-have all their parts in common. One, however, is essentially related to its parts, or 
at least a proper subpart of its parts, while the other is not.
^  Rea [97b]: xix. Add to this, too, the temporal restriction highlighted earlier.
Rea does not account &*r this issue probably because of the ambiguity centering around 
"at the same time". He addresses this ambiguity when considering the doctrine of 
temporal parts, but not until later in the essay. It is clear, then, that his view concerning 
the ambiguity coincides with my own and so, &om his perspective, the temporal 
qualiEcation critique is valid.
^  Hints of this view can be found in his earlier essay, but Rea makes his position 
much clearer in the "Introduction" to his reader. There can be no doubt that on Rea's 
construal of the Ship ofTheseus puzzle, if the problem of material constitution is raised at 
all, both ships, a  and 6, must be present at the beginning. See especially [97b]: xix-xx.
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There are some problems, however, with Rea's proposed reading of the Ship of 
Theseus puzzle. It seems to me that it is far easier for us to think of object a  and 6 when 
they are of diSerent kinds, e.g., the collection of planks and the ship, the lump of clay and 
the statue, the collection of particles and the person, etc.. It is much more difhcult, indeed 
counterintuitive, to claim that in the Ship ofTheseus puzzle there are two ships that exist 
&om the very beginning. The only way one could assume that there are two ships that 
exist at the beginning^, it seems to me, is to aGGrm something like the doctrine of material 
constitution: namely, that two objects can be spatially co-located at the same time.
But more than that, one must also afBrm that two objects of the same kind can be 
co-located in space and time. But this is just to deny David Wiggins' time-honored S* 
principle: no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time.^
While detractors yet remain of the material constitution relation when it is afGrmed of 
multiple objects of diSerent kinds, that number grows exponentially, and includes many 
proponents of the relation, like Wiggins, when it is claimed of multiple objects of similar 
kinds. To claim there are multiple spatio-temporally coincident objects remains counter 
intuitive in its own right. But to further claim that there are multiple spatio-temporally 
coincident ships or statues or cups, whatever, takes a further step in the direction of
^  There may be three ships present: the one that is nonessentially related to its 
parts, the one that is essentially related to its parts, and the Ship of Thesais. At this point, 
we have insufGdent justification to suppose that the Ship ofTheseus must be identical 
with one of the other two. Of course, depending on how the puzzle is resolved, the Ship 
of Theseus may just be identical with one of the other two. However, if neither of the two 
are identical to the Ship ofTheseus, then Theseus' ship must be a third ship present at the 
beginrnng.
^  [68]: 5.
24
wanton metaphysical whimsy. There are a host of problems associated with the thesis that 
at least two mugs-perhaps an inhnite numbo^l-exist on the desk where my mug now sits, 
and there are few proponents of material constitution who wish to de&nd that view. A 
defense is what is needed, however, if one wishes to forward such a radical thesis, and as 
6 r  as I can tell Rea does not ofkr one.
Not only, then, must one assume some version of material constitution in order to 
just% that the SWp ofTheseus puzzle is a puzzle about material constitution, which 
appears to get the cart in 6ont of its horse, one has to assume a particularly strong version 
of material constitution where not only can two objects occupy the same space-time, but 
two objects of the some Azwf can occupy the same space at the s ^ e  time, which most 
proponents of material constitution deny.^ Both of these problems seem insuperable on 
their 6ce.
Rea admits that we have strong intuitions to identij^ what he would call ship a  and 
ship 6 but he thinks that in order to do so-and I think he is correct here-we must assign
^  For example: David Wiggins, [68] and Sameness and Substance. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Pub., 1980); Lyrme Rudder Baker Persons and Bodies: A Constitution \/iew. 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 'TJnity without Identity: A 
New Look at Matenal Constitution" AwÆay ÆXZ/f (1999): pp.
145-165, "Why Constitution is not Identity" JbwTzaf o / " 94 (1997): 599-621 
(though there is some ambiguity here); Judith Jarvis Thomson "Parthood and Identity 
Across Time" JburnaJ 80 (1983): 201-220; reprinted in and cited hrom
Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and 
Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 25-43, 'The Statue and the Clay", Ao&y 32 (1998): 
pp. 149-173; Mark Johnston "Constitution Is Not Identity" MüW 101 (1992): 89-105; 
reprinted in and cited &om Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C Rea (New 
York, NY: Rowman and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 44-62; Samuel Levey 
"Coincidence and Principles of Composition" 57(1) (Jan. 1997): pp. 1-10;
Michael Burke "Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard 
Account" 52 (1992): pp. 12-17, (Oxford, England; Basil Blackwell, Ltd), etc..
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either the persistence conditions of a  or the persistence conditions of 6. It must be the 
case that either the persistence conditions of a obtain or the persistence conditions of 6 
obtain-at the beginning of the story-but not both.^ The result would be to identic a  and 
6 and then identic f/zaf ship with the Ship ofTheseus, but then the puzzle would once 
agdn look like a puzzle about identity across time.
Rea, however, urges that the &ct that we cannot determine or choose which of the 
two ships is the Ship ofTheseus at the end of the story, the recently reconstructed ship or 
the continuously repaired ship, testiûes, as he puts it, "to the difhculty of making this 
assignment" at the beginning of the story From this he concludes that "there are really 
two ships at the beginning of the story that share all of the same parts without being 
iden tica l" .I agree in part, but the 6c t that it is difhcult to assign which ship is the Ship 
ofTheseus at the end of the story does not bear on the question of whether or not it is the 
case that there is but one set of persistence criteria at the beginning of the story, and so 
but one ship present then and there. That we are confused as to which ship is the Ship of 
Theseus at the end of the puzzle I do not deny, but this should not lead us to think that 
there are in fact two dif&rent objects with diSerent persistence criteria at the beginning of 
the puzzle-al the very least it does not by itself warrant such an inference. From our 
confusion at the end of the puzzle we can draw no clear conclusion for the beginning of
^  [97b]: xix-xx. But this is true only if the indeterminacy/vagueness is rooted in 
the objects themselves and not in our understanding of the "objects" and their relations.
Rea [97b]: xx
^^Rea[97b]:xx.
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the puzzle; we can only draw the conclusion that we are confused at the end of the puzzle. 
Todo anything hirther based on that bit of justiScahon alone is to con&ise our epistemic 
condition at the end of the puzzle with the state of the metaphysical landscape at the 
beginning of the puzzle.
There is a second nuyor problem with Rea's account of the Ship ofTheseus 
puzzle. When he toys with rejecting the necessity assumption, he also goes awry. He 
thinks that a rqection of the necessity assumption entails temporary identity, which can 
ultimately be used to dissolve the problem of material constitution since the problem does 
not arise if temporary identity holds.^ This is the case because once the necessity 
assumption is denied we are in a position to identic the relevant a  and 6, what he calls 
ship a  and ship 6 (ship a  being the one that bears R essentially to its parts^ and ship 6 
being the one that fails to bear R essentially to its parts). The one afBrms the essentialist 
assumption the other afGrms PACP. So Rea thinks that when one denies the necessity 
assumption, one is 6ee to afBrm that ship a  and ship 6 are identical at the beginning of the 
story but are not identical at the end of the story-one ship has undergone complete part 
replacement, that is the continuously repaired ship, and the other ship has not undergone 
any part replacement, that is the recently reconstructed ship. But if this is true, then there 
is no puzzle concerning how ship a and ship 6 are related at the beginning of the story; 
they are identical.
^ [97b]: xxvii.
^  Strictly speaking, this should reference at least a portion of its parts, which is a 
weaker assumption. The stronger assumption is unnecessary and almost certainly false.
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I do not think that this line of argument is open to one who regects the necessity 
assumption. Rea asserts that ship a  and ship 6 are identical at the beginning of the story, 
but this is not possible for they do not share all of their properties. One has the property 
of essentially bearing R to its parts, and the other has the propaty of not essentially 
bearing R to its parts (or simply 6ils to have the earlier property-depending on whether or 
not there are negative properties). But Ar Aom creating a problem only once the two 
ships that exist at the end of the story are generated, this creates a problem for Rea's 
treatment at the beginning of the story. If the two ships are identical, then, by Leibniz' 
Law, they must share all of the same properties. By the contrapositive of Leibniz' Law, if 
they do not share all of the same properties, then they are not identical. But, ex /%x)(Aes%, 
ship a  and ship 6 do not share all of the same properties-they diSer with respect to their 
relation to their parts. So either it is the case that the original Ship ofTheseus both has 
the property of bearing R essentially to its parts and fails to have the property of bearing R 
essentially to its parts-a nifty contradiction-or ship a  and ship 6 are not identical, and 
indeed cannot be identical, as Rea supposes.^^
Rea commits a mea when he grants that the competing intuitions regarding 
the original ship is the point of the puzzle, and recognizes that if pushed, he would have to 
agree that both ship a and ship 6, STO and STR, still have equal claim to identity with the
^^There is another option. It could be the case that one of the ships, the most likely 
candidate is ship a  or STO, simply did not exist at the beginning of the story and Srst 
came into existence when it was constructed in dry dock. This response, however, is not 
available to Rea and so will not be discussed here.
^  Cf. [97b]: A  19.
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original ship and our intuiüons of the same. He thinks that in order to resolve this tension 
we need to get clear on vdiat the essential properties of the two ships are and to identic 
the Ship ofTheseus with the "object" that has the essential properties of a ship.^ The 
moral Rea draws hrom this is simply that any puzzle which leads to the problem of material 
constitution and either Ails to have an a and a 6 that are of known, well deGned kinds, or 
is unclear concerning the essential properties associated with each object, will be difdcult 
to resolve. But one wonders why Rea does not go further when drawing his moral. One 
might just as easily say that unless and until such puzzles, including the Ship ofTheseus 
puzzle, can be shown to have an a and a 6 with a known, well deGned kind or where the a  
and the 6 are objects Wiose essential properties are clear, one cannot say \\diether or not 
the puzzle jusGGiably raises the problem of matenal constitution. Of course, Rea does not 
want to draw this conclusion, but it is unclear what warrants his Ailure to do so.
Rea claims that once he has shown how an afOrmation of temporary identity 
resolves the issue of material constitution, then the continuously repaired ship is the 
forerunner Ar identiGcadon with the original ship.^ However, I Ail to see how he can do 
this in a nonquestion-begging way. Importantly, to support his view, he notes that when 
the puzzle is presented, the intuition is pushed regarding the original ship that it can 
undergo a complete replacement of its parts.^  ^ But of course, if ship a  and ship 6 are 
identical, then there is the counter intuition that the ship cannot undergo a complete
[95]: 534.
^  [97b]: xxvii.
[97b]: xxvii.
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replacement of its parts. Rea claims that the counter intuition arises only at the end of the 
story when we are con&onted with the recently reconstructed ship. However, givai how 
Rea has construed the Ship ofTheseus puzzle to St his paradigm, the relevant a  and 6 
must be ship a  and ship 6, which, on his view, are both present at the beginning of the 
story. So 16il to see how Rea can get away 6om the 6ct that these intuitions are present 
&om the very beginning. Others concerned with the Ship ofTheseus puzzle may be open 
to using this line of argument, but I do not see how it is open to Rea.
Furthermore, even if one were to give Rea license to make this kind of argument, 
one must question why he is justiSed in giving priority to intuitions which are qristemically 
evident prior to vdien the counter intuitions are evident. Rea thinks that temporary 
identity relieves the intuitive pressure that we gain at the end of the story to think that the 
original ship must not be able to undergo complete part replacement. And since we were 
previously intuitively inclined to hold that the original ship could survive complete part 
replacement, we should stick with that intuition unless there are compelling reasons, or 
intuitions, to the contrary. But this looks to me to decide the issue based on temporal 
priority of intuition, which is itself determined by presentation of the story. Of course our 
intuitions are Erst to the e@ect that the ship can undergo complete part replacement, that is 
precisely how the story is setup. It should not be surprising, then, that our intuitions go in 
the order that they do. Even if Rea can wiggle out of this conundrum, however, he still 
has to answer the earlier questions that I raised: namely, if he presents the puzzle in the 
way he needs to, then the original ship also has the added property of being essentially
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related to its parts in such a way that it could not undergo complete part replacement (or 
vice versa, either way it is a big problem for Rea).
While there are puzzles that raise the problem of material constitution, the Ship of 
Theseus puzzle, at least as Rea has developed it, simply is not one of them.^ It is to one 
of the other puzzles that we now turn. 
nL  Tibbies the Cat
The Tibbles-Tib puzzle is a familiar one.^  ^ I cull my own formulation 6om 
versions forwarded by David Wiggins, Peter van Inwagen, and Peter Geach.^  ^ We may 
suppose that Tibbies the cat is luxuriating on the mat at some time t. There is also, at the 
same time, an object on the mat that is all of Tibbies save 6)r Tibbies' tail. Call it Tib. 
Now, consider some later time t* when the unthinkable occurs, Tibbies loses his tail. (We 
may suppose that the tail is annihilated so as to remove certain worries 6om arising later.)
^  Following Frederick Doepke "Spatially Coinciding Oiyects" 24 (1982): pp. 
45-60; reprinted in and cited &om Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C. Rea 
(New York, NY: Rowman and LittleSeld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 10-24, the Ship of 
Theseus puzzle can raise the problem of material constitution if the puzzle is understood 
as one which deals with the relationship between the ship and the collection of planks and 
hxtures that composes the ship. On such a construal, one need not raise issues relating to 
temporality at all. Of course, this is neither the standard treatment of the Ship ofTheseus 
puzzle nor the construal that Rea Avors.
Also known as the Body-minus puzzle (Rea [97b]) or Descartes-minus (Van 
Inwagen "The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts" fAz/aycyzhrcal gwwter/y
62 (1981): pp. 123-137; reprinted in and cited from Material Constitution: a Reader ed. 
Michael C Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 191- 
208).
Cf [68], [81], and "Reference and Generality (Selections)" in Material 
Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C. Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 305-312, respectively.
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Tib, of course, is unafkcted since Tib did not include the tail as a part to begin with. So 
the thing that at time t is Tib is identical to the thing that at time t* is Tib. Further, the 
thing that at t is Tibbies is identical to the thing that at t* is Tibbies. In addition, it looks 
like the thing that at t* is Tib is identical to the thing that at t* is Tibbies. By the 
transitivity o f identity, then, the thing that a t t is  Tib is identical to the thing that at t is 
Tibbies. However, since Tibbies had properties at t  that Tib did not have-namely, having 
a tail-the thing that at t is  Tib is not identical to the thing that at t  is Tibbies. Of course, 
these latter statements-attributing identity and nonidentity to Tibbies and Tib-cannot both 
be true, since they contradict one another, yet both seem justiSed by the story. We have a 
problem.
As with the Ship ofTheseus, the Tibbles-Tib story assumes certain things in order 
to generate the puzzle. For example, three dimensional, enduring objects-as opposed to 
four dimensional, perduiing objects-exist.^ These are objects like tables, trees, and cats. 
Such material objects can survive the replacement of parts and the proper parts of such 
material objects exist even though they are undetached hom those material objects, e.g., 
Tib. There are certain assumptions made regarding the nature of identity as well: namely, 
identity is transitive and neither sortal-relative nor temporal-relative. Finally, something
^  &iduring objects persist through time and are wholly present at every time at 
which they exist. Perduring objects persist through time in the following way: they are 
partially present at each temporal moment in terms of diSerent spatio-temporal parts being 
present at each particular time. The object itself is a collection of these spatio-temporal 
parts. Perduring objects are, then, extended through time as well as space, so they are 
h)ur dimensional objects. Thus it is clear that this assumption is necessary in order for 
there to be a problem with Tibbies being identical with Tib. Otherwise, the claim that 
Tibbies and Tib are identical would be obviously false because Tibbies and Tib clearly 
have diSerent (temporal) parts.
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like an anü-coincidence thesis is assumed: distinct matenal objects cannot fully occupy all 
and only the same place at the same time/*
Something must be done to resolve the contradiction that arises in the context of 
the story, and this list of assumptions provides a comprehensive road map to possible 
solutions to the problem generated by the puzzle because denying any one or a number of 
these assumptions makes it impossible for the troubling contradiction to a r i s e . A  denial 
of each of the assumptions has been championed by some philosopher at one time or 
another. Peter Unger, for example, has argued against the existence of garden-variety, 
everyday material objects.*  ^ Peter van Inwagen has argued against the notion of physical 
objects such as Tib.*^  Roderick Chisholm denies that any physical objects can undergo a 
loss of parts.*  ^ And there are several Wio deny either that identity is transitive or who
44 Cf [95]: 539.
Rea argues that it is comprehensive, though not exhaustive, because there are 
ways of solving the Tibbles-Tib puzzle, in particular, that do not reject any of the 
foregoing assumptions, e.g., Michael Burke's novel solution [cf. Rea [95]: 539, fh 30, and 
Michael Burke "Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle", Journal 
91 (1994a): pp. 129-139 ]
** Peter Unger, T Do Not Exist" Perception and Identity, edited by G. F. 
MacDonald (London, England: The MacMillan Press, 1979); reprinted in and cited &om 
Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C. Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and 
LittleGeld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 175-190. Peter van Inwagen argues in a similar 
vein, though he allows for the existence of living things including persons IMaterial Bernes 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990b)].
47 Van Inwagen [90b].
** Chisholm, Identity through Time", Chapter 3in Person and ObiecL (La Salle, 
IL: Open Court Publidiing, Co., 1979); reprinted in and cited 6om Material Constitution: 
a Reader ed. Michael C. Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and littleheld Publishers, Inc., 
1997): pp. 209-235.
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urge that identity is relative either to sort or time.*  ^ Finally, there are those who afBrm 
that distinct physical objects can occupy exactly the same space at the same time/" On the 
face of it, none of the foregoing seems promising, yet one will have to ^ve in order to 
resolve the contradiction. I will brieSy address each proposed solution in turn with an eye 
toward Ending the most plausible alternative. Ultimately, I will side with those who afBrm 
the coincidence of objects and will provide my own account of said coincidence, but such 
a treatment will be made in subsequent chapters.
Peter Unger would dissolve the problem be&re it even got started by denying the 
existence of garden-variety objects like cats.^  ^ He Erst argues that Tables do not exist, but 
his argument generalizes to cats (and even people). First, he establishes the current 
sdentiEc picture of tables as collections of atomic enEties. This is not essential to his 
argument. A coUecEon of wood Ebers or wood chips will do just as well. He then 
performs a sorites of decomposiEon:
(1) Suppose a parEcular table exists.
(2) For all X, if X is a table, then x consists of many, but a Enite number, of 
atoms.
Geach [80]; John Perry, "The Importance of Being IdenEcal", in The IdenEEes 
of Persons. Amelie Oksaiberg; Myro [86]; etc.
^ Wggins [68] and [80]; Thomson [83]; Doepke [82] and "The Trees of 
ConsEtuEon" 49 (May 1986): pp. 385-392; Baker [2000], [99], and
[97]; etc.
Unger [79]: 176.
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(3) For all X, if X is a table, the net removal of one atom, or only a few, in a
way which is most innocuous and 6vorable, will not mean the dif&rence as 
to whether there is a table then and there/^
But, if the above three premises are true, then, Unger tWnks, one is committed to the 
obviously 61se claim that a collection consisting of no atoms is a table.
At least one of (l)-(3) must go, and Unger thinks that (1) is the obvious, if 
counterintuitive, choice. Ungo" admits to the "airy-6iry" &el of the argument, but retreats 
to platitudes of logic in his defense. If commonsense and logic conflict, so much the 
worse for commonsense. But there are questions worth asking ofUnger's argument that 
do not deal with matters of formal logic. For example, one need not be committed to his 
obviously 61se conclusion if one either gives up (3) or o8ers a more complex picture of 
the metaphysical situation for objects, like tables, that (3) scopes.
First, "innocuous and &vorable" removal seems easy enough early on, but after, 
say, 1/3 of the collection has been removed, it becomes less clear how to remove hirther 
atoms in an innocuous and 6vorable way. Indeed, one has strong intuitions that such a 
restriction will have been violated long before the collection is down to the last atom. Of 
course, Unger thinks that such an argument commits one to a precise point, a precise atom 
or few atoms, that makes (Ac difference between a table's being there and not being there, 
which, he asserts, is to expect a miracle. But this seems no more "miraculous" than his 
conclusion that tables, and even he, himself fails to exist. One need not know of a precise 
point for there to be one.
Unger [79]: 177-178.
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Moreover, one need not necessarily be committed to a precise point-tables may 
just be vague objects. To say that tables are vague objects, however, appears to be 
consistent with (3). The problem, then, is not with (3), but with when to apply it.
For, if tables are vague objects, there will come a time during Unger's process of 
ronoving atoms when the appropriateness of afSrming the antecedent in (3) is 
indeterminate, because it vnll be indeterminate whether or not there is a table there and 
then. Of course, following this grey stage, at some point one fully expects that it will be 
clear that there is not a table present. Thus, whether (3) turns out to be 61se or is true but 
also consistent with the loss of the table during some stretch of atom removals, we need 
not follow Unger to his unpalatable conclusion.
Unger's denial of the existence of garden-variety objects, then, is not the way to 
go. There are unresolved questions surrounding the third premise of his argument. 
Epistemic or metaphysical vagueness is a more ^pealing option. And, fmally, the old 
stand by. If the conclusion of an argument is that the person forwarding the argument 
does not exist, there must be wrong with the argument!
Similarly to Unger, Peter van Inwagen elsewhere denies the existence of many 
garden-variety objects, except, most notably, humans^, but in this context he resolves the 
Tibbles-Tib dilemma by denying the existence of objects like Tib.^
^ Van Inwagen [90b]. Actually, Van Inwagen denies the existence of Tibbies as 
well as Tib, which is why his version of the story refers to humans (and their parts), which 
do exist, rather than cats (and their parts), which do not.
^ Van Inwagen [81]. I say "like Tib" because, again. Van Inwagen is concerned 
with humans, not cats.
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Using an argummt that is quite similar to the one under discussion here, but 
referring to Descartes and Descartes-minus^^, he establishes the truth of four propositions 
on the assumption that D-minus exists:
(1) The thing that was D-minus before t = the thing that was D-minus after t.
(2) The thing that was D-minus aAer t = the thing that was Descartes after t.
(3) The thing that was Descartes after t = the thing that was Descartes before 
t.
(4) The thing that was D-minus before t the thing that was Descartes before
Of course, proposition (4) violates the transitivity of identity, which van Inwagen afBrms. 
Thus, he takes the argument to be a reductio of the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached 
Parts (DAUP); the doctrine that allows for the existence ofD-minus or, in our example, 
Tib.
While van Inwagen's argument is interesting, I do not think that it necessarily 
shows what he wants it to show. Why? Because, even assuming that D-minus exists, 
proposition 2 is Alse.^  ^ But Van Inwagen needs proposition 2 in order for 4 to violate the
For our purposes, D-minus is Descartes minus his leA leg. Consider Descartes 
loping along an ill-used trail during the war at some time t. Both Descartes and D-minus 
exist at t. At t*, Descartes happens upon the 17^ century equivalent of a land mine and 
his left leg is obliterated. As with Tibbles-Tib, nasty metaphysical problems arise with the 
obliteration of Descartes' left leg.
^ Van Inwagen [81]: 195.
I will show this throughout the course of the dissertation. SufBce for now to say 
that there are other reasons to think that proposition 2 is &lse. But if proposition 2 could 
be false for some other reason, then proposition 4 need not violate the transitivity of
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transitivity of identity. Hence, his rgffwcfzo 6ils. But this result seems correct. It does 
appear that at least some objects do indeed have parts. For example, my truck has four 
wheel partis, last I checked. And Tibbies clearly has a tail, just like Descartes has legs. 
Why not also Tib and D-minus, respectively? In any case, I do not think it wise to deny 
the existence of such parts just to resolve the Tibbles-Tib dilemma if it can be helped. 
While this is hardly an airtight argument in favor of the strongest statement of DAUP, it 
may allow for the existence of Tib and D-minus.
There is a stronger rejoinder to van Inwagen's argument that is made possible by a 
recasting of the Tibbles-Tib story . ^  One can recast the Tibbles-Tib puzzle in such a way 
that it expresses the same problem without assuming the existence of Tib. Addressing 
Tibbies and the body, or collection of body parts, that composes Tibbies, rather than the 
troublesome .Tib, and using the Gve assumptions raised earlier in our treatment of the Ship 
of Thesmis puzzle, we can ar^ust the story as follows. First, affirming the existence 
assumption, there are cats and ps that compose them. Here we have Tibbies, and the ps 
that compose Tibbies could be Tibbies' body parts. Next, for any cat, in our case 
Tibbies, the ps that compose it-body parts, say-also compose an object that cannot 
survive the loss of a part, e.g., ear, whisker, tail, etc., thereby afBrming the essentialist 
assumption. This object could be an aggregate or a collection, in our case the body of
identity even though DAUP be true. Thus, Van Inwagen's argument does not show what 
he wants it to show.
^ I rely on Rea's recasting of the argument in what follows. Cf. Rea [95].
^ Other composition^ items would work just as well.
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Tibbies sadsûes this assumption. Covering Rea's PACP assumption, bar any cat, the ps 
that compose it compose an object that can survive the loss of at least one of its parts. So, 
the intuition is that Tibbies can survive the annihilation of its tail whereas its body cannot 
survive the annihilation of its tail; thus satis^ing PACP. As 6 r  as the identity assumption 
is concerned, Tibbies is identical with its body, and at t this seems intuitively plausible on 
Rea's understanding of identity.^ Moreover, there is no further object in the story, 
whether at the same time or some later time, with which Body is identical (unlike the 
earlier renchtion of the story). Finally, Rea's necessity assumption is also present in the 
story. If Tibbies is identical with Body, Tibbies is necessarily identical with Body. With 
these assumptions, the argument can be recast without assuming the existence of objects 
like Tib.
There are two important results. First, since this Rirmulation does not assume the 
existence of Tib, and so does not assume DAUP or the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached 
Parts, it does not fall prey to van Inwagen's critique.^  ^ Thus, van Inwagen's response 
does not resolve the Tibbies puzzle, and so does not resolve the problem of material
^  Of course, this is precisely where proponents of material constitution might balk, 
but such will be addressed in subsequent chapters.
Rea notes that DAUP's relation to the puzzle, as its been recast, is such that it is 
because DAUP is stronger than the essentialist assumption in the recast argument. In a 
footnote he talks about the mereological near essentialism that DAUP entails on van 
Inwagen's interpretation. As Rea construes mereological near essentialism it entails the 
essentialist assumption, but the reverse is not the case-although Rea notes that van 
Inwagen would reject the essentialist assumption. Ultimately, as I have noted, van 
Inwagen thinks that ps compose something only if the ps activity constitutes a li&, but, by 
dehnition, a living thing is just that kind of being that is capable of changing its parts over 
time. Cf Rea [95] : hi 34, and Van Inwagen [90b].
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constitution. Second, this particular construal of the problem fails to assume the 
transitivity of identity. Thus, a denial of the transitivity of identity will ultimately &il to 
resolve this version of the Tibbies puzzle, and so cannot serve as a solution to the problem 
of material constitution as a whole.
This new rendition of the argument wrestles with our intuition that Tibbies and its 
body have diSerent persistence criteria-its body carmot survive the loss of a tail while 
Tibbies can. So it is evident that Rea's Sve assumptions are suÆcient to generate the 
problan. From this it follows that one carmot resolve the problem of material constitution 
by taking any particular stand on either DAUP or the transitivity of identity. In other 
words, one can generate the problem apart Som assuming either DAUP or the transitivity 
of identity.
We have seen, then, that the problem the Tibbies story raises carmot be resolved 
either by denying the existence of garden-variety objects, the existence of Tib-like objects, 
or the transitivity of identity. But such does not hold true if one denies the existence of 
enduring objects. In other words, the Tibbies story does not raise the problem of material 
constitution if there are no enduring objects. This is because, on a perduring, or fbur- 
dimensionalist, view, the ps that compose Tibbies at t do not also compose Body at t. 
When considering the fbur-dimensionalist perspective, there is an ambiguity in expressions 
of the form "the ps compose O at t". Such can either mean that at t the ps compose an 
object O, or that the ps compose an object 0-at-t. According to a three-dimensionalist 
understanding these amount to the same thing. 0-at-t just is another name for O; 
however, on the fbur-dimensionalist view this is not the case. 0-at-t is a proper spatio-
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temporal subpart, or temporal slice, of O Thus, the ps that compose 0-at-t, on a 6)ur- 
dimensionalist view, do not also wholly compose O; rather, they only partly compose O.^ 
As such, there is no reason, on the fbur-dimensionalist view, to suppose that Body 
composes Tibbies, because Tibbies is the referent 6»r the object which includes (is 
composed by) all the proper spatio-temporal parts (subparts) of Tibbles-e.g, Tibbles-at-t, 
Tibbles-at-tl, Tibbles-at-t2, etc.. Body, however, is not composed by all of those parts, 
but simply by those proper subparts which include the tail. Thus, Body itself is merely a 
spatio-temporal proper part of Tibbies, and does not fully compose Tibbies.
So, the intuition that Body and Tibbies are identical is unmotivated on the fbur- 
dimensionalist view. And, as such, there is no paradox. This amounts to a denial of the 
very Erst premise in the original statement of the problem: namely, that at t Tibbies is 
identical with Body. On a 6)ur-dimensionalist view that is simply false. Thus, the body- 
minus problem does not generate the problem of matenal constitution fbr the fbur- 
dimensionalist. Neither does the Ship ofTheseus. However, there is a puzzle which does, 
and this is the puzzle that is h)und in Allan Gibbard's Lumpl and Goliath story.
IV. Lumpl and Goliath or The Statue and the Clay
The puzzles addressed thus far &il to raise the problem of material constitution fbr 
one who denies the existence of enduring otÿects. Since objects perdure rather than 
endure, on a fbur-dimensionalist account, they are composed by temporal parts, or slices, 
in addition to spatial parts, and in none of the puzzles addressed thus far have the temporal
°  Unless O only exists at t. This important qualihcation will be clarihed in the next
section.
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slices of the related otjects-the Ship ofTheseus or Tibbies and Body (or evai Tibbles- 
Tib)-overlapped completely. Such is not the case fbr the puzzle that focuses on the 
statue, Goliath, and the lump of clay that composes it, Lumpl.
The Lumpl and Goliath story originates with Alan Gibbard^ and is used by him to 
support the notion that tho-e is contingent identity. The story is as follows: a sculptor 
decides to create a statue of the in&nt Goliath and does it in the following way. He 
6shions the upper portion out of a piece of clay and the lower portion out of a piece of 
clay and then puts them together, thereby at the same time creating both the statue and a 
new piece of clay. A couple of days later afto  ^the statue has hardened, the sculptor 
becomes disenchanted with the work and smashes it, thereby destroying both the piece of 
clay and the statue at the same time. (If one puzzles over whether or not the piece of clay 
is still extant, one needs simply to alter the story slightly to include the annihilation of the 
matter so that it is clear that the statue and the piece of clay are both terminated at the 
same time.) Gibbard uses this story to say that Lumpl and Goliath are identical. They 
come into existence at the same time, go out of existence at the same time, persist through 
all and only the same times, and share all and only the same spatial region. But Gibbard 
also holds that Lumpl and Goliath are not necessarily identical. For example, it could have 
been the case that before the statue hardened the sculptor had refashioned the piece of clay 
into a replica of Michelangelo's David, or it could have been the case that after the statue 
had hardened one of the Gngers of Goliath had 611en ofT (or been annihilated). In the Grst 
case, Lumpl would still exist, though Goliath would not. In the second case, Lumpl would
Gibbard [75].
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no longer exist, but Goliath would. In otho" words, although Lumpl and Goliath are in 
fact identical, on Gibbard's \dew, they are not necessarily identical because they are related 
diSerently to their parts: Goliath is essentially related to a particular shape, though not any 
speciGc collection of parts, Wiile Lumpl is essentially related to a collection of parts, 
though not a particular shape. Thus, Gibbard thinks that this story shows that there are 
contingent identities.
On my view, the mere fact that Lumpl and Goliath diSer with respect to essential 
properties is sufBcient to show that they are not identical, and there are a number of 
essential properties that Lumpl and Goliath do not share that Gibbard does not mention. 
But admittedly this is no refutation of Gibbard's position, for he questions just what I 
presume to be the case: namely, that all identities are necessary. There are, however, 
other properties that Lumpl and Goliath do not share, and that are not themselves of a 
modal nature. Take, 6)r example, the property that Goliath has of being worth $10,000 
dollars because it is a work of art. Surely the lump of clay does not cost nearly so much. 
Thus, they diSer with respect to properties relating to value.
Regardless of one's intuitions on this score, however, the Lumpl-Goliath story still 
plays an important part in the problem of material constitution because it precludes a fbur- 
dimensionalist resolution to the problem. To see vdiy, we need to jBrst render the puzzle 
in hght of Rea's Sve assumptions.^ Take the Lumpl-Goliath case where Goliath is said to
^  As Rea points out, there are actually two possible ways of construing the puzzle. 
The Srst wrestles with our intuitions concerning whether or not objects can have material 
parts other than those it in fact has-Goliath can survive the loss of its hnger, while Lumpl 
could not survive the loss of that part. And the second wrestles with our intuitions 
concerning whether or not objects could have diSerent shapes or different arrangements of
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be in a position to survive the loss of its finger, while Lumpl could not survive the loss of 
its Snger part. On this rendition of the puzzle, the existence assumption is simply that 
there are statues and ps that compose them, Goliath Gts the bill in this case. The 
essentialist assumption is that if the ps compose a statue, then the ps compose something 
that cannot exist and fail to be composed of those ps. Le., Lumpl. The identity assumption 
is justiSed by our intuitions concerning the relationship that in &ct obtains between Lumpl 
and Goliath in the actual world: namely, Lumpl and Goliath have all and only the same 
parts, both spatial and, in this case, temporal. While denied by Gibbard, the necessity 
assumption here redects the intuition that were Lumpl and Goliath identical, then Lumpl 
could not be distinct 6om Goliath.^ Finally, the PACP assumption. If the ps conq)ose a 
statue, they compose something that could have existed and failed to be composed by 
them, and that, of course, is once again Goliath in this rendition of the story.
Thus, the problem of material constitution is raised, but the 6)ur-dimensionalist 
cannot resolve it. Why? Because unlike the Tibbies story, where, on the four-
parts other than those it in fact has-Lumpl could take a diSerent shape and survive, 
though Goliath could not. Either of these sufBces to show that 5)ur-dimensionalist 
responses cannot resolve the problem of material constitution in the Lumpl-Goliath case, 
so I will address only the Srst rendering of the puzzle here ([95]: 544-545).
The sharing of spatial parts is central to the identity assumption whereas the 
sharing of temporal parts is not. I mention the sharing of temporal parts here only to 
highlight this feature since it is crucial to the argument that 6)ur-dimensionalist accounts 
fail to resolve the problem of material constitution.
^  These last two assumptions highlight a crucial drSerence between Gibbard and 
myself. His resolution to the problem of material constitution is to deny the necessity 
assumption while mine will ultimately be to deny the identity assumption and ofkr an 
alternative relation in its place.
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dimensionalist view, Tibbies and Body do not share ail of the same spatial parts since they 
do not exist through ail and only the same time, and so do not share all and only the same 
temporal slices, Lumpl and Goliath do exist through all and only the same time.
Therefore, they share all of the same parts, no matter how sliced, and the identity 
assumption is raised, even on a fbur-dimensionalist picture.
V. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have assessed three puzzles in light of whether or not they raise 
the problem of material constitution: Ship of Theseus, Tibbles-Tib, and Lumpl-Goliath. I 
have argued that the Ship of Theseus does not actually raise the problem, at least as Rea 
presents the story. Nevertheless, Tibbles-Tib, reformulated to Tibbles-Body, and Lumpl- 
Goliath do raise the problem and in addition tease out interesting features related to 
possible resolutions of it. The Tibbies story raises the problem in such a way that it 
precludes resolution by either denying the existence of garden-variety objects, the 
existence of Tib-like objects, or the transitivity of identity. Lumpl-Goliath raises the 
problem in such a way that it precludes resolution by 6voring perduring objects over 
enduring ones; thus, the fbur-dimensionalist is in no better position the problem
of material constitution than is the enduranüst.
As we have seen, there are other ways to resolve the problem.^ Alan Gibbard, for 
example, denies the necessity assumption on the way to arguing for contingent identity, 
and by so doing is saved &om the problem as stated here. While denying the necessity of
^  Rea mentions six: denial of each of the ûve assumptions (identity, necessity, 
existence, essentialist, and PACP) and indeterminacy solutions ([95]: 545-550).
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identity, whether as an intended means of resolving the problem of material constitution or 
no, strikes me as odd, I have no intention of explicitly addressing that topic in this 
dissertation. As I have intimated throughout this chapter, I resolve the problem by 
denying what amounts to Rea's identity assumption and arguing for a diSerent relation to 
take its place. Before oSering that argument, however, I hrst address the views of others, 
like myself vdio deny the identity assumption in favor of material constitution.
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Chapter 3
L Chapter Introduction
In an important article in the area of object individuation, David V^ggins argued 
that two otgects could occupy the same space at the same time under certain conditions.^ 
Using Leibniz' Law as his arbiter of identity, he argued that a tree and the aggregate of 
cellulose molecules that composes it are not identical, though they occupy just the same 
spatial r%ion at a given time.^ It is important, however, that the two objects not be two 
trees, 6)r Wiggins argued that a condition of spatial co-location without identity is that the 
spatially coincident objects be of diSerent kinds. On his view, then, no two trees (cats, 
statues, whatever) could occupy just the same spatial region at a given time and 6il to be 
identical.
While many have thought Wiggins' spatial coincidence, or constitution, thesis to 
be implausible on its face, many others have answered his call to develop a complete, 
consistent picture of the relation that must obtain between two spatially co-located 
objects. In this chapter, I address two such views. In the Erst, Frederick Doepke further 
develops \\%gins' thesis and uses it to argue against eliminitive reductionism. In the 
second, Judith Jarvis Thomson makes use of another metaphysical relation-that between
'[1968]
 ^[1968]: 4-5. He also used a &rm of Geach's Tibbles-Tib argument in favor of 
this thesis.
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parts and wholes (mereology)-to provide a complete picture of the constitution relation. 
Ultimately, I hnd both views to be inadequate. Doepke's is incomplete as it stands and 
fails to hnally silaice eliminitive reductionism. While Thomson oSers a far more complete 
picture of the constitution relation, it comes at too great a price: namely, a bevy of 
redundant, ontological entities called hisions and a mereological picture that is not 
obviously tied to the real world in any way. 
n. Frederick Doepke: Reduction and Constitution
Following David Wiggins, Frederick Doepke argues that (at least) two things can 
occupy the same place at the same time.  ^ Examples of spatially coinciding objects might 
be a statue and the gold of the statue, a ship and the collection of boards that make it up, a 
person and his or her body. Doepke, however, does not think that Wiggins has provided 
an adequate account of the relationship between coincident objects.* He argues 6)r his 
own account of object coincidence in "Spatially Coinciding Objects", and provides, along 
the way, arguments against four possible counter responses to the material constitution 
view.  ^ Here I am concerned mainly with Doepke's own view, but will also address 
elements of his anti-reductivist argument where such is telling about his own 
understanding of material constitution.^
 ^Wggins argues this, for example, in [68].
* I will take 'coincident' and its cognates, when applied to objects, to refer to 
spatially, and hence temporally, coinciding objects.
 ^Frederick Doepke [82].
 ^The Reductionism that Doepke argues against is one that reduces macro objects 
to their micro constituent parts, thereby riding the world of everyday, garden-variety
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1. Doepke's Account of the 'is' of Constitution
Doepke Gnds an adequate account of the relationship between coinddent objects 
wanting in the literature, and he thinks an account will make the existence of such objects 
more palatable to the naysayers/ Motivating the need for an account of the relationship 
are two questions; questions that a person who argues that an identity holds between the 
"two" objects has no need to answer, but for which Doepke, and others Wio think that 
some other relation holds between the "two" objects, mnaf provide an atiswer. First, why 
are these two distinct, spatially coinciding objects so similar? Second, given that they hold 
all of their spatial parts in common, how can they be diSerent? An answer to both 
questions, Doepke maintains, will provide an account of the zj of constitution.
On the one hand, the person who argues that an identity holds between the "two" 
objects has no need to account for their similarity-there is but one object. On the other 
hand, the person who argues that there are two objects present must provide an 
explanation, and Doepke does just that. First, he points out that propoties of an object 
(e.g., spatial properties [place, shape, size], weight, taste, color, smell, etc.) are 
determined by the parts of an object. If objects have exactly the same parts at the same 
time, they will share the same properties.' Hence, Doepke argues that "Since it is logically
objects and ostensibly dissolving the problem of material constitution.
 ^[82]: 10. Much has been published on this topic since Doepke's contribution.
'  While Doepke is not entirely clear on this point, he does not think that they will 
share all of the same properties. For example, they will not share all the properties 
associated with one another's persistence and/or perishability criteria. This will be 
addressed more later.
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possible for two things to share the same parts at the same time [he can] explain vdiy 
objects are alike. . .otherwise than by identifying them".'
Doepke has accounted for coincidait objects which share all the same parts, but he 
recognizes that it is possible they do not share all of their parts. For example, a person 
and the collection of particles of which she or he is composed do not share all of the same 
parts, nor does the Ship of Theseus and the collection of wood cells that make up the ship. 
Take the Ship of Theseus. The boards that make up the ship are parts of the ship, but the 
boards are not parts of the collection of wood cells that make up the ship. Similarly for 
the person and the collection of particles that composes him or her. The heart and lungs 
are parts of the person, but not of the collection of particles. To handle this problem, 
Doepke argues that the ship and the collection of wood cells are similar in every respect as 
if they had the same, and only the same, parts. This is because the "additional" parts had 
by the ship are only extant because certain sub-sets of the collection of wood cells are 
"accfdbnW/y interrelated in ways to the existence of the 'additional' parts".
That is, the presence of the "additional" parts can be wholly explained in terms of 
accidental structural characteristics within the collection of particles or wood cells that are 
necessary for either a heart or a board to be present, respectively. Structural properties 
are accidaital for the collection of wood cells, but are essential for the mid-level 
objects/parts that are the planks of the ship. The same can be said Air human bodily parts.
'  [82]: 15. 
[82]: 16.
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Doepke is Gnally in a position to explicate what he terms the complete- 
composition relation, i.e., the relation that accounts for the objects' similarity. He 
stipulates the recursive deSnition of ' completely-composed o f :
_y is completely-composed of % at time t if^&t ) at time t,
1) % has parts &,
2) every part of % is a part of_y &,
3) any part of}» which is not a part of % is completely-composed of parts of
The reason Wiy spatially coinciding objects are so similar is that one object is completely- 
composed of the other. In addition, certain objects will be completely-composed of each 
other, e.g., you and your body, a rock and itself because they have exactly the same 
parts."
After answering the similarity question and providing the hrst installment of his 
dehnition of the rs of constitution, Doepke addresses the dissimilarity question. The 
alleged coincident objects have already been shown to be dissimilar in some respect, or 
there would be no need to count them as Two" objects. For example, one reason that the 
statue and the gold that composes the statue are said to be diSerent is that the gold is said 
to survive the destruction of the statue. That is, the gold has difkrent persistence criteria
11 [82]: 17.
"  [82]: 17. This apparent symmetry in the completely-composed relation appears 
at odds with what Doepke says elsewhere. I will return to this apparent dissonance later.
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than does the statue. Doepke seeks to make sense of this difference between two objects 
which share all and only the same parts using the notion of constitution.
Doepke argues that the purpose served by the concept of constitution is to make 
intelligible the perishabili^ of an object. Given that a cup is composed of glass, to say that 
the cup is destroyed is just to say that the ^ass loses the shape of a cup and assumes the 
shape of shards littering the âoor. The notion of constitution allows us to make sense of 
the cup's destruction, since it allows us to pick out a substratum, the glass, which persists 
beyond the cup's destruction. Doepke, then, offers the following deGnition of 
'constitution', constitutes y  at time t if and only if % could be a substratum of_y's 
destruction".^^
Doepke then accounts for the &*rmal properties of both complete-composition and 
constitution. Where identity is symmetrical and transitive, complete-composition (at time 
0 is asymmetrical (z is composed of^ [at time () only if it is not the case that y is 
composed of % [at time t]) and transitive. Similarly, constitution (at time is asymmetrical 
and transitive. Doepke provides an example of the asymmetry of constitution that is 
instructive.
Constitution (at time 0 is asymmetrical: "if x constitutes}/ at time i, then the 6ct 
that}/ could perish at time r is explainable by describing a certain change, beginning at time 
i, in which x would be the substratum".^* He tells the story of a person and his or her 
body. You do not constitute your body, but your body does constitute you. You are
"  [82]: 19. 
"  [82]: 19.
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perishable because your body could undergo certain changes in which the neural structures 
responsible for consciousness would be lost. The description of your body at time t, with 
neural structures intact, provides an explanation of your existence at time t, and supplies 
sufBcient (or so it would seem) explanation for your continued existence through time f*. 
But if your body were to undergo a change in the neural structure resulting in the loss of 
consciousness, you would peish. On the othe^ hand, the neural structures themselves, 
though essential for you, are accidental to your body. Hence, your existence and 
perishability are both detemined by an accidental characteristic of your body, the requisite 
neural structure, but we cannot explain your body's existence by referring to you, because 
your existence will always be irrelevant in accounting for your body's existence. So, your 
body does constitute you, but you do not constitute your body.^  ^ A di&rence in the 
relationship between one object, the person, and its structural characteristics, and the 
other object, his or her body, and the same structural characteristics-i.e., essential for the 
former while accidental for the latter-explains the diSerence in the perishability and 
persistence conditions between the two, and so the diSerence between the objects.
Combining, then, the foregoing discussions of complete-composition the
statement and formal properties of constitution, Doepke claims to have provided an 
account of the if of We next turn to Doepke's argument against the
15 [82]: 19-20.
[82]: 21. Although the distinction is, at times, quite slight, &om here on out I 
will use 'cowAAzAon' to re&r to the wider sense of the if of constitution, and 
'constitution' to re&r to the second conceptual coryunct within Doepke's account of 
coMf AAzAon. Relevant cognates will also be denoted by iAzAc or standard type, 
respectively.
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reducdvist response to the notion of coincident objects. While at hrst glance this 
treatment may seem out of place in a section devoted to explaining Doepke's 
understanding of the cowdA/Ao» relation, there is a bothersome ambiguity in Doepke's 
view that will be made more clear when contrasted with the reductivist position he is 
arguing against.
2. Doepke's Anti-Reductivist Argument
With his account of complete, Doepke moves to a consideration of the
reductivist response to the notion of coincident objects. He provides three reasons one 
might have a metaphysical bias toward giving priority to metaphysical cwMAA/Ang 
objects rather than the objects so cowAA/fai. One reason for favoring metaphysically 
cpwAA/Ang  ^objects is that they are generally less dispensable for thought than objects 
coTwAA/fgA. That is, given a gold statue (perishable object) and the gold that composes 
the statue (substratum), any and all of the relevant properties at time t are ascribable to the 
coTiyAA/AMg object, and the co/iyAAftgA object can be disregarded. The same, however, 
cannot be said in reverse.
Another reason Doepke gives far favoring metaphysically co/wAA/A/fg objects is 
that whatever something is created or destroyed there is some time during the change in 
which the existence of the object created or destroyed is indeterminate, thus creating a
"  [82]: 21. Again, strictly speaking, not all properties are reducible in just this way 
on Doepke's view. This will be made more clear a bit later. Also, by way of 
fbreshadot^nng, Doepke's accounts sounds close to Lynne Rudder Baker here with regard 
to properties, though Baker holds that constituted objects are metaphysically prior. I 
address Baker's view in chapter four.
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ref^ence problem.^* This problem can be eliminated, however, by referring instead to the 
conatrA/Ang objects (e.g., the gold of the statue) whose existence remains relatively 
determinate.'^
While the €rst two reasons for 6voring metaphyâcally co/zfAAfAyzg objects are but 
briefly noted, the third reason commands Doepke's sustained attention. While objects 
can often be replaced by references to the objects vdiich cwwAAzte them, 
Doepke wonders whether they can always be so replaced. The reductivist response is that 
they can. Indeed, the reductivist makes the stronger claim, namely, that one is never 
justiGed in making an inference 6om the existence of some cowAAfA«g object x to the 
existence of some coAfAArtecf object This, according to Doepke, is the third reason 
for favoring metaphysically constituting objects, and it is decisive, if it holds.
The reductivist view does seem attractive, Why not say that a referoice to a 
person just is a reference to a collection of particles? That is to say, persons are reducible 
to the collections of particles that co/wAA/fg them. Doepke counters that there are certain 
instantiated properties in the world which cannot be instantiated by other than the objects
"  Sadly, Doepke is not clear whether he intends to suggest an epistemic or 
metaphysical indeterminacy.
"  [82]: 21.
^  Thus, the reductionism that Doepke addresses here is eliminitive.
[82]: 21. Thus he cannot hold that all properties of coMfAA/teA things are held in 
common with their constituents.
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Doepke's example relies on the notions of consciousness and memory. A memory 
of mine, say, that of Grst hearing about Ronald Reagan being shot, is not a property which 
can be instantiated by a collection of particles (or so Doepke holds). The collection of 
particles persists just as long as the particles do, and any change (addition, subtraction or 
replacement) results in a new collection. But having a true memory requires that the 
memory can be traced back, in accordance with catain identity criteria, to the same thing 
that had the experience in the hrst place. Nothing can begin to exist with a memory, and 
the relevant collection of particles may beina humanoid structure for the Grst time. It 
follows, then, that I exist as a separate substance.^
The reductivist will counter that one can tell a story, one which captures all of the 
facts, without any mention of objects like people. For example, to have a
memory just is to possess a sub-collection of particles in a certain pattern as a result of the 
commerce of certain of the collection's particles with sound waves (the hearing ofReagan 
being shot), and the continuation of this pattern (the particle make-up is immaterial) 6om 
one collection of particles to another (the preserving of the memory). Upon the having of 
the memory, then, this pattern of particles has an ef&ct on another sub-collection of 
particles rendering, at least in part, a certain motion in this other particle area which is the 
having of the memory. So, the challenge to see how one can justify talk of objects 
remains unanswered.
After presenting the possible reductivist response, Doepke oSers the meat of his 
argument against it. First, calling the having of a memory (i.e., the hearing, preserving,
^  [82]: 22.
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and remonbering Reagan being shot) a single event E, and allowing, the sake of 
argument, that the occurrence of E  can, in some way, be explained by referring simply to a 
collection of particles, he claims that "you diSer essentially 6om a collection of particles in 
that you can literally gain and loose [sic] particles" .^ This is precisely what allows a 
person to serve as the substratum of E.
During the development of E  you undoubtedly undergo some change in particles. 
Doepke argues that "only because you do continue to be present throughout these 
changes in the development of E  can we explain, at each stage of the development, how 
that stage came about as the result of some one thing (you) having advanced through the 
various, earlier stages, in accordance with certain laws".^ References to you as a 
substrata can accomplish this because the actual particles which make you up are 
accidental to you. On the other hand, one cannot account for the development of Æ 
referring only to the collection of particles as substrata, since at each stage there is a 
different collection of particles. There is no continuity between the collections of particles 
that would account for the having of E. But, as Doepke indicates, j/on are accidentally 
composed of particles, so the coming and going of particles (the 6c t that you are 
composed of a different collection of particles at any time f) can be ignored when 
accounting for E, whereas it could not be ignored if the substrata were the collection of 
particles. Doepke concludes, "since, in order to explain how E  occurred, it is pointless to 
take account of these phenomena [the comings and goings of particles], we ought not to
^  [82]: 23. 
^  [82]: 23.
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do so".^ Thus, a reductivist position that eliminates objects in &vor of
coTMAA/fiMg objects cannot account for catain phenomena, like memories. Ghven that 
memories are real, this amounts to an admission of the existence of co/wAAf objects,
e.g., persons, and to a rejection of reductivism.
So goes Doepke's argument against the reducdvist response to the notion of 
comczdlgMr objects. I turn now to an evaluation of his argument, and will follow the 
evaluation with a possible reductivist response to his portrayal of the reductivist account 
of having a memory. Ultimately I show thatDoepke's representation of the consTzA/don 
relation is confused and that the reductivist can counter Doepke's memory challenge, but 
only at the cost of afBrming a diSerent cowAA/tW entity.
3. Doepke's Asymmetry and the Constitution of the Body
There is something troubling about Doepke's account of the M of coTMAA/Aon and 
his argument against the reductivist response. Doepke claims that both the complete- 
composition and constitution relations are asymmetrical. That is, unlike identity, these 
two relations only go one direction: if % is composed of y  at time f, then y cannot be 
composed of x at time f (the same can be said of constitution). It is unclear, however, 
how this asymmetry can be made consistent with Doepke's view of the relationship 
between a person and his or her body. Two issues need to be clariGed. First, as indicated 
earlier, on Doepke's view a person's body constitutes that person. Certain neural 
structures, accidental to the make up of the body, are essential to the make up of the 
person. In fact, the presence of certain neural structures accounts for the persistence of
^  [82]: 23.
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the person, while the lack of those same neural structures would account for the perishing 
of the person.^ It is not yet clear, however, what constitutes the body. This leads to the 
second issue that needs clariGcation: namely, Doepke's comment, noted earlier, that 
"objects like you and your body, and a rock and itseb  ^which have exactly the same parts, 
are completely-composed of each other", thus hinting that complete-composition is a 
symmetrical relation^
This comment does not seem to square well with Doepke's claim that the 
complete-composition relation is an asymmetrical relation. By way of response, Doepke 
could focus on the temporal clause "at time f  and claim that, while at time i there is an 
asymmetrical complete-composition relation where one's body completely-composes him 
or her, at time the relation could switch and one could be said to asymmetrically 
completely-compose his or her body. The apparent symmetry, then, would only obtain 
across time, while the asymmetrical relation would continue to hold at any given time; 
thus, resolving the alleged inconsistency. Even so, a symmetrical relation at the level of 
complete-composition does not impact the asymmetry of constitution, though it would 
seem to aSect conyhmr/on, and so is not helpful when addressing the constitution of the 
body. Doepke states elsewhere that, "although it is relatively unlikely that an arbitrarily 
picked object will constitute another object, we should not be surprised to Gnd it
th o u g h  Doepke does not make the relationship between perishability and 
persistence clear in this article, he does say elsewhere that, ". . .references to constituting 
objects serve not only to explain conditions of perishing but also conditions of 
persistence" (Frederick Doepke, [1986]: 390).
^  [82]: 17.
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constituted ^  another object. For if an object is not constituted by any object at all then, 
like a Democritean atom, it cannot perish".^ I am sure Doepke does not take the body to 
be a Democritean atom. It is reasonable, then, to inquire as to its constitutional relations. 
Doepke does not say what constitutes the body, but it is here that one can Gnd an answer 
to his anti-reductivist argument.
A hrst place to look for the constitution of the body, intuitively speaking, is the 
collection of particles. After all, Doepke allows that the collection of particles completely- 
composes the person.^ One might think that the collection of particles also completely- 
composes the body. Givai that the person completely-composes his or her body and the 
transitivity of the complete-composition relation, Doepke appears to be committed to this 
result. Nevertheless, as we shall see this does not help us to determine what constitutes 
the body.
In a later article on a related subject,'The Trees of Constitution", Doepke 
reiterates the Amiliar notion that "the person's body constitutes the person; a person does 
not constitute his or her body".^ But, Doepke mmntains, the asymmetrical relation of 
constitution does not necessarily relate only to two objects. One object can constitute two 
other objects, in a tree-like asymmetry, provided that the two constituted objects are not 
themselves related in terms of constitution.
^  [86]: 389. 
^  [82]: 23.
30 [86]: 385.
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For example, take some stone, a stone statue, and a landmark. Like a gold statue 
and the gold that constitutes it, the shape of the stone, while accidental to the stone itself^  
is essential to the statue. In addition, the stone and the statue share all of the same parts. 
So, the stone is said to co/wAufg the statue. In addition, the stone constitutes the 
landmark, but not in the same 6shion. The shape of the stone could be altered, thus 
altering the shape of the landmark, but the landmark would yet remain. That is just to say 
that the shape of both the stone and the landmark are accidental qualities of each.
However, we might say that the stone has a certain iridescent quality. This quality is 
accidental to the stone, but, we will say, it is essential to the landmark. That is just to say 
that the landmark would perish if the iridescent quality were lost. In this example, neither 
the statue nor the landmark constitute one another, but both are constituted by the stone.^  ^
Still, it is an open question whether this tree-like constitution relationship helps to 
determine what constitutes the body, and I do not think that it does. First, the constitution 
relationship between the person and the collection of particles is yet to be determined.
But if the collection of particles is put in the position of the stone, and the person and the 
body in the other two positions, then, although the constitution of the body is clear, the 
resultant relational schema does not ht the tree method, as there are constitutional 
relations between the body and the person. Second, if the body is put in the position of
This example is borrowed 6om Doepke [86]: 386-387. Actually, one might 
claim that the statue does constitute the landmark, since the statue has an iridescent quality 
which is accidental to it, but essential to the landmark. Or, conversely, that the landmark 
constitutes the statue, since it has a certain shape which is accidental to it, but essential to 
the statue. But the careful reader will note that this supposed constitution relationship is 
symmetrical, so it carmot ût the constitution relationship that Doepke is championing.
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the stone, and the person and the collection of parüdes in the other two positions, it 
remains unclear what constitutes the body. So we must look Anther.
Doepke allows Aar the possibility of an inverted tree of constitution as well.^ In 
this case, two otgects constitute anotha^ ol^ecL But the inverted tree will only work if 
one of the two constituting objects is itself constituted by the other constituting object. If 
this were not the case, then one would have two objects, both of which possess accidental 
qualities that account Aar the perishing and persisting of an object. One could then 
imagine the loss of one of the two objects, therday resulting in the perishing of the 
constituted object, while the remaining constituting object accounts Aar the persisting of 
the constituted object. As long as one of the constituting objects constitutes the otha, 
hpweva, no such incohaence arises.^
Doepke oSas, as an eacample, a ship composed of wood planks. Both the 
collection of wood planks and the collection of wood cells constitute the ship. The ship 
would perish if eitha the collection of planks or the collection of cells lost its sh^e. 
Furtha, the collection of wood planks would perish if the collection of cells lost its shape 
such that the shape of the planks was no longa present. So, the collection of wood cells 
constitutes the collection of wood planks, and both constitute the ship, vdiich really
[86]: 390-391. 
^  [86]: 390.
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amounts to sa)ing that the constitution relationship is transitive between the collection of 
wood cells, the collection of wood planks, and the ship .^
The question remains whether a person, his or her body, and the collection of 
particles that completely-composes him or her will fit into this 6amework. Doepke would 
say, it seems, that there is no match between the example given and our interest in Gnding 
the constitution of the body, but I argue that there is/^ In so doing, I show that the 
reductivist can wriggle 6ee of Doepke's challenge, but only by embracing 
objects.
4. On What Constitutes the Body: The Reductivist Response 
I contend that the example of the ship is relevant to determining the constitution 
relations between a person, his or her body, and the collection of particles that completely- 
composes him or her. First, however, I must argue that the collection of particles, in a 
particular array, is what constitutes the body.
What do we mean by 'the body'? One might claim that the body is simply a 
collection ofbody parts. This seems intuitive enough. What more is a body than the 
collection of vascular parts, epidermal parts, gastro-intestinal parts (e.g., intestines, 
stomach), nerve parts (e.g., central nervous system, peripheral nervous system), etc.?^
^  [86]: 391. For my part, I fail to see what the inverted tree adds to the view that 
is not already present in light of the transitivity of constitution. Still, since the inverted 
tree is Doepke's view, and I am arguing that there is a success&d reductivist response to 
Doepke's challenge, I make use of the inverted tree structure in what follows.
3S [82]: 23.
do not intend to be claiming anything overly controversial here. How the body 
parts are parsed out is not all that important, so long as they are parsed out. Nor do I
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There seems to be nothing over and above the various body parts that the '%ody" is, so 
the body »  the collection ofbody parts. Doepke should not chafT at this supposition, 
since it is by the sharing of all their parts that the Ship of Theseus and the collection of 
wood planks that make up the ship are said to be sim ilar.O ne would think the same 
would hold for the body and the collection ofbody parts.
However, if it is allowed that the body is the collection ofbody parts which make 
it up, it is equally clear that the body is constituted by the collection of particles that 
completely-compose it. Take the heart as an example. Doepke has already said that the 
heart results because of a sub-collection of particles, within the collection of partides that 
make up the entire body, which is accidentally related in such a way that is essential for the 
heart to be present there and then.^' That is, within the collection of particles that make 
up the body, there is a sub-collection related in such a way (we could just as easily say 
'patterned in such a way' or 'structured in such a way') that constitutes, provides both 
persistence and perishability criteria for, the heart. Now, if the heart is constituted by a 
sub-collection of particles in this way, it follows that the body is constituted by the 
collection of particles that make it up, since all of the body parts will be constituted in the
think that Doepke would have any particular problem with my claim. 
^  [82]: 16. Here 'is' is intended as the 'is' of co/zftzAr/zon.
[82]: 16.
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same manner that the heart is constituted, and the body just is the collection of all the body 
parts/^
Givai that the constitution relation is transitive, the foregoing seems to be just 
what is going on in the ship example alluded to earlier. The collection of wood cells 
constitutes the collection of wood planks. Both the collection of wood cells and the 
collection of wood planks, in turn, constitute the ship. But, and here is the important 
point, the collection of wood planks joins in the constitution of the ship only by virtue of 
certain elements of its own constitution. That is, one need not talk about the collection of 
wood planks at all, in order to account for the constitution of the ship. One merely has to 
talk about the relations within sub-collections of the wood cells, which accounts for the 
collection of wood planks, and then talk about the relations between the various sub­
collections, Wiich accounts for the ship itsdf.
The same is true for people. One can account for the persistence and perishability 
of a person given certain neural structures. In addition, one can account Ar the 
persistence and perishability of the neural structures given certain accidental relations of 
particles within the collection of particles that completely-composes the body. So, one 
can ultimately account &r the persistence and perishability of a person in reference to 
certain patterns of particles within the collection of particles that completely-composes
% ow  the 'is' is read here is unimportant in one sense. If we take the 'is' to be the 
»  of identity, there is no problem with our move 6om "constitution ofbody parts" to 
"constitution ofbody", since identity is a transitive relation. The same is true if 'is' refers 
to the Ü of constitution, since coMstimrzon is transitive as well. Of course, ultimately the 
reducti\dst is arguing for an 'is' of identity while Doepke and myself are arguing for an 'is' 
of constitution.
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that person, which is just to say that the collection of particles, in a certain array, 
constitutes that parson. But if a person's persistence criteria ultimately derives 6om the 
collection of particles in a particular array, there is no need to postulate a separate 
substance, namely, that person, to persist as the substratum of the memory event E. The 
collection of particles in a particular array can serve in the necessary role.
Of course, this is consistent with the view that there are (at least) two objects 
present: the object which is essentially related to its membership and the object which is 
essentially related to its structure or form. The latter is the "person", while the former just 
is the collection of particles.^ Indeed, there are still two objects present, objects which 
difkr with respect to their modal properties, so while the reductivist is able to meet 
Doepke's diallenge, he or she ultimately fails to eliminate all constituted objects. Thus, 
there is, on my view, nothing wrong with Doepke's conclusion. My problem with Doepke 
is how he arrives at this conclusion.
First, the reductivist can meet Doepke's challenge in such a way that is consistent 
with Doepke's view, though, admittedly, the response does not ultimately succeed to deny 
all cowriA/fgff objects. Second, Doepke's argument against the reductivist teases out an 
inconsistency in his own view regarding the symmetry or asymmetry of the co/MAA/tzoM 
relation. He seems to want it both ways. In his argument against the reductivist he needs 
the relation to be symmetrical, but in his explanation of the formal properties of the 
relation he denies, and indeed argues against, symmetry. A temporally relative notion of 
symmetry may be open to Doepke, but such a move appears /wc at best. We are left to
^  The latter is the person, but not in the sense that Doepke intends.
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wonder Wiat it is about coMatzAftio/; that demes symmetry at a temporal moment but 
afBrms symmetry across dme. Doepke gives no answer, and his account of co/wYzAzAo/z is 
confusing and incomplete in light of this.
Thus, Fred Doepke's account of the constitution relation is found wanting. We 
turn now to an alternative account that is oSered by Judith Jarvis Thomson. While her 
view is less vague, we will Snd that it has problems of its own.
HL Judith Jarvis Thomson: Mereoiogy and Constitution
1. Thomson's Mereological View
Judith Jarvis Thomson develops her version of constitution using two primary 
examples: a Tinkertoy house and the wood that makes it up and the ever ubiquitous statue 
and portion of clay. She lays out the Tinkertoy house example in an early article on the 
subject.*  ^ Consider a pile of Tinkertoys which are used to construct a house at some time, 
t. Call the house. House. House is placed on a shelf at time tl, and it seems clear that at 
tl House is identical with the Tinkertoy house on the shelf at t l . Now suppose we were 
to name the collection of wood*  ^that is on the shelf at t l . Wood. On the 6ce of it.
[83]
^  Thomson calls this a fusion rather than a collection initially. In so doing, she 
develops another important element of her account, the fusion piindple: there exists some 
X such that if x is a set of S, then there exists a unique y such that y is the hision of S. The 
fusion principle aids in developing the problem of constitution, but, as she notes ([83]:
§2), while it is dear that if something like the fusion piindple is true, the problem of 
material constitution is generated-given her Tinkertoy House example-with the exchange 
of one of the logs, even if the fusion principle is not true, it turns out that so long as the 
phrase ^ e  wood" has a reference, then the problem of material constitution is still 
motivated by her Tinkertoy house example. I will address Thomson's hision principle in 
more detail later. Here I am satished to address her weaker thesis.
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Thomson contends. House is also identical with Wood at tl. But now we have a problem. 
If one of the Tinkertoy pieces is removed^ 6om the House, say, an unimportant piece 
near the roo^ and thrown on the floor at t2, then one would think that House is still on the 
shelf at t2 but Wood is not, because Wood is also partially on the Boor at t2. But such 
cannot be if House and Wood are identical. Thus, this concern raises the problem of 
material constitution, according to Thomson, and motivates ho" account of that relation.
After fleshing out her example, Thomson provides a brief account of her 
dehnitions of constitution and identity, both of which I End problematic. Thomson dehnes 
constitution as follows: "x constitutes y a tt =df. x is a part of y at t and y is a part of x at 
t» 44 maintains that what this amounts to with regard to her example is that House 
constitutes Wood at t l  and Wood constitutes House at tl, which is a consequence she 
embraces. However, a further consequence of her deSnition of constitution as stated here 
is that the Tinkertoys do not constitute House or Wood at tl, 6)r the house, very clearly, 
is not a part of the Tinkertoys at tl  any more than, say, the heart is a part of the collection 
of cells of any given person at any given time, or a plank is a part of the collection of 
wood cells of a given ship at any particular time. Since she requires parthood to go both 
ways for constitution to work, this edition of her view is not able to account for paradigm 
cases of constitution, including, it would seem, her own example case: wiiere House 
constitutes Wood and vice versa. Moreover, the primary constituting agent, in terms of
Alternatively, it could be replaced by another piece and still generate the
problem.
""[83]: B i l l .
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order, as she sees it, is the collection of Tinkertoys, but the Tinkertoys cannot constitute 
either House or Wood because neither House nor Wood are a part of the Tinkertoys. 
Thomson addresses this problem in a subsequent essay.
Thomson dehnes identity as follows: 'be is identical to y ifT for all t  if xE@t or 
yE@t, then x is a part of y a tt and y is a part of x at t".*^  The problem with this identity 
axiom, Wiich comes straight out of her cross temporal calculus of individuals, is that it is 
too loose. For example, it allows for Gibbard-type cases to be cases of identity; it 
conflates t^ a t  Gibbard calls contingent identity with identity something that
not even Gibbard allows.^ Admittedly, Thomson tepidly oSers an alternative modal 
account of identity whidi addresses this concern.*  ^ She dealA with the Gibbard case 
relative to her Tinkertoys and recognizes that she may need to give up the cross temporal 
calculus of individuals in favor of a modal cross temporal calculus of individuals. In the 
modal version, the right half of the identity axiom is taken to be necessary die dfcto.
One wonders, however, why Thomson needs this mereological identity axiom in 
addition to, or instead o^ the more standard Principle of the Indiscemibility of Identicals, 
or what has become known as Leibniz Law.^ Her temporally and modally qualihed
[83]: 38. Read "xE@f as "x exists at time t". An example is Lumpl and 
Goliath, as I note shortly.
^  Cf. Gibbard [75]. Cf Johnston [92] who also argues for the inadequacy of the 
mereological axiom of identity to account for identity
""[83]: 42.
Throughout the dissertation I use 'Leibniz Law' to refer to the indiscemibility of 
identicals-(x)(y)((x = y) (F)(Fx " Fy))-unless otherwise noted.
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version of the Calculus of Individuals identity axiom may amount to the same thing as 
Leibniz Law, but Thomson has not said as much and has not given an accounting of the 
relationship between the two principles/^ I side with Mark Johnston and others in 
suggesting that the second order characterization of identity, or Leibniz Law, has achieved 
a canonical position in philosophy due in part to its pre-theoretic, intuitive force, its 
perseverance, both in terms of de&nsibility and use&lness, throughout the history of 
modem philosophy and the contemporary period, and hnally, as Johnston suggests, by the 
mere &ct of its wide standing support, understanding, and uncontroversial position as a 
logical principle. At the very least, then, if we are to give up that second order principle of 
identity in favor of some other principle, including the mereological principle of identity no 
matter how qualihed, we need first to understand what the mereological principle is 
saying, especially in relation to the sharing of properties among "identical" objects, and 
second why it is to be preferred over against the established principle 6om second order 
logic. ^  In any case, I will continue to use Leibniz Law as a viable identity thesis as I have 
throughout this dissertation.
One wonders whether or not Thomson is making certain assumptions concerning 
the relationship between the parts of an object and its properties, and/or the relevance of 
certain types of properties, e.g., extrinsic or relational properties, to questions concerning 
identity.
^ Neither of these, Johnston suggests, is forthcoming, though he was then 
unaware of Thomson's recent paper. Seeing none h"om the tent of mereology, regarding 
motivating a metaphysic as opposed to merely creating one, Johnston thinks that 
mereology is no better ofTthan Mariology ([92]: 52).
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Thomson provides a more extended treatment of her version of constitution in a 
subsequent essay. Since this represents her mature account, and in light of the deûciencies 
in her earlier account, it is to this treatment that I now turn.
2. Thomson's Mereological \^ew: The Sequel
In "The Statue and the Clay",^  ^Thomson sets up the problem of constitution using 
the standard example of a portion of clay, which she names Clay, and a statue, which she 
names Al&ed. Clay is in existence already at 9am but Al&ed does not come into existence 
until a later time, say, 2pm. Thomson then addresses the question of whether or not Clay 
and Al&ed are identical by laying out some of the commonsense notions surrounding the 
evolution of A16ed 6om Clay. In particular, she canvasses some of the reasons why 
Al&ed and Clay are taken to be nonidentical, including that Alhred and Clay exist at 
diSerent times. She also considers why it is that we cannot 6irly claim that Clay simply 
becomes Alfred, just like we might think that Clay becomes a mound of clay, or a 
scattered portion of clay as opposed to a nonscattered portion of clay and the like, by 
virtue of changes in shape and spatial proximity.^^
Thomson then ofkrs what is called the replacement argument, which is essentially 
her argument concerning the Tinkertoy house and the replacement of the piece of wood 
that generates the nonidentity of House and Wood in her earlier paper, but here changed 
to match her new example. Instead of a Tinkertoy piece being removed or replaced in 
House and then tossed on the floor, a part of Clay-the part itself being a portion of clay-is
[98]
^  [98]: 150.
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removed or replaced and then thrown on the floor. As with the earlier example, Al&ed is 
yet on the shdf afta^ this is done, but Clay now fails to be on the shelf) being also partially 
on the floor.
Thomson does not provide a clear argument in favor of the thesis that artefacts can 
survive (at least) partial part replacement. Instead, she notes that while it does seem Airly 
straightforward that arteActs, and p a h ^ s  other objects, can undergo replacement of 
parts, how big a part replacement an arteAct can undergo and still survive is dd)atable.^^ 
Ultimately, how large a part replacement at a given time an artefact can survive or 
whether or not an artefact can survive complete replacement over time are issues which 
have led some to ultimately decide that either arteActs cannot undergo any part 
replacanent whatsoever or that there are no arteActs at alL^ Thomson will offer no 
argument against either view^  ^but will simply assume that arteActs can undergo some part 
replacement and will leave how great such replacement can be to someone else. She does, 
however, assume that in her example AIAed exists at a particular location Wiile 
undergoing a part replacement o^ say, a hand, but that CAy no longer exists at that 
particular location-on the sheli  ^table, whatever-because a new piece has been added to 
AlAed that was not a part of CAy-the original portion-and the part that was subtracted 
Aom AlAed, a hand, is now on the door. And so CAy, the original portion, is now both
^ Of course, this is the SAp of Theseus problem.
^  CAsholm [76], Van Inwagen [90b], and Unger [79].
Though she does say that such "responses strike me as weird" (153).
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on the shelf and on the floor while Al&ed is only on the shelf The relationship between 
A16ed and Clay, then, is not identity; rather, it is one of constitution.
Be&re oGering her revised account of the constitution relation, Thomson 
addresses three issues that are relevant to her view. First, she addresses the parthood 
relation and takes it to be a three-place relation between a part and a whole at a time: Le.,
X is a part of y at t.^ Second, she does not limit parthood to proper parthood. When she 
uses 'part' it could include the thing itself so that the following thesis is true: if x exists at 
a particular time, then xis a part o fxat that time.^  ^ Moreover, parthood entails existence, 
so some object x can be a part of some object y at a particular time only if x and y exist at 
that time. She notes some consequences of this. Nonexistent objects do not have parts, 
so we cannot say that a unicorn has a horn part because unicorns do not exist. Similady, 
objects that have existed but no longer exist, or that do not yet exist but will, do not have 
parts. Thus we cannot say that Caesar has a nose as a part since he no longer exists and 
my future child does not have limb parts because it does not yet exist. Third, she restricts 
her notion of the parthood relation to the material realm: "x is a part of y at t iff the space 
occupied by x a tt  is part of the space occupied by y at t", though she does not deny that if 
there is an immaterial realm it too may (at least partially) consist of parts.^*
^ [98]: 154.
[98]: 154.
'  [98]: 155.
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Thomson is now in a position to oSer an initial deGnition of constitution: "x 
constitutes y at t only if x and y occupy the same space at t".^ In other words, only if x 
and y are co-located. While this condition is necessary, it is not sufhdent. So she provides 
the following, which gives both necessary and sufGdent conditions &>r constitution and 
thus a complete deGnition for constituGon.^
X c o n s t itu te s  y  a t t  = d f.
1) X is a part of y a tt  and y is a part of x att, and
2) there exists some z such that z is a part of x a tt  and 
necessarily for all T if x exists at T, then z is a part ofx at T 
and for all z' if z' is a part of z at t, then possibly there 
exists some T such that y exists at T and it is not the case 
that z' is a part of y at T, and
3) it is not the case that there exists some z such that z is a part of y 
at t and necessarily for all T if y exists at T, then z is a part of y at T 
and for all z', if z' is a part of z at t, then possibly there exists some
[98]: 155. Note that her understanding of constitution has changed in such a 
way that the counterexamples mentioned earlier re: the constituGon relaGon between the 
Tinkertoy house and the wood no longer count against her view. Cf SecGon IV, 
subsecGon 1.
^  This deGniGon of consGtuGon takes into account what Thomson claims is a 
diSerence that Clay and AlGed have with respect to their parts. In Rea fashion, she argues 
that they are diSerently related to their parts. Clay being a porGon is essentially related to 
its parts whereas AUred being an artefact is not, but is essentially related to its G)rm.
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T such that x exists at T and it is not the case that z' is a part of x at
T«i
The Srst condition amounts to saying that the objects in question must be parts of one 
another if they are to stand in the constitution relation with regard to one another. 
Moreover, assuming all parts are spatial, it entails co-location and so accounts far the 
initial necessary, though insufhcient, definition she of&rs. The second and third conditions 
concern the relationships that the respective objects have with regard to their parts. One 
is essenhally related to its parts-namely, x, which must have part z if it is to exist-Wiile 
the other is not essentially related to those parts-namely, y, which can exist even if z is not 
among its parts. Thus, it is possible that y exist without x, according to the second 
condition. According to the third condition, the reverse is not true. That is, there is no 
part of y that is essential to it that is not also essential to x. According to the second and 
third conchtions, then, there may or may not be parts of y that are essential to it, but if x 
constitutes y, then there will be no parts that are essential to y that are not also essential to 
X (condition 3), though there will be parts that are essential to x that are not also essential
^ [98]: 157. In the body of the text I have provided the logicese equivalent of 
Thomson's dehnition. In logical syntax it reads:
X constitutes y a tt  =df
1) x<y@t & y<x@t &
2) (3z)(z<x(^ & 0(VT)(xE@T z<x@T) & (Vz')(z'<z@t 
-  0(3TXyE@T & -(z'<y@T))) &
3) X(3z)(z<y@t & 0(VTXyE@T z<y@T) &
(V z')(z'<z# -  0(3T)(xE@T & -(z'<x@T))))
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to y (condition 2). Finally, these critena entail that Thomson's version of constitution is 
both transitive and asymmetric.^
In our example, Clay can be said to constitute Al&ed because: 1) they are parts of 
one another, 2) there are parts of Clay that are essential to it, say, the hand part of A16ed, 
that are not also essential to Al&ed, and 3) there are no parts of Al&ed that are either 
essential to it, or whidi are essential to it and not also essential to Clay-4ndeed, any part of 
Alfied is essential to Clay when Clay constitutes Al&ed at t. On Thomson's view then, as 
with Rea, the ontological di&erence between Clay and Al&ed is that they are di&erently 
related to their parts. Al&ed can survive a loss of parts while Clay cannot.^
&  FWoTty
Coupled with, and important to, Thomson's understanding of constitution is her 
view regarding what she calls âtsions. Indeed, constituting objects, in our example. Clay, 
are in every case fusions of some variety or other, generally what she calls all-fusions. 
Further, Thomson's picture of constitution entails a multi-level ontology; an ontology she 
motivates using the fusion relation. Thus, prior to offering a fiill account of Thomson's 
take on material constitution, one must &esh out her account of fusion relations.^
^  [98]: 157.
^  At least not its macro parts, though, as we will later &nd. Clay can survive a loss 
of its micro parts.
^  Indeed, Thomson herself deals hrst with the notion of all-&isions before &eshing 
out the fusion relation, and adding what amounts to an in&nite number of&ision types, 
aAer providing a preliminary sketch of her picture of constitution but before giving her 
fuU-&edged view complete with a tri-level ontology.
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On Thomson's view, some x all-fuses S, where S is the name given for some 
nonempty set of material objects, so long as two conditions are met. The Grst condition 
gives the existence criteria for x: necessarily x exists at a time t ifF there exists a y such that 
y is a member of S and for all y if y is a member of S, then y exists at t. In other words, so 
long as all of the members of S exist at the same time, x, the all-fusion of the set, exists at 
that time as well. For example, the set wiiose manbership consists of my key chain and 
6ve distinct keys exists at t, so the unique all-fusion of that set exists att, as well. The 
second condition is also necessary and provides the part relationship of the fusing
entity with the set that the entity Arses: y is a part of x ifFboth x and y exist and ultimately 
all parts of y are also parts of x.^ For example, one might think of the set consisting of 
Mister Potato Head and the all-fusion of this set. Mister Potato Head has many parts, but 
these parts are also parts of the unique all-fusion. The upshot of these two conditions is 
that when x exists as the all-fusion of S, then every member of S must also exist and every 
member of S must also be a part of x and so must all of the parts of S's members be a part 
of X . Whenever both of these conditions obtain for any set S, there is a unique x that is 
the all-fusion of S.
On Thomson's view, all-fusion is a ubiquitous relation. For example, there is an 
all-fusion of every portion of clay. To put it another way, every portion of clay has an all- 
Aision of the set of its members, which are themselves, undoubtedly, portions of clay. So, 
recall Clay when a part of Clay is on the floor and a part of Clay is on the shelf. The
^ [98]: 158. Note that here parthood is asymmetrical, so it does not lead to 
counterexamples of the type mentioned earlier with regard to her initial definition of 
constitution.
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portion of clay that is the all-hrsion is the portion that has as its parts both the portion of 
clay on the floor and the portion of clay on the shelf And this portion, this all-fusion, is 
another entity and has its own existence. In other words, far every set of material objects, 
S, 6)r which there is a time at which all of S's members exist, there is an x that all-hises S 
at that time. There are no further constraints. Thus, the all-hision of the set of portions of 
clay that makes up Clay exists, but so too does the set whose membership is the chair on 
which I am now sitting, my cat named Berkeley who is currently lounging in a patch of 
sunlight, and the Kansas City Chiefs nerf football on my bookshelf. Since all of the 
members of this set exist at the current time, 2:15pm, there is an x such that x all-fiises 
that set and x exists. While Thomson admits that such entities-the all-fusion of the set I 
have just described and of any set whatever whose members exist at the same time-is a 
queer entity, she 6ils to see why such entities could not, indeed, do not, exist.^
All-fusions play a part in Thomson's account of constitution, so we will return to 
them a bit later both to further flesh out the ramifications of the relation for her view and 
for critical evaluation. Prior to doing so, however, it is important to note that all-fusions
^  [98]: 161. Indeed, she notes clear existence and parthood criteria that crosses all 
possible worlds. And while it is clear 6om the deGnition that not all sets wül have an all­
fusion, since a given set's membership may never all exist at the same time, it is also clear 
that, as Thomson points out, any nonempty set could possibly exist at the same time and 
so for all nonempty sets an all-fusion possibly exists which amounts to saying that there is 
a world in which that all-Arsion, the all-Grsion which results 6om that set's members 
existing at the same time, exists. And she sees "no metaphysical impossibility in the 
supposition that it does. Altanatively put: there is a possible world in which it does" 
(161). Moreover, Thomson notes that there is no empirically veriGable contingent matter 
of fact that would, if discovered, clearly indicate that some S caimot but 6il to have its 
members existing all at the same time. In which case, since there is no empirically 
veriGable reason accessible to scientiGc investigation, to suppose that S has no all-fusion, 
Thomson sees no reason to suppose that it does not.
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are not a unique kind of entity. In point of Act, all-fusions are joined in Thomson's 
ontology by a great variety of fusion entities. Take, 6 r  example, some-Asions. Some- 
Asions are Ae Asion entities that result 6om sets which have at least one member, Aough 
Aere could be many more members, that exists at some time. Since not all members of a 
given set must exist at the same time Ar some-Asions, every some-Asion resulting &om a 
multi-membered set exists whenever one or more of Ae members of that set exist. 
Moreover, Aere is a some-Asion Ar every set with at least one existing member. Adeed, 
every set with only one member will have boA an all-Asion and a some-Asion. Thus, Ar 
any given single-membered set Aere is Ae set with the one member, Ae member itself Ae 
all-Asion of the set, and Ae some-Asion of Ae set. A  other words, Ar such a set Aere 
exists the member, K, the set of K,^ call it S, the all-fusion of S, call it AUK, and the some 
Asion of S, caU it SomeK.^
Far Aom being distuAed by this bloating of ontology-at Ast blush, a needless 
bloating of ontology-Thomson contmues. "Why not three-Asion?"^ she asks. Three- 
Asions result Aom sets that have three members existing at the same time. Four-fusions,
67 If sets can be said to exist.
^  [98]: 166-167. It should be noted that m some cases Thomson thinks that one 
or more of Ae various Asion entities are identical with oAer Asion entities or Ae 
members of Ae sets themselves. For example, with some-Asion Thomson notes that Ae 
some-Aision which results Aom any set wiA one member is identical with that set's 
memba .^ But I Ail to see how this can be so Ar, at Ae very least, the member, call it K, 
fails to have Ae property of being a some-Aision while the some-Asion, caU it SomeK, has 
that property. I wiU say more about boA Thomson's view and my critique of her view on 
this issue later.
® [98]: 167.
79
then, result &om the sets that have four members, and so on. For any set with n-members 
existing at some time, tha-e exists the n-fusion of that set. Existing numbered membership 
is not the only qualiGcation that Thomson envisions for further hision caseÿ. She opens 
wide the door to her ontology by afBrming the existence of such hisions as some-red- 
fusions, which are hisions of sets that have some members that are red at a particular time, 
though not all need be (at any particular time or ever) so any one red member will do.
And then there is the following illuminating fusion: two-three-bears-fiision. This is the 
hision of the set that has the following members: two member that exist at the same time, 
t l, and three members that by tl  have been eaten by bears.™ In other words, any 
conceivable means of relating objects, no matter how contrived, is su&cient to create a 
new fusion relation and a host of fusion entities. While the existence of such entities is 
admittedly counterintuitive, Thomson thinks that there is "no good reason" to think that 
such entities do not exist, so she embraces their existence.^^
While she realizes that there is a clear bloating of ontology as a result of her view, 
Thomson argues that the "ontological attic" is not as cluttered as it might Erst appear. For 
example, there are identities among some of the hisions.™ Take a set which has three 
members that all exist at some time t. In such a case, the set has both a three-hision and 
an all-fusion, and Thomson thinks that the all-fusion is identical with the three-hrsion. 
Indeed, this does look plausible, at Srst blush. The fusion which results 6om the set
™ [98]: 167.
[98]: 167.
™ [98]: 167.
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ThreeS is an all-Aision and at the same time a three-fusion, and so I suppose that it is 
conceivable that this Aision has the property of being an all-fusion and the property of 
being a three-fusion, though there is the possible diSerence in essential properties and/or 
persistence conditions that I will shortly address. So the all-hision and the three-hision 
share all of their properties, on Thomson's view, and are identical. This holds also &r 
other hrsion types like some-red-fusion if one of the members of the set ThreeS is red.
Thomson also notes that there are part relations among the fusions. For example, 
there is a part relation between fusions whenever there is an all-fusion because it will have 
a some-Aision as a part. And there are cases where all-fiisions and some-fiisions are parts 
of one another.^ And, Anally, there are times when fusions constitute other fusions. In 
6ct, all-Aisions can constitute some-Aisions just when all the members of a given set exist. 
Here again we read Thomson's justiAcation, in part, for her view. She wants to accept all 
of these fusion entities. She likens reality to an overcrowded attic. Some of the items are 
admittedly junk, but "there is no need to deny the junk; we can simply leave it to gather 
dust".^* While Thomson may be right that there is no reason to deny the junk, I have yet 
to see any reason to afhrm the junk, and it is just this sort of justiAcation that is owed 
here.
C. fWo/M Eva/na/gff
Judith Thomson has suggested commitment to a mereological relaAonship she calls 
all-fusion in an eAbrt to provide a viable account of another relation: namely, material
^  [98]: 167. 
[98]: 167.
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constitution. AU-Aision is not the only fusion relationship Thomson embraces, but it is the 
one of primary concern here. While it may have some use in Thomson's account of 
constitution, I think that there are several reasons to question commitment to a relation 
that entails the existence of such ontologically onerous entities.
First, it seems fair to ask whether or not Thomson's daims of identity, part, and 
constitution relations among the fusions signihcantly reduce the numbers of fusion entities. 
We must give serious pause before accepting her suggestion that many fusion cases are 
identical. Indeed, I doubt that there are many identities among the fusions at all. Take, 
for example, her paradigm case of the set ThreeS. It has an all-fusion, on her view, 
because all of the members exist at some time t, and it has a three-fusion as well since it 
has but three members. Thomson claims that these fusions are identical, so that, as &r as 
we have gone in the fusion litany for ThreeS, there is but one hision that exists related to 
this set. But we should not jump on Thomson's bandwagon too quickly. For it turns out 
that this set also has a some-hision that exists just when one of the members of the set 
exists. And, we might suppose, it also has a some-red-fusion because one of the members 
of the set is red.
Regarding the some-fusion, if each of the members exist when and only Wien the 
other members exist, it looks like the some-fusion is also identical with the all-fusion and 
the three-fusion on her view and we still have but one fusion enhty associated with the set 
ThreeS. But, it turns out that if just one of the members of the set exists for any period of 
time when the other two, or even just one other, fails to exist, call this time t*, the some- 
fusion and the all-fusion cannot possibly be identical. This is because the existence criteria
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6 )r some-Aisions is 6 r more loose than for all-fusions. Some-fusiona exist just when any 
member of the relevant set exists, but all-fiisions only exist whei all of the members of the 
relevant set exists at the same time. Thus, in my example, the some-hision would clearly 
exist at t* while the all-fuâon would just as clearly 6 il to exist at t*. But, then, either the 
all-hision and the some-hision fail to be identical or it must be the case that the all-fiision 
both exists at t* and 6 ils to exist at t*. The latter is obviously in^ossible, so the two are 
not identical. It follows that in such a case there will be at least two fusion entities related 
to the set. Moreover, the same holds for the three-hision related to the set. The existence 
criteria of three-fusions are loose like those of all-fusions. Thus, in cases vdiere the three 
members of ThreeS fail to exist at all and only the same times, there will be at least fAree 
fusions: the all-fusion, the some-fusion, and the three-fusion.
It is apparent, then, that even if Thomson's identity claim holds, it holds for few 
cases and so does not noticeably reduce the number of fusion cases mandated by her view. 
But even this slight reduction is in question, for it must be asked whether all-hisions will in 
every case have the property of fusing a particular kind of set. In other words, is it the 
case that an all-fusion has the essential property of fusing all members of a set at a 
particular time? This is a property that some-fusions fail to have, since only one member 
of any given set need exist in order for a some-fusion of that set to exist. Three-fusions 
operate diSerently. I suppose that they too would have something like the essential 
property of hising all members of a set at a particular time. However, a three-fusion also 
has the property of necessarily Rising a set with three members which an all-fiision 6 ils to 
have. In other words, even in Thomson's idealized case, the all-fiision and the three-
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fusion fail to share all of their properties-4he three-fusion has the essaitial property of 
fusing three-membered sets while the all-fiision Ails to have that essential property-and so 
cannot be identical. Regardless, then, of what turns out to be the case with regard to part 
sharing and co-constituting, it is clear that Thomson's ef&rts to tidy what she calls a 
cluttered attic have Ailed. It is now time to look and see just how cluttered her attic has 
become.
As Thomson rightly notes, if we anbrace all-Asions, we are then shackled with the 
existence of some very odd objects. Indeed, according to her own example^ ,^ the chair in 
which I am now sitting and the Aont leA leg of that chair is one set, and the chair in which 
I am now sitting and the Aont right leg of that chair is another set. Further, the chair in 
which I am now sitting is the sole member of the set whose membership is itself Now, on 
Thomson's view, there is an all-fusion of the Arst set, there is also an all-Asion of the 
second set which caimot be identical with the all-Asion of the &st set-Ae all-Asion's 
cannot be identical since the sets Aey Ase are not identical, i.e., they have diAerent 
members-and Ae same is true wiA Ae third set; it is Ased by an all-Asion which is not 
identical wiA either of Ae other two. So Aere are three fusion entiAes^  ^in adAAon A Ae 
chair m which I am now sitting. Presumably all of Aese enAAes are spaAaUy co-located.
If the all-Asions are also chairs, then, since my chair is obviously a chair, Aere are (at
75 [98]: 160-161 and A 9.
Lest we think we have AniAed counting the all-fusions related to my chair I 
must quickly note that Aere is a large number of sets, perhaps an inAnite number, 
associated wiA my chair, and Thomson is committed to Ae existence of an all-Asion 
relating to each one of Aem.
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least) four chairs in the space occupied by my chair. This strikes many, including the 
m^ority of proponents of the constitution rdation, as counterintuitive in the extreme. 
Hence, it would serve as a reductio of her view.
Thomson might respond that the all-fiision of the set whose sole member is my 
chair and my chair itself are identical. Such is apparently her driving assumption vdien she 
says regarding a diGerent issue: "since the all-hision of a set with only one member is that 
one member, we can reput our question as follows: can an arti&ct constitute an 
artifact?".^ This is a troubling sentence, for it looks like Thomson claims here that the all­
fusion of S, where S is the set whose sole member is some artifact, call the artifact K, is 
identical with K. But this result is counterintuitive, because surely the relevant all-fiision, 
AllSk, has a property that K does not possess-namely, the property of being an all­
fusion-such that AllSk must be a different object than K. The relation, then, cannot be 
one of identity, but must be some other relation. It might be that Thomson is here using 
the is of constitution rather than the is of identity. But presuming that AllSk is an artifact 
and Thomson intends the constitution relation here, then the question she purports to 
address-can an artifact constitute an arti6 ct-is self-evident, and she does not think that 
the answer to this question is self-evident.^*
If arti&cts cannot constitute arti&cts, then it is either false that AllSk is an artifact 
or it is 61se that K constitutes AllSk, but then we still need an account of the relationship 
between the two. The only other obvious option is the fusion relation, but if this is
^  [98]: 164. 
^  [98]: 164.
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Thomson's intended usage, then ah that is happening here is that she is giving us yet 
another way to understand 'is': the is of identity, the is of constitution, and the is of all- 
fiision. But such an interpretation does not make sense of the aforementioned sentence, 
and the most obvious interpretation is that she is claiming that AllSk and K are identical. 
While I have doubts concerning this move, as mentioned above, even if we take my chair 
out of the equation-or, altanativdy, the all-fiision that if my chair, on her view-^here are 
still three chairs present vdiere I am sitting-the three all-fusions that cannot possibly be 
identical-so we still have a problem.^
Thomson recognizes the counterintuitive nature of this result and of&rs some 
possible ways out of the dilemma. One way out is to deny that the all-flisions associated 
with the sets whose members are my chair and its right leg or my chair and its left leg are 
chairs. On this understanding, the only chair in the room is my chair, and, because 
identical, the all-fiision associated with the set whose sole member is my chair. 
Alternatively, Thomson suggests a change in how objects are counted. For example, one 
might just as well count by sets rather than things. If by sets, one might count "the 
number of sets, each of which has as its members all the things in the room at t that are 
chairs at t and that are parts of each other at t."*° On Thomson's view, the three all-
^  In point of fact, there are more than three chairs where my chair now rests, 
considerably more. For, on Thomson's view, there is an all-fusion for any set, S, whose 
membership exists at the relevant time, and, given her liberal interpretation of wiiat can 
count as members of sets, it appears clear that there is an inhnite-or something very close 
to an infnite-number of sets related to my chair, so all-fiisions, so chairs.
[98]: 168.
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fusions are all parts of one anotha:. Thus, though there are three all-fusions at t, and so 
three tHngs at t, there is but one chair rAere at t.
So, even she remains committed to a Air number of entities that have separate 
existence and are fairly odd things indeed: namely, each of the three all-fiisions.
Moreover, this problem is not restricted to my chair and the various sets that one can 
dream up that are related to it, i.e., that have it as one member. The set whose members 
are the quarter in my pocket and the quarter in your pocket also has an all-fiision.
Further, if all-hisions can be members of sets, then Thomson is committed to the existence 
of all-fusions of all-fusions, or what we might call second-order all-fiisions. I fail to see 
why fusion entities cannot be members of sets, on Thomson's view, and in fact she 
appears to embrace such second-order entities'^, though their hihction and general roijo» 
ff 'étre is unclear. Surely such a bloating of ontology requires some justiGcation, but none 
is forthcoming. While Thomson continues to be on the lookout for any good reason to 
reject the all-fiision relation-and her many other fusion relations-it looks as though (at 
least) one has been found. The consequences outlined here provide good reason to reject 
the entities in question, and so the relation(s) that breeds them.
Of course, Thomson might contend that this amounts to an incredulous stare. 
Incredulous stares were not enough to debunk David Lewis' possible worlds and I doubt 
such would sufGce for Thomson's fusions. As luck would have it, however, the oddness 
of the fusion entities is not the only reason why one ought to give pause prior to accepting 
them and the relations that give rise to them. There are other concerns. While Thomson
And if second-order entities, then also any n-order entities.
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has provided some mkrmation regarding the nature of all-fusions, she owes still more.
For example, it is unclear whether or not all-fusions are material objects, and if so, 
whether arte&cts or natural kinds. Further, it is unclear what we are to make of the 
following statement: "every thing is the all-fiision of at least one set, namely the set whose 
sole memb^ is itself'.^ On the one hand, this could mean that far all x, if x has existence, 
then it has an all-fiision. If so, what is the relationship between the all-hision and the thing 
itself? Surely appeal to a set whose membership is that thing does not create enough 
ontological space to warrant wior/zer object that is over and above that thing! On the 
other hand, Thomson might mean that for all x, if x is a thing, then x is also an all-fusion 
of the set whose sole member is itself.'* In this case, the set, S, would have as its sole 
member object x, but because S has a member that exists at t, it also has an all-fusion, y, 
such that y all-fuses S at t. But, then, y just is x, on this interpretation. The all-hision, y, 
is dependent far its existence on the non-empty set, S. S is dependent for its existence on 
X. However, xjust is the all-fiision, y. A puzzle remains, then, over the dependency 
relationship between x, y, and S, but also over what value, if any, is added to x when it 
becomes the all-Aision of the set whose sole member is itself.'^
[98]: 159.
Once again, whatever they are, all-fiisions are not sets, so that there is no help in 
that direcdon.
** As noted above, this does appear to be her view.
On a related note, since Thomson sees no metaphysical impossibility in the 
supposition that all nonempty sets have an all-fiision in some possible wodd, what does 
this mean for unicorns? Or Santa Claus? In other words, what, on her view, counts as a 
nonempty set? Is the set of all unicorns empty or nonempty? If nonempty, what makes it
8 8
Finally, Thomson raises the issue of science and sciaitihc investigation and notes 
that no manner of scientific investigation can 61si^ ha  ^view. While this is obviously true 
since her fusion view amounts to a metaphysical thesis that is justihed solely on a priori 
grounds, it is not clear how one should take the claim. Thomson thinks that what follows 
is that one has no good reason to reject her view.*  ^ While this is a clear attempt at 
justihcation for her view, it fundamentally begs the question: namely, what reason we have 
for aGBrming the view in the Grst place. In the Gnal analysis, when it comes to justihcation 
for the view, we are left wanting more. There is no explanatory power that all-fiisions 
provide and that makes our supposition regarding their existence warranted-indeed, 
explanatorily essential. Moreover, there are no causal properties that these new objects 
have such that we cannot explain everyday, ordinary phenomena without them. Instead, 
we leam that there is no amount of sdentihc investigation that can prove that hision 
entities fail to exist, but, while true, this no more warrants the existence of fusion entities 
than it does Cartesian souls. What is owed is a positive argument for the existence of such 
objects, and no such argument has been forthcoming. Thomson has provided a deGnition 
with clear existence and persistence criteria and a class of relations that entail the existence
nonempty? On some interpretations, the set of all unicorns is an empty set because there 
are no unicorns, in the actual world or any other possible world, and so there can be no 
extension to the set of all unicorns. Is this the same for Thomson or is she committed to 
an extension for all such sets of nonexistent-qua-actual-world objects? This ultimately 
boils down to a question regarding Thomson's view of the relationship between set 
membership and possible worlds. At the very least Thomson owes us clarihcation here 
lest an acceptance of her hision thesis commit us to a particular possible worlds 
metaphysic.
"=[98]: 161.
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of fusions if true, but saying it simply does not make it so. She cannot argue for the 
existence of such queer objects by mere dehnition alone.
D. f  Tn-ZeveZ OnZoZbgy
Thomson uses the all-fusion relation to diSerentiate between masses of atoms, clay 
portions-or portions of clay-and statues. With the all-hision relation, Thomson dehnes a 
mass of atoms as Allows: x is a mass of atoms =df for some set of atoms S, x all-fiises 
S .^ The mass of atoms is related to the collection of atoms in ways consistent with what 
has been said above, though there may be some worries regarding the nature of collections 
and/or aggregates, etc.. For our purposes it is enough that the all-fiision of a set of atoms 
just is the mass of atoms.
With the addition of masses of atoms, Thomson thinks she has provided a three- 
level ontology. In our example, there is the statue, Al&ed, the portion of clay. Clay, and 
the mass of (clay) atoms. Since the persistence criteria for masses of atoms is quite tight, 
we might name the mass something like, AllS,kmm,civ.2pn, which indicates that the named 
object is an all-fiision of the set of clay atoms in existence at 2pm. With statues she notes 
that continuily of shape is what matters for persistence. For the other two, Clay and
A11S„ ."I? '»!-" confûmify of matter determines persistence, but for Clay the relevant
matter is its macromaterial parts-Clay can survive micromaterial change-and for
"  For the existence of such all-fiisions she gives the following rationale: "Are 
there such things? I can see no good reason to think there are not" ([98]: 161), which is 
consistent with what she says regarding fusion entities in general.
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AUSwn—yj.y 'Yn, tliB Televaiit matter is its micromaterial parts, since any change in atomic 
membership entails loss of existence.'*
On Thomson's view, constitution is what relates the three entities. 
constitutes Clay at 2pm-altematively, AUS.^chy.« constitutes Clay at t-and Clay, in turn, 
constitutes Al&ed at 2pm. Because constitution is transitive, AllS^ om^ oiv.* constitutes 
Al&ed at t, but because constitution is asymmetrical, Al&ed does not constitute either 
AUSw»__ r«.y , or Clay at t. In our earlier example, supposing that time t is the time prior to 
the replacement of Al&ed's hand and t* is the time after the replacement of Al&ed's hand, 
all three entities-AllS,*^,^^,^^ Clay, and Al&ed-are on the shelf at t, but at t* only Al&ed is 
on the shelf. Clay still exists, though partly on the shelf and partly on the door, while 
AllS,*,m^ djy, has ceased to exist, though AllSw^  ^rky M, exists, again, partly on the shelf and 
partly on the door.
Thomson notes that intuitions may dider with respect to the persistence criteria of 
portions. In order to make the tri-level ontology work uniSirmly across portions, then, 
where intuitions go contrary as to whether or not a portion ofx can survive the loss of a 
single atom-it is obvious with clay that it can, but it may be less obvious with other mass- 
kinds, e.g., gold, water, etc.-she stipulates that any portion is such that it can persist 
through the loss of an atom so that micromaterial constitution is not relevant for portions. 
The same does not hold, of course, for masses, none of which can survive even the 
exchange of one atom. Due to this stipulation, Thomson Airther notes that some xis a
X: [98]: 162.
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portion only if it can instantiate shape-constrained temporary properties. Thus, portions 
are what immediatdy constitute ard&cts.
3. Thomson's View Assessed
Thomson's Tri-level ontology, made possible by her commitment to the fusion 
relation, coupled vnth her version of the constitution relation allows her to answer puzzles 
raised by the problem of material constitution. Thomson's account works for non-natural 
kinds, though there is some disagreement over whether or not it works for natural kinds.^ 
Even so, it comes at a high price. A price that is too dear to pay unless there is no other 
way to answer the constitution puzzles.
First, Thomson is guilty of a bloated ontology which is in desperate need of 
population control. Her commitment to all manner of fusion entities amounts to the 
ontological equivalent of the Big Bang, an explosion in the population of metaphysical 
entities for which she provides no positive justiScation. What she of&rs is plenitude when 
what is called &r is paucity-that is, unless and until a positive argument for the plenitude 
of fusions is offered.
Admittedly, Thomson recognizes the counterintuitive nature ofho^ mereological 
Big Bang, but argues that her ontological attic is not nearly so cluttered by the explosion 
of fusion entities if one pays close attention to the identity, part, and constitution relations 
that hold among them and between them and garden-variety, everyday objects. However,
For her part, Thomson thinks that it does (cf [98]: 169) but Lynne Rudder 
Baker is not so sure (cf [2000]: 181, especially A. 27).
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while Thomson claims that in some cases fusions are, example, identical, I have argued 
that such claims are exceptions to the rule rather than the rule of thumb.
Second, though Thomson rightly notes that no manner of scientihc investigation 
will ever serve to disprove the existence of hision entities-namely, because fusion entities 
exist, if they do, purely by virtue of dehnition within one's metaphysic and so are a priori 
known to exist if at all-this fact proves neither that fusions 6 il to exist nor that they east. 
What is owed, then, is a positive argument for their existence. Given that they are 
theoretical entities, one ought not to expect their existence to be proved by either a 
microscope or a telescope. Even so, one might expect some positive account that 
highlights either explanatory importance or causal efScacy. Neither has been forthcoming 
&om Thomson.
One might argue that some measure of explanatory justihcation has been provided, 
though admittedly not in any obvious way, simply by their necessary inclusion in her 
response to the problem of material constitution. Two items here are worth noting. First, 
it is true that fusion entities play an essential role in Thomson's constitution view. Thus, if 
fusions are cast in doubt, so, too, is Thomson's version of constitution. Second, not all of 
Thomson's fusions, it would seem, are essential to her theory of constitution. However, 
given her account of fusion entities, she is in a tough spot and must bite the proverbial 
bullet. In other words, given how Thomson has developed the fusion relation(s), if she 
accepts one of them, she must accept them all-justihed or no. Unless fusions come to 
serve some obvious and essential explanatory function or there is justiGcation provided for
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their existence that amounts to more than mere deGnition, we are forced to dismiss 
Thomson's view.
All of this either explicitly tells against her view or gives us cause to search for a 
more acceptable account of material constitution. While there is strong reason to reject 
Thomson's wew outright, if another account of constitution can be found that costs less, 
metaphysically speaking, than Thomson's view, then even the extremely limited beneGt 
that her view provides, namely, a workable account of the constitution relation, will be 
nuUiGed. It is in an effort to continue that search that we turn now to the work of Lyime 
Rudder Baker.
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Chapter 4
L Chapter Introduction
Lynne Rudder Baker has recently oSered a novel interpretation of the constitution 
relation/ Unlike Judith Thomson's interpretation. Baker's does not rely on mereological 
relations to dehne constitution. Rather, Baker Reuses on properties and the sharing of 
those properties among constituting objects. The sharing of properties by constituting 
entities with their constituted cousins is commonplace among constitution theorists. 
However, to this "bottom-up" property sharing Baker adds the notion of "top-down" 
property sharing. In other words, on Baker's view constituted entities also share 
properties with their constituting cousins.
In this chapter I spell out Baker's version of material constitution, highlighting her 
unique view on the mutual borrow-abihty of most properties, including kind properties, by 
constitutionally related entities, then I oSer a critique of her view which will focus on her 
downward property borrowing thesis and her related understanding of object individuation 
and counting. Ultimately, I show that Baker's argument by example in &vor of her view 
is insu&cient to motivate the view in light of alternate, plausible interpretations of those 
examples, that there are unacceptable consequences of her view, and that there is no 
reason to accept those consequences since the problems that her view is supposed to
' Lynne Rudder Baker [2000]. See also, [97]: 599-621, and [99].
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resolve either remain unresolved by her view, can be resolved through other, less 
controversial, means, or both/
H. Lynne Rudder Baker: Constitution and Property Borrowing
In order to set the stage for Baker's view, it is useful to address a few preliminary 
issues. Baker uses several examples to tease out the constitution relation-statues, discs, 
persons-but I will primarily concern myself with her statue examples, specihcally 
Michelangelo's Dowef. Moreover, it is important to note that she takes David to be a 
three-dimensional, enduring object, as opposed to a fbur-dimensional, perduring one.  ^ In 
addition, since the constitution relation raises identity concerns, it is important to note 
Baker's take on the identity relation. She makes it clear that when she speaks of identity 
she is speaking of identity in the strict Leibniàan sense and, further, on her view identity is 
rightly construed as a necessary relation. She does not End it essential to address 
contingent or reladve identity, or any other kind of "faux" identity .^  As such, a diSerence 
in modal properties will be sufBcient to prove a diSerence in objects. With these 
preliminaries to the side, we are now prepared to stake out Baker's view.
 ^I do not ûnish the last portion of this thesis until Chapter 5. 
 ^[2000]: 29.
4 Since Baker holds that identity is a necessary relation, she denies the possibility of 
contingent identity, and questions whether or not the notion of relative identity is even 
coherent (see [2000]: &. 13). For this and related issues see also Peter Geach, "Identity" 
Logic Matters (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Pub., 1972): 238-249. And for 
criticisms of relative identity: John Perry, "The Same F ', PArZofqpArcoJ 79
(1970): 181-200, and David VHggins [80]. Baker also 6 vorably notes Saul Kripke's 
position on this issue, cf "Identity and Necessity" in Identity and Individuatiori edited by 
Milton K. Munitz (New York, NY : New York University Press, 1971).
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1. Baker's View
Pediaps not surprisingly given our survey of the literature to this point, Baker's 
primary example Wien teasing out her view of the constitution relation is that of a statue, 
Michelangelo's and its constituting matter, a piece of marble. For ease she names
the piece of marble-David is already named-Piece, though she recognizes that to do so is 
rather odd.  ^ As we have seen already, there are multiple contenders for the property(ies) 
with respect to which the constitutionally related objects are said to drSer. Baker offers as 
her example of the difference in properties between David and Piece the property that 
David has of being a piece of art essentially, which is a property that Piece lacks since 
Piece can exist in a world without art. In other words, there is no world in which David 
exists and there is no art, but there are such worlds for Piece.^
Thus far we are in Amiliar territory. In setting up the problem. Baker places her 
position in the light of recent dd)ate on the relationship between objects: 'Tither x is 
identical to y or x and y are separate entities, independent of each other" . ^  Since David 
and Piece fail to share at least one property, then, they are not identical and must be 
separate entities. But, Baker contends, this is not the only, nor the appropriate, result, and
Though also justifed or at least not problematic, [2000]: 29, A 9.
 ^Baker recognizes that this move on her part is ultimately to afBrm that essential 
properties, e.g., of being a statue or being a piece of art, may be extrinsic and 
relational-and she notes that this is a place where she departs 6 om a traditional 
understanding ofLeibniz' Law as put forward by Robert Sleigh in his article, "Identity of 
Indiscemibles" in A Companion to Metaphvsics. edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa 
(Ox&rd, England: Basil Blackwell, 1995): 234, ([2000]: 30 fh 10).
 ^[99]: 144.
97
she is careful to place ha  ^position in between the two extranes of identity and complete 
separation. In other words, while x and y are not identical, neither are they wholly 
separate entities that are independent of one another.'
Thus, even though it is clear that Piece and David are not identical, it is equally 
clear on Bako-'s view that Piece and David are not independent individuals. For, various 
of David's properties clearly depend on Piece's physical properties-e.g., the aesthetic 
quality of David having pent-up energy, which is dependant on the weight distribution and 
physical structure that Piece possesses.^ In addition, the &ct that they are co-located in 
space and time, at least since 1504 C.E., serves as further evidence of their close 
relationship as does the similarity among the vast m^oiity of their properties: smell, color, 
weight, shape, etc. Notwithstanding the clear dependence and similarity, however. Baker 
argues that we cannot consider Piece as a proper subpart of David, because it is clear that 
Piece plus something else is not identical with David. There is nothing that one could add 
to Piece that would then result in a coiyunction of proper subparts that is then itself 
identical with David. Thus, David and Piece are neither identical, nor separate and 
independent, nor related as part to whole. Rather, the relationship between Piece and 
David is one of constitution.
'  Here the dependency claim is important because, in fact, she is committed to 
separate entities of a sort as we will soon see and will discuss in § 3 .1.
^[2000]: 31. 
"  [2000]: 31.
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David, then, is constituted by Piece, but is not identical with Piece. Piece could 
exist in a non-art world while David could not. In addition, both David and Piece could 
exist without the other, though David could not exist without being constituted by some 
piece or other while Piece could exist without constituting some statue or other, or, 
indeed, any other kind-arti&ct or natural. This relationship between objects, the 
constitution relationship, abounds in particular with respect to evoyday, garden-vaiiety 
objects, and \\diile I have already noted the same constituent matter could serve to 
constitute various and sundry diSerent objects-e.g., the same aggregate of bricks could 
constitute either a schoolhouse or a courthouse, whether in the same physical structure or 
not, and the same courthouse or schoolhouse could be constituted by a diS^ent aggregate 
of bricks, or perhaps not bricks at all-Baker points out that on her view there are some 
limitations to \\hat can constitute what, e.g., David could not have been constituted by a 
12 centimeter chunk of jade even though Michelangelo might have carved it. Here Baker 
takes a Kripkean turn and names David. Then, she claims that David, designated by 
baptism in the actual world, could not have been a 12 centimeter jade statue even if the 
artist were the same. She also notes that her car could not be constituted by a soap 
bubble, because such things have insuGBcient sticking power, in terms of their existence, to
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Gonsütute automobiles." Thus, while she allows that constituting objects are not, in the 
particular, essential to objects constituted, she also argues 5)r some limitation.
Recognizing a need to move b^ond mere intuitions on this and other issues with 
respect to the constitution relation-especially in an efkrt to show just Wien two objects 
bear the constitution rdation with respect to one another-Baker of&rs her version of clear 
necessary and suGBdent criteria for the rdation. In so doing, she makes use of three 
technical concepts that require brief explanation before giving her dehnition. To say that 
an object is in G-favorable circumstances is just to say that the object is in the relevant 
environment that would give rise to a G kind. To say that an object has G* is just to say 
that G is the object's primary-kind property and is possessed by the object non- 
derivativdy." To say that an object possesses a property non-derivatively is just to say 
that its possession is not dependent on its constitution relations. I will say more about
^^ And Kripke's lectern could not be constituted by a block of ice. Here she agrees 
with Kripke's conclusion, but not for his reason. In a footnote, she distinguishes her view 
hom Kripke's origin essentialism. Kripke argues that the lectern he is in &ct using could 
not be made hom a block of ice because origins are essential to a thing. Baker denies that 
origins are essential but argues for Kripke's conclusion in the case of the lectern based on 
the &ct that in normal everyday circumstances lecterns made out of blocks of ice could 
not function sati&ctorily as a lectern since it would melt too quickly. Her words: it would 
be unable to "play a lectern role in our climate" ([2000]: 32, 61. 18). See also Saul 
Kripke, Naming and Necessitv (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
One wonders whether sticking power is the only concern 6 )r cars made out of soap 
bubbles-perhaps the average weight of American drivers would also dampen the 
excitement this idea might otherwise create in the motor city-and whether the Penguin of 
Batman 6 me might not get along famously with a lectern made of ice. Even so, this 
concern is outside the scope of this dissertation, so I will not raise it further here.
"  'G ' will stand in for any kind whatever and will indicate primary kind for any 
kind whatever.
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each of these concepts shortly. But this will sufBce &r now so that we may take a 
preliminary look at Baker's view.
X constitutes y a tt  =df
1. X and y are spatially coincident at t; and
2. X is in G-favorable circumstances at t; and
3 . It is necessary that: for all z, if z has F as its primary kind (and 
non-derivatively) at t and zisin G-&vorable circumstances at t, 
then there exists another object, u, such that u has Gas its primary 
kind (and non-derivatively) at t and u is spatially coincident with z 
at t; and
4. It is possible that: x exists at t and there does not exist another 
object, w, such that w has G as its primary kind (and non- 
derivatively) and w is spatially coincident with x at t; and
5. If y is immaterial, then x is also immaterial.^
The hrst condition, the requirement 6)r spatial coincidence, is standard for constitution 
theorists. The immateriality relationship, condition hve, however, is not commonly found 
in the literature. While some leave open the possibility of constituting relations among
"  [2000]: 168. In logicese/logical syntax:
X  constitutes y a tt  =df
1. X and y are spatially coincident at t; and
2. X  is in D at t; and
3. It is necessary that: (z)[(F*zt & z is in D at t), then 3u(G*ut & u 
is spatially coincident with z at t)j; and
4. It is possible that: (x exists at t  & -3w[G*wt & w is spatially 
coincident with x at t]); and
5 . If y is immaterial, then x is also immaterial.
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immaterial things^\ Baker holds that properhes are nonspatial parts of constituted objects. 
In other words, on her view there are both material and immaterial parts that constitute 
objects, e.g., the statue."
With conditions two through 6>ur, Baker commits herself to what I call the 
emergence of objects: "When certain things wkh certain properties are in certain 
circumstances, new things with new properties come into existence"." For example, a 
stone or collection of stones put into a certain circumstance becomes a monument. She 
thinks that the set of stones then acquires new properties, and that some of these 
properties are causal properties while others are kind properties. This is signiScant 
because the pile of stones, or, rather, the monument", now causes persons to gather on 
certain holidays, brings tears to persons' eyes, serves to arouse protest, etc.. Baker does 
not argue that there is any intrinsic, nonrelational property that the monument has but that
"  For example, Judith Thomson.
[2000]: 43. I will not say much on this issue here since it is not an essential 
element of her view. One could just as easily leave room open far immaterial parts 
without entertaining a commitment to their existence.
"  [2000]: 32-33.
"  In this example. Baker focuses on the stones-i.e., these causal properties come 
into being vdien the stones enter a new circumstance. However, given the quote earlier 
and her conditions for constitution, these causal properties come into being just when a 
new thing, that is, the monument, comes into being. And the monument is clearly, on 
Baker's view, uot just the collection of stones. Thus, Baker does not say what she should 
say here and is, at least to this point, blurring the boundanes between the two objects, 
which is not wholly surprising given her commitment to her non-separateness thesis. It 
seems clear, then, that she would not embrace my description of "object emergence" for 
her view, though I think she is committed to such emergence. Also at issue here is her 
property borrowing thesis which will be addressed shortly.
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the pile of stones lacks or vice versa. She rests her claim that the pile of stones and the 
monument are not identical on the dif&rence in terms of their extrinsic, relational 
propaties: namely, that of a  Mo/nanent or of existing only in worlds which give rise 
to monuments (e.g., where intensional bangs exist, appropriate social constructs obtain, 
etc.).
But these results fall directly out of conditions two-fbur. The pile of stones is in 
monument-6vorable circumstances, satis^ing condition two. Necessarily, whenever piles 
of stones are in monument-&vorable circumstances, there exists another object that is a 
monument and that is spatially coincident with the stones. On the assumption that 
monuments and piles of stones are primary kinds, this sadsGes condition three. Finally, it 
is possible that the stones exist and there is no addidonal object that is a monument and is 
spatially coincident with the stones-namdy, just when the stones are not in monument- 
favorable circumstances-thus satis^ing condition four.
David and Piece also Gt the conditions Baker outlines. At the time in quesGon they 
are spaGally coincident (condiGon one). Piece is also in an artworld, shaped by an arGst, 
Michelangelo, in a parGcular way, and put on display (condiGon two). We might also 
sGpulate that necessarily whenever things, like pieces of marble, are put in these 
circumstances, there are other things, like statues, that are coincident with them-Piece and 
David, respecGvely, Gt this condiGon in our example (condiGon three). However, it 
remains possible that Piece exists without David's existing-in a nonart-world, for example, 
since existing in an art-world is an essential property of David but not of Piece (condiGon 
four). Finally, neither David nor Piece is immaterial (vacuously saGsfying condiGon Gve).
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Concerning the formal properties of the relation. Baker holds that constitution is 
nontransitive, irreûexive, and asymmetric." She further thinks that the constituted object 
has ontological priority over the constituting object: "Ifx constitutes y at a certain place 
and time, then there is a unihed individual at that place at that time, and the identity of that 
individual is determined by y"." This is one of those places where Baker's position is less 
than dear in part, I think, because she appears to afBrm two mutually inconsistent views.™ 
Even so, she ^pears to say that so long as x constitutes y, y "encompasses" or 
"subsumes" x: "the identity of the constituting thing is submerged in the identity of what it 
constitutes".^ And Bnally, Baker takes the relevant related objects to be individuals as 
opposed to stuGs or masses.^
"  [2000]: 44-46.
"  [2000]: 33.
™ Namely, that x and y are different, spatially coincident objects that there is 
one "uniBed individual" present there at t. I return to this issue later.
[2000]: 33. Admittedly, this is all very metaphorical, and while Baker promises 
elaboration, the Brst step in that direction just brings further confusion. She writes that 
"constitution is a contingent rdation between zmfrvzfàfaZ things" (33, emphasis in the 
original). But this claim that tha^e are two individuals in the constitution relation is in 
sharp contrast with the claim I have just noted in the text that there is but one uniBed 
individual and the constituted entity is it. Ultimately, as I understand it, these metaphors 
stand in for some of the more technical parts of her view-e.g., property borrowing, 
property derivation, primary-kind properties-as such we must take an extended look at 
these technical elements before we can hope to understand the metaphors. Even then the 
outlook is bleak.
^  Contra both Judith Thomson [98] and Dean Zimmerman, "Theories of Masses 
and Problems of Constitution", f  M/oaqp/ncoZ 104 (1995): pp. 53-110, and
"Coincident Objects: Could a Stuff Ontology Help?" yf/Wyarf 57(1) (Jan. 1997): pp. 19- 
27.
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With these considerations, Baker notes that her understanding of constitution 
diG&rs in important ways &om the kind of constitution that, for example, Dean 
Zimmerman argues against in his article "Theories of Masses and Problems of 
Constitudon". Zimmerman takes the relata to be "masses of kinds of stuff' and he permits 
the objects to constitute one another, which Baker does not allow-as already seen. Baker 
argues for an asymmetrical constitution relation as opposed to a symmetrical constitution 
relation. Zimmerman ultimately decides that coincident physical objects are not possible^ 
and Baker thinks that she slips away 6om his conclusion because of her symmetrical view 
regarding the sharing of properties, and the rejection that essential properties must be 
intrinsic to a thing.^
As it is stated. Baker's dve-part criterion for constitution makes use of two 
additional concepts related to property possession: property possession that is independent 
of constitution relations and property possession that is dependent on constitution 
relations. On Baker's view, "there are two ways to have a property, nonderivadvely and 
derivatively".^ This distinction is central to her view and her defense against certain
a [95]: 90.
^  [2000]: 32. Regarding essential properties. Baker indicates that her position 
entails the following 6ve principles: 1) everything that exists and that is not eternal has 
essential properties; 2) some things, e.g., artworks and artefacts, have relational properdes 
essentially; 3) some things, again, artefacts and artworks, e.g., have intentional properties 
essentially; 4) some things, same examples, have properties whose instantiation depends 
on convention, language, or other aspects of a culture, essentially; and 5) one thing may 
have a certain property essentially while another thing may have that same property 
contingently ([2000]: 35-39).
^  [2000]: 55.
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detractors.^ The latter, derivative possession, allows for property sharing (or borrowing) 
while non-denvative property possession makes saise of propaty exempliûcation that is 
independent of constitution relations. The formal conditions are stated below with (I) 
standing for the independence, or nonderivative, condition and (D) standing for the 
dependent, or derivative, condition
(T)XhasHatt independently ofx's constitutionrdations to y  a tt  =df
(a) X has H at t; and
(b) Either (1) (i) x constitutes y att, and
(ii) x's having H a t t  (in the given 
background) does not entail that x 
constitutes anything at t. 
or (2) (i) y constitutes xat t ,  and
(ii) x's having H at t (In the given 
background) does not entail that x is 
constituted by something that could have had 
H a t t  without constituting anything at t.
(D) X h a s  H at t  d e r iv a tiv e ly  = d f  th e r e  is  s o m e  y  su c h  that:
(a) it is not the case that x has H at t independently of x's 
constitution relations to y at t; and
^  Cf [2000]: 169fF. See also: Burke [1992] and Zimmerman [1995].
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(b) y has H at t independently of y's constitution relations to x at
t / '
So, for example, David has the property of bang a statue indq)endently (non-derivatively) 
of its constitution relations with Piece because Piece could not have the property of being 
a statue without constituting David (condition Ib2). In addition. Piece has the property of 
being a statue dependency (derivatively) because Piece does not possess that property 
independently of its constitution relations to David while David does possess the property 
independent of its constitution relations to Piece. Also known as top-down property 
borrowing, this is one of the, if not the, most novel features of Baker's version of the 
constitution relation. As such, we will take some time to work through the salient Matures 
of this concept.
2. Property Borrowing DemystiBed
Property borrowing, or sharing, among numerically distinct objects is but one way 
in which objects might be said to acquire properties. Property acquisition is the primary 
issue in the borrowing (or sharing) concern ofBaker and other constitution theorists.
What might be called bottom-up property borrowing is a ubiquitous concept among such 
theorists. Intuitively, this is the view that constituted objects "borrow" certain properties, 
e.g., shape, weight, color, etc., Bom their constituting cousins. Top-down property 
borrowing, however, is unique to Baker's view.
As Frederick Doepke, among others, has made abundantly clear, the person who 
argues that a statue, David, for example, is not identical to the piece of marble (or
^  [2000]: 169.
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whatever) out of which it is made must account for what turns out to be an impressive 
similarity in properties given their numerical distinctness.^ In answer, constitution 
theorists maintain that constituted objects borrow or share properties in virtue of their 
constitution relations. In other words, constituted objects, like David, possess many, 
though not all, of their properties by virtue of their constituting pair, like Piece. While 
many of the constituted objects' properties are derived 6om their constituting pair, not all 
are so derived. For example, David derives its weight 6om Piece, though not its kind.^ 
Further, while many of the properties of the constituting object will be shared with the 
constituted object, not all will be shared. For example. Piece shares properties related to 
weight, color, etc., though not its essential relations to its micro-parts.
This bottom-up property borrowing 6om constituting objects to constituted 
objects accounts for much of the vast similarity among constitutionally related objects: 
e.g., the similar physical characteristics. As such, it is quite plausible and has proven 
suGScient for most constitution theorists, but Baker argues that the other direction, top- 
down property borrowing, is also necessary. On her view, constituted objects also share 
certain of their properties with their rdated constituting objects. The top-down thesis is 
6 r  less intuitive, and, so 6 r  as I know, only Baker holds it. Thus, she owes us some 
justiScation for this controversial thesis.
Baker oGers several arguments in favor to top-down property borrowing. Since I 
deal extensively with this aspect ofBaker's view in the next section, I mention only briefly
^Doepke [82].
^  Baker would use the term 'primary kind' instead of kind.
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one of her aigummts here so as to better flesh out her view. With regard to David and 
Piece, Baker oGers the following counterexample to the only bottom-up borrowing thesis. 
She suggests that the value of the statue, appraised, say, at $10,000, is also a property that 
the constituting entity, our piece of marble, possesses by virtue of its relationship with the 
statue. It is counterintuitive in the extreme, in Baker's opinion, to suggest that while 
David is valued at $10,000, Piece is valued at a mere $50. In addition. Baker thinks that 
the two direction borrowing thesis helps counter various objections raised by those who 
want to argue that there is no constitution without identity.^ Thus, she oGers two kinds 
of argument in 6vor of top-down property borrowing: argument by example and 
argument to the best explanation.
As one might guess, there are limitations to the borrowing thesis-both bottom-up 
and top-down. According to Baker, property borrowing does not range over the 
fbllovnng three types of properdes: alethic properties, which are properties that include 
modal tams in their English expressions-properties which are modal by nature, e.g., 
property of being a statue essentially (something that David has and cannot share with 
Piece); constitution or identity properties, where they are properties that say something 
about a thing's identity, as in identical to x or self-identity, or constitution relation, as in 
constitutes x or is constituted by x or is constitutionally related to x (e.g., Piece has the 
property of constituting David and cannot share that property with David); and properties
^  [99: 152]. The key, of course, is to determine if in fact top-down borrowing is 
useful in itself when countering those objections and what it adds to one's ability to 
counter those objections that one would not have otherwise. I will consider this at length 
in the next section.
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that are rooted outside the times in which they are had (temporal properties, e.g., at time t, 
X has the property of being in Milwaukee at tl-a t time t this is a property x has that is 
rooted outside that time at which it is had, namely, t). Baker notes that such kinds of 
properties can never be possessed derivatively^^ though constitutionally related objects 
will share all of their "ordinary properties.^
As she notes, on her construal of constitution the following is a consequence: 
"necessarily, ifxhas constitution relations to y, and x has one of these noninheritable 
properties, then x has the property nonderivitively and y does not have it at all, 
derivatively or nondeiivatively".^ This means that so long as there is some constitution 
relationship between x and y-it does not matter Wiich way it goes-and so long as one of 
the objects, x or y, has one of these noninheritable properties, then not only is it the case 
that one of the objects, say, y, must fail to inherit the property, y cannot possess the 
property at all. One of the more novel, and perplexing, aspects ofBaker's borrowing view 
has to do with what types of properties we borrowable among constitutionally related 
objects. Noteworthy among the many properties that are borrowable: kind properties.
As we have seen. Baker holds that "there are two ways to have a property, 
nonderivitively and derivatively".^ This holds true for kind properties just as it does for 
properties dealing with a thing's physical characteristics. With respect to our example of
[99]: 152. See also [2000]: 48-49. 
[2000]: 178.
[2000]: 55.
^  [2000]: 55.
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David and Piece, then. Baker holds that David is a statue and is a statue non-derivatively 
and that Piece is also a statue but is a statue derivatively. In other words, Piece is a statue 
and has borrowed that kind property 6om David. David is also a statue but has not 
borrowed that kind property 6om Piece, or &om anything else-David possesses the kind 
property of being a statue on its own.^  ^ To make this somewdiat more clear, Baker ofkrs 
the following distinction. Kind properties, or what she calls primary-kind properties^, 
may be possessed derivatively or non-derivatively: Tor any primary-kind property being 
an F, if any x is an F at all, then either x is an F essentially or x borrows the property of 
being an F 6om something to which x has constitution reladons".^ This helps somewhat, 
but elsewhere she dehnes primary-kind properties in relation to having a kind essentially^*, 
while it looks like here she suggests that one can borrow primary-kind properties. These 
two claims are in tension, in light of her view on the limitations of property borrowing. If 
primary-kind property possession entails that one have it, the kind property, essentially.
[2000]: 54. Of course, if Piece is not a statue at all, then it carmot be a statue 
derivatively. If I can show in the next section that Baker has not given us any 
uncontroversial examples of derivative properties, such as that had by pieces, statues, 
bodies, etc., and that the problems raised by material constitution can be explained without 
positing top-down property borrowing, then we have no reason to think that downward 
property sharing (borrowing) is motivated.
^  The relationship between kind properties and primary-kind properties is easily 
confused in Baker's view and yet this is one of the more crudal elements of her theory. In 
what fbllows-both here and in the next section-I will make every eSbrt to clearly 
articulate the relationship.
[99]: 156. And elsewhere: "for any primary-kind property, being anF, if any x is 
an F at all, then either x is anF essentially, or x has the property of being an F 
derivatively" [2000]: 56.
'  [97]: 618.
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then clearly it cannot be borrowed since it is a type of property that is nonborrowable. On 
the other band, if it does not entail that one have the property essentially, then we are left 
to wonder what a primary-kind property is over and above a kind property.
Baker, however, does not intend that primary-kind properties entail essential 
properties, only that they sometimes entail necessary exenq)liGcation. She writes, "for any 
primary-kind property, being an F, if any x is an F at all, then either x is an F essentially, or 
X has the property of being an F derivatively".^^ While this is somewhat confusing. Baker 
seems to say that properties are had in diSerent ways and the ways of having properties 
does not imply a difkrence in the kind of property; rather, it implies a difkrence in terms 
of that property's exemplihcation (i.e., across all worlds or only in some worlds). Further, 
she ties togeth^" the notions of derivative/nonderivative possession and 
nonessential/essential property expression. One has a property essentially iff one has that 
property nonderivitively, and one has a property derivatively iff one has that property 
nonessentially. Thus, an object's primary-kind property, when possessed nonderivatively, 
entails that the related primary kind is essential to the object, and when the primary-kind 
property is possessed derivatively it entails that the related primary kind is not essential to 
the object.
In sum. Baker's view amounts to the following. Let being an F be x's primary- 
kind property and being a G bey's primary-kind property where being anF is not identical 
to being a G. Further let D be G-favorable conditions, and let F* be the property having 
the property of being F as one's primary-kind property and let G* be the property of
^  [2000]: 56.
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having the property of being G as one's primaiy-kind property. And here the reason to 
distinguish F* and G* &om F and G is that some objects may have F derivatively, and so 
have the property being an F derivatively, in which case x is anF but being anF is not its 
primary-kind property and so x is not an F*.^ Now, when x is in D, y exists. Ol^ect x has 
F and F* \^iile object y has G and G*, but additionally x borrows G &om y and y borrows 
F 6om x*\ though neither G* nor F* are borrowable. Nevertheless, while one can make 
sense of the view, it remains to be seen whether or not it is plausible.*^
HL Baker's View Considered
There are four elements in Baker's view that bear further scrutiny. The Grst is her 
emphasis on the unity of constitutionally related objects. Here I merely quali^ her 
position which, on my view, she pushes further than it can really go, and perhaps further 
than it is intoided to go. Second, I address Baker's top-down borrowing thesis. I argue 
that such a thesis is unwarranted, and at the very least unnecessary for a viable 
constitution theory. Third, even if the top-down borrowing thesis is granted, I argue for a 
weaker thesis: namely, that primary-kind properties cannot be borrowed, either top-down 
or bottom-up. Finally, I raise certain concerns regarding Baker's atypical views on 
counting and sortais. While I may not here decisively refute Baker's position, I hope to
^  The "introduction of F* restricts the definition to cases to Fs [sic] that have the 
property ofbeing anF as their primary-kind property" ([2000]: 168). It is worth noting 
that F* and G* are properties and alethic, so not of the borrowing kind.
And, of course, many other properties are borrowed as well.
I have borrowed heavily 6om a summary section in Baker for this paragraph 
([2000]: 168-169).
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create some room 6)r an altemadve constitution view, one that I argue 6)r in the next 
chapter.
1, Separate Union
In Baker's attempt to clearly distinguish constitution 6om identity, she 
understandably emphasizes the distinctness between the relevant objects in her examples. 
But to overemphasize distinctness is misleading, on her view, and she thinks this in part 
because constitution is importantly also a unity. For instance, she writes that "as we see in 
the examples o^ say, a statue and the lump of clay that farms it, x and y are not separate, 
independently existing individuals".*^ Recognizing the value in both sets of contrary 
intuitions. Baker attempts to accept both and straddle the fence between unity and 
separation: "in sum, if x and y are constitutionally related, to say that x has a property H 
derivatively highlights the diSerence between x and y and hence the 6c t that constitution 
is not identity; but to say that H is, nevertheless, a genuine property of x highlights the 
unity of X and y, and hence the similarity of identity and constitution" .** However, trouble 
looms when Baker emphasizes the union without recognizing the claim to distinctness that 
her own view requires.
Baker desires to make sense of the constitution relation as an intermediate relation 
between separate existence and identity, but one wonders what separate existence 
amounts to. On the &ce of it, it could mean something like the relation that exists 
between objects that do not overlap in all of their spatial parts-or, I suppose, that do not
*" [2000]: 29.
** [2000]: 178-179.
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overlap n% in their spatial parts, where n% is some number that is high enough to suggest 
separate, though not entirely discrete, existence. So, Baker is interested to show that 
constitution does not entail separate existence, but, altanatively, she is also forced to 
disassociate Piece and David as much as possible so that she is able to explain their 
diSerence in kind, or primary kind.*  ^ Indeed, Baker suggests that under certain conditions 
a new thing comes into existence: "when Piece is in certain statue-&vorable 
circumstances, a new enti^ (a statue, David) comes into existence".^ Here she clearly 
claims that at such a time when Piece is in statue-6vorable conditions, David comes into 
existence and there are now two entities extant then and there, and one wonders why she 
would not also say that there are two individuals present at that time.*^
Indeed, one wonders if Baker is sneaking a substantive move in here when she 
indicates that if x constitutes y, then they are not separate, independently existing 
individuals.^ This claim is in tension with our intuitions with respect to 
constitution-Hiamely, that there are two spatially coincident objects where David now 
sits-and, more importantly, it is a claim which serves her purposes toward arguing that the
[2000]: 178.
[2000]: 178. See also [99]: 146-147.
But this is precisely what she has shied 6om saying heretofore: "for when x 
constitutes y, there is a unitary thing-y, as constituted by x-which is a single thing . . ., x 
has no independent existence" ([2000]: 46). Of course, here she uses the language of 
thing rather than object, and so she might simply counter by saying that there is one thing 
but two objects. But sudi a move would smack of mere wordplay. Given that she thinks 
that there are two coincident entities, one wonders just how her view diSers in fact &om 
the various coincident entities views that she dismisses elsewhere ([2000]: 173, & 9).
^  [2000]: 298:
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constitution relation is ultimately a unity relation  ^and so may be ad hoc. Yet, I want to be 
careful here. It seems to me that Baker is relying heavily on what it means to be an 
independently existing individual if her claim to unity is true. Even so, the fact remains 
that for objects that bear the constitution relation to one another there are reasons to think 
that those (two) objects each exist. Further, there are reasons to think, depending on the 
examples, that one object's existence does not depend on the other object's 
existence-vdiich looks to me like the objects do, then, exist independently. As an 
example, take the hunk of bronze and Rodin's the TWnker-the hunk of bronze can persist 
through the demise of Thinker and does so just when the hunk of bronze is reduced to a 
malleable substance, once again, and is refashioned into Michelangelo's David. The hunk 
persists through the change whereas the Thinker does not. Alternatively, the Thinker 
persists through the change in the hunk of bronze just when one of the hngers on the 
Thinker is broken ofNhe hunk has met its demise, but we do not think that the Thinker 
has met its demise. The &ct that both the Thinker and the lump of bronze have diSerent 
persistence conditions seems to me to justi^ their having some measure of independent 
existence, and Baker is committed to these results.
While the unity/separateness issue may well reduce to semantics. Baker's emphasis 
on property borro^sdng, specihcally her commitment to downward borrowing, is more 
perplexing. As it goes to the heart of her view, and is, as I shall argue, an untenable 
position, if my argument Gnds its mark. Baker's view fails.
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2. Baker's Downward Property Borrowing Thesis
At the heart ofBaker's version of constitution is her novel, downward borrowing 
thesis. No other constitution theorist holds the view, but Baker is committed to it far 
several reasons. First, it accounts for property sharing 6om constituted to constituting 
entities, e.g., the value of David is shared with Piece.^  ^ In other words, Wide bottom-up 
property borrowing can account for much of the similarity, Baker does not think it can 
account for all of the similarity (between constitutionally related entities). Second, it 
distinguishes Baker's view 6om the "standard account" of constitution between two 
spatially coincident objects. Baker thinks that the standard account construes the objects 
as too distinct. On her view, constitutionally related objects are "unihed" and share all 
manner of properties including kind properties.^ Third, Baker argues that downward 
property borrowing saves her constitution view 6om charges of incoherence. Without 
downward borrowing, then. Baker would have to give up her commitments to top-down 
similarity, uniGed constitution, and would be in danger of incoherence.^^
[2000]: 57.
^  [2000]: 57. I have already noted some of the problems with her uniGed view in 
the previous secGon.
[2000]. 1699:
Clearly, Baker would not embrace these consequences, but there are reasons to 
think either that the consequences are preferred to the downward borrowing view or that 
one need not embrace downward borrowing to avoid the consequences. (The Grst two 
reasons given for her view are most closely Ged to her arguments by example, while the 
third reason given is most closely Ged to her argument to the best explanaGon.)
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Baker ofGa-s several ctmnbereauimpdexstxatlie orüjfiipTWiund borrowing theâs in 
support of her downward borrowing view. While I do not have the space to address each 
of her purported counterexamples, I will address several of the more interesting ones. The 
remaindo" are sufBciently similar in style and content that if my challenges bear ûuit 
against the ones outlined here, they wiH bear ûuit against the otha^s as well.
As we have already seen. Baker has taken pains to outline the necessary and 
sufGcient conditions 6)r an object having some property independently of its constitution 
relations and an object having some property dependent on its constitution relations. As a 
reminda, thesis (T) and thesis (D) below represent the necessary and sufBcient conditions 
for independence and dependence, respectively.
(I) X has H a t t  independently of x's constitution relations to y at t =df
(a) X has H at t; and
(b) Eitha (1) (i) x constitutes y at t, and
(ii) x's having H at t (in the given 
background) does not entail that x 
constitutes anything at t. 
or (2) (i) y constitutes x at t, and
(ii) x's having H a t t  (in the given 
background) does not entail that x is 
constituted by something that could have had 
H a t t  without constituting anything at t.
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(D) X has H at t derivatively =df there is some y such that:
(a) it is not the case that x has H a t t  independently of x's
constitution relations to y at t; and
(b) y has H a t t  independently of y's constitution relations t oxat
t.S3
So to illustrate, David has the property of being a statue independently (non-derivatively) 
of its constitution relations with Piece because Piece could not have the property of being 
a statue without constituting David (condition Ib2). In addition. Piece has the property of 
being a statue dependently (derivatively) because Piece does not possess that property 
independently of its constitution relations to David while David does possess the property 
independent of its constitution relations to Piece.
In each of her proposed counterexamples to the only upward borrowing thesis. 
Baker oSers essentially the same form of argument. First, she takes her example to 
evidence a similarity concerning a particular property between the constituting and 
constituted object. She further notes that the property in question is held independently by 
the constituted object, though not by the constituting object. Given thesis (D) above, this 
clearly implies that the property exemplified by the constituting object is possessed 
derivatively by virtue of its constitution relations with the constituted object which 
exemplihes the self-same properly though independently.^ As I will show, each of 
Baker's counterexamples satis^ this understanding of the necessary and sufhcient
^  [2000]: 169.
[2000]: 48.
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conditions of both (I) and (D) in the relevant re jects so that if the constituting object has 
the property in question at all it does not have it independently. Thus, I do not quarrel 
with Baker's thesis, even in the special case of primary-kind properties, that the 
constituting objects do not possess the properties independently. Rather, I question in 
each case whether or not the constituting object has the relevant property at all, which is, 
on my view, the primary issue at hand.
Baker oSers a immber of counterexamples to what she calls the thesis of only 
upward property derivation (borrowing). Her counterexamples are an attempt to show 
that the standard account of the constitution relation, of ohly upward property 
derivation-that is, where constituted entities may derive properties 6om constituting 
entities, but not the other way around-is in error. This, of course, opens the door for her 
view in which she holds that property derivation among constitutionally related entities 
goes both upward and downward. So her counterexamples are understandably such that 
she attempts to show in these examples something like a downward derivation of 
properties among constitutionally related entities. I will address three of her 
counterexamples : the United States Sag, an Academic Dean, and the Queen of England.
The Srst example is of a United States (US) Sag. She Srst notes that it is illegal to 
bum a US Sag." Supposing, then, that it is iSegal to bum a US Sag, she considers the 
piece of cloth that constitutes a particular Sag, and she thinks that its being iSegal to bum
This may not actually be correct though even if it were false it would not tell 
against her view.
1 2 0
that Sag, since it is a monbcf of the class makes it illegal to bum the cloth that
constitutes that Sag. But she notes that the Sag does not derive the property of being 
such that it is illegal to bum &om the cloth; rather, it is the other way around. The cloth 
derives the property of rZ/egad Zo or some such, Som the Sag. "What makes it 
iSegal," she writes, "to bum the piece of cloth is that the piece of cloth constitutes a US 
Sag."^ And she Sirther notes that "legislators write laws to protect national symbols, not 
to protect pieces of cloth" .
Of course on my view this case does not serve as a viable counterexample to the 
only upward borrowing thesis and to counter Baker's view that it does I note in particular 
the last quoted sentence above. I afGrm the truth of that sentence, legislators, at least in 
the United States, do write laws protecting flags and not pieces of cloth, but nothing 
follows h"om this regarding the legality of burning pieces of cloth, and I contend that there 
is no such protection &r pieces of cloth. As Baker has noted, legislators do not protect 
pieces of cloth and, contra Baker, it is not illegal to bum any particular piece of cloth even 
while it is illegal to bum a US flag.
In a Srst case, suppose one takes a particular piece of cloth that is shaped and dyed 
in the appropriate ways such that it has come to constitute what is today our national 
symbol. But now further suppose that when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the 
Union, no stars were added to the national Sag. Clearly, then, this 50-starred piece of 
cloth would not be a United States Sag. Burning it, then, would not be a problem. In a
^  [2000]. 48.
[2000]: 48.
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second case, suppose that this piece of cloth is burned just prior to its being dyed with the 
stars and stripes pattern. Here again, it would not be illegal to bum the piece of cloth just 
because there is no flag present.^ Neither of these two cases prove troubling for Baker's 
view, since they do not include examples of a constituting cloth for a US dag that &ils to 
exemplij^ the property in question. Even so, they do attest to the accidental character of 
the cloth's possessing said quality-namely, in wrtue of its spatial coordinates.^^ The 
reason the cloth Ails to have the property in both of the cases is due to the &ct that fomc 
orAer object does not obtain, namely, a US flag. While this does not refute Baker's 
example, it does highlight a countering intuition that when one seeks to learn whether 
some object x has some property P one should check x to see if it has P, not go searching 
for some other object, y.
Baker's flag example has a more alarming consequence: an unnecessary 
duplication-i.e., redundancy or bloating-of properties. My going to jail is in virtue of my 
breaking the law with regard to the burning of the United States flag. There is no second 
law that I break when I bum the flag that relates to the cloth, nor am I guilty of breaking 
the same law twice. To put it another way, given the law we are supposing, an object that 
gains the property, once the law passes, ofbeing illegal to bum, gains that property in
' Another option: if at time t you place before me a United States flag and there is 
a law such that it is illegal to bum that dag, but then at tl  the legislature votes and the 
national symbol changes 6om the stars and bars to an oak leaf (as opposed to a maple leaf^  
so as to be diderent dom Canada), it is still illegal to bum the US dag but it clearly is not 
illegal to bum that particular piece of cloth. A t t a  dag existed there, but at t l  a dag no 
longer exists there; the piece of cloth remains the same.
^  The dag's possessing said property is also contingent, but not on the existence 
of another object. Its possessing said property is contingent on the whims of legislators.
1 2 2
virtue of its being a United States dag. However, AxpotAafi, the piece of cloth is not a 
United States dag. Were it a United States dag, it would be identical with the United 
States dag it is said to constitute-with which it is spatially co-located-I would assume.
But the piece of cloth is not a United States dag, and so, again, given the law, it would not 
be illegal to bum it, so long as we are talking about that particular law: namely, the law 
associated with the burning of dags. There may be other reasons why burning that piece 
of cloth is illegal, but we would have to look at the law books to determine if this is the 
case. The law that we are supposing would not be sufBcient to show that it is illegal to 
bum that piece of cloth though it would admittedly be su&cient to show that it is illegal to 
bum the dag that is co-located with the cloth.
Indeed, one might suppose that a necessary condition of an event's being of the 
appropriate kind so as to count as a breaking of a law is that it be a member of the 
relevant class of events picked out by some piece of legal legislation or other. In our case, 
then, the event must dt the class A BURNING OF A UNITED STATES FLAG.
However, the case in question is not a member of this class. Rather, it is a member of the 
class A BURNING OF A PIECE OF CLOTH. Tme, at the same time and place there is 
an event which w a member of the class A BURNING OF A UNITED STATES FLAG, 
but this is a contingent 6ct. It might not have been the case that this latter event 
transpired just when the dDrmer event transpired, as when that piece of cloth failed to 
constitute a United States dag at that time. Of course. Baker may want to say that these 
are the same event. That is, that the BURNING OF THE PIECE OF CLOTH just is the 
BURNING OF THE UNITED STATES FLAG; they are the same event and so should
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"both" be classiGed as members of the cWs A BURNING OF A UNITED STATES 
FLAG. However, this view is implausible on its 6ce. These can only be the same event if 
they have the same objects as their subjects, but this is clearly not the case. The one has as 
its subject a United States flag and the other has as its subject a piece of cloth.^
The accidental fact that we cannot dissociate a particular United States flag 6om 
its constituting cloth because they are spatially co-located in no way mitigates against the 
6ct that it is not illegal to bum the doth-object. The fact that one always is guilty of an 
illegal act, that is of burning a United States flag, when one also bums pieces of cloth 
which are, at that time, in a constituting relation with a United States flag, is simply an 
accident by assodation-an association that the piece of cloth has with the United States 
Gag with which it is spatially co-located. At the very least such does not serve as 
sufhdent justiGcaGon to warrant the addhion of the property in quesGon to the piece of 
doth, and hence, since the cloth clearly does not have said property independently, of a 
conclusion in favor of downward property borrowing.
The second counterexample has to do with an Academic Dean and his or her body. 
The consGtuGng object is the body while the consGtuted object is the Dean. Baker notes
^  Unless of course we are supposing that we are picking out a parGcular object by 
ostension Wien we say f/zut and we just point in the direcGon of the doth. But if this is 
the case, there ought to be no ambiguity about the object to which we are referring when 
we pick it out by ostension. But this is predsely what the consGtuGon argument denies.
In other words, there is ambiguity when pointing at the object Gapping on the Gag 
pole-we might be picking out the Gag or the piece of doth that consGtutes the Gag. 
Although there is a close relaGonship between the two, it is not one of identity, there are 
two objects present. So ostension wiG not help on this issue, and Baker's reading of the 
Gag example comes perilously close to papering over an ambiguity that her view requires 
if her larger argument is to work: namely, her argument in &vor of the constituGon 
relation being a nonidenGty relaGon.
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that the Dean has the right to be at the head of a graduation procession and so does the 
Dean's body. But the Dean's right to be at the head obviously does not derive hrom the 
body that constitutes the Dean. On the contrary, the Dean's body has the right by virtue 
of its constituting relationship to the Dean. And the Dean, it is important to note, has the 
right independently ofbeing constituted by t&zf body or any other particular body, though 
one might think that some body or other must constitute the Dean far the Dean to exist at 
all.*^  A couple of points here.
Once again, the question that Baker fads to address is whether or not the Dean's 
body has the relevant property in question: namely, having the right to be at the head of a 
graduation procession. While the Dean clearly has that right, the Dean's body does not 
since bodies do not have rights at all under normal circumstances.^ Persons have rights, 
bodies do not. Suppose the Dean suf&rs a stroke and is comatose. One might think that 
the Dean survives in that comatose state and, if so, the Dean still has a right to be at the 
head of the procession. Moreover, on Baker's view, the Dean's body has that right. Why
While it is true that the Dean has the right ofbeing at the head of the procession 
independently ofbeing constituted by tAat body, it is false that the Dean has the right of 
being at the head of the procession independently ofbeing constituted by body. That 
is, constitution by some body is a necessary condition for the Dean's having the right that 
he or she in &ct has ofbeing at the head of the procession. So while that particular body 
is not necessary for the Dean's having the property of having the right ofbeing at the head 
of the procession, some body is essential. Otherwise, the Dean would not have that 
right-there would be no Dean.
^  I say under normal circumstances because I suppose that it is possible, though 
unlikely, that there exists-or at least could exist-some primitive tribe or other that 
conferred rights on bodies as a matter of religious practice. Such is not the case in 
Baker's example, however, and would not prove helpful in providing a counterexample to 
the only upward borrowing thesis in any event.
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is it, then, that person's planning graduation do not insure that the Dean's body is placed 
at the head of the procesâon? One might think that the Dean no longer exists, in that 
scenario, and so the Dean's body no longer has the derivative proper^ of having the right 
to be at the head of the procession. But suppose, then, that the Dean simply oversleeps, 
indeed, she is slumped in a chair at the graduation ceremony 6 st asleep. Does the Dean's 
body still have the right to be at the head of the procession, and so ought we place the 
Dean's body at the head of the procession? Of course not! In both of these cases, the 
body's so-called right fails to supaaede the circumstances that the Dean is in. But this is 
obviously the correct result for the Dean is the relevant party here as far as rights are 
concerned. But, if the body did have a right to be at the head of the procession, then the 
Dean's circumstances ought not be relevant to whether or not the body is placed at the 
head. In fact, the Dean has the right, the body does not. The only property that the body 
has in virtue of the Dean's having the right ofbeing at the head of the procession is that, 
under normal circumstances, the body is at the head of the procession. But it would be 
mistaken to suppose, as Baker seems to, that this contingent fact entails some right that 
the body possesses. The Dean is there by right, the body is there by virtue of its serving as 
the constituting object of the Dean. Nothing further hallows &om this concerning the 
"rights" of the body.
Two hnal points with regard to the hrst two counterexamples. First, one wonders 
how far the reduction goes. Suppose that Baker is correct and there is downward 
property sharing. In that case, the Dean's body has the right ofbeing at the head of the 
procession. But I take it that the collection of cells at time t that constitutes the Dean's
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body at t also has the property of having the right to be at the head of the procession 
supposing that at t  the body has the property of having that right at that time. It may also 
be the case that the individual memba^s of the collection also have the property by virtue 
of their membership in the collection or that there exist otha^ collections, of molecules, 
etc., that also have the property and so the right. Surely it is obvious that we are reaching 
the limit of plausibility here. But in virtue of what will the downward property sharing 6il 
at any of the ahrrementibned stages? What is the relevant difference between the body 
and the collection of cells, say, that makes downward property sharing non-applicable? I 
can think of no non-ad hoc limitation and Baker does not provide any, perh^s because 
she is unconcerned with this counterintuitive result. On its &ce, however, this result 
would appear to tell against her view. Not, admittedly, with defnitive force, but with an 
uncomfortable cumulative effect.
Second, combining certain aspects 6om the two alleged counterexamples, consider 
the case ofBen. Ben is an unh^py recruit in this story since he is the intended victim of a 
hypothetical murder by stabbing. Now, while it is illegal to murder Ben by stabbing him, it 
is not straightforwardly illegal to stab Ben's body. Take, for example, a case where Ben 
has just recently expired. If one were to sneak into his room and stab him, no crime has 
been committed-unless sneaking into his room is a crime or something like that-certainly 
not the crime of murder.'^ Of course. Baker may simply argue that the property ofbeing
^  A similar plot line was actually the focus of an episode of the now defunct TV 
program Co/n/nAo. In that episode, a man murders a woman and thar, upon realizing that 
he cannot expect to get away with his crime, he fames himself for a secow/ murder of the 
woman, "kills" her again (by shooting her), and then leaves the scene and waits for the 
police to fnd him out. He is caught for the second murder but exonerated when the
127
illegal to be murdered, or some sudi, is lost by Ben's body just when Ben expires, so my 
story does not promote a problem for her counterexamples. However, even if one did 
murder Ben in the story, which means that one has committed an illegal act and &r which 
he or she will stand trial, there is not then a second law that one has broken, that of 
murdering Ben's body or stabbing Ben's body or some such, for which one will also stand 
trial. But if this is the case, then why think that one has committed an additional illegal act 
by murdering Ben's body at all? And if one has not committed an additional illegal act by 
murdering Ben's body, then why think that Ben's body has the property ofbeing illegal to 
be murdered?
The third counterexample is similar to the second in that it involves a person and 
her body, but it is worth addressing since it teases out what appears to be one ofBaker's 
chief reasons for thinking her counterexamples tell against the only upward borrowing 
thesis.
When Baker illustrates and explains her qualiGcation "in the given background"^, 
she uses a new example, that of a Queen. The Queen, she does not say 6om where but 
we will say the Queen of England, has the property ofbeing respected in various ways and 
Baker mentions one: when the Queen enters a room, everyone stands.^  ^ Following
fbrensics show the time of death preceded the shooting. Luckily, Columbo never falls for 
such obvious chicanery and nabs the nefarious evildoer in the end.
[2000]: 53. This is similar to an aspect of my view and will be addressed in the 
next chapter.
Baker credits Fred Dretske who credits Susan Feegan for this example. Cf. 
[2000]: 52, hi. 50.
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Baker's suggestion, let us call the property that the Quern has the property ofbeing 
regally respected. The "given background"-namely, various social and political Matures 
of the worid-is essential for the Queen to be said to possess the propaty ofbeing regally 
respected. In other words, without the given background there would be no such 
property, so the Queen could not possess it, which is why this example illustrates Baker's 
"given background" concept. Now Baka^ says that the Queen's body, what she calls Bq, 
is also regally respected. And so I assume that Baka holds that Bq also has the propaty 
ofbeing regally respected. She gives as h a  justiûcation ofBq's having the property of 
being regally respected the &ct that when Bq enters a room, all pasons stand. Since Bq 
does not, indeed cannot, possess this propaty independently, it must possess the proper^ 
by virtue of its constitution relations to the Queen.
At this point in the chapter, it will come as no surprise that I hnd this new example 
troubling. Moreover, vdiile it just seems to me patently false that bodies can be regally 
respected, I recognize competing intuitions do not go very 6 r  in re&ting Baka's view. 
Thus, I will o8er four reasons for discarding Baker's Queen countaexample. First, 
regarding this example one might question whetha or not bodies enta, or can be fairly 
said to alter, rooms at all. Queens enta rooms to be sure, but I do not straightforwardly 
see how bodies can be smd to enta rooms. Bodies are cleady found in rooms, and they 
are spatially located in diSaent places at diSerent times, but / y / m a m o v i n g  about 
and entering rooms requires minimal intentionality, which bodies do not have. What 
bodies constitute, pahaps in part, do have minimal intentionality or at least might have 
minimal intentionality-e.g.. Queens. Queens have (at least) minimal intentionality; they
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can be said to enter rooms and to move about 6om chamber to chamber. Bodies, 
however, do not have minimal intentionality and can not be said to move about 6om 
chamber to chamber, where such moving about is the kind of moving that entails some 
measure of minimal intentionality, and entering rooms, wh^e entering a room entails at 
least minimal intention. Of course it could be the case that some one did not 
straightforwardly intend to enter (Aof room, but still that person did intend to open the 
door and move about and did have proportional attitudes with regard to how doors 
operate, how knobs work, how movement occurs, and all those sorts of things.
Second, while I suppose bodies could be regally respected in some other possible 
world, this is not in 6ct the case. Suppose, for example, that some distant tribe has the 
belief that an ancestor remains with the body for some period of time aAer death and so 
pays certain respects to that body. Here again, however, the ancestor is what is being 
respected and not the body. Again, when the Pharaohs were buried with much pomp and 
circumstance and with many of their earthly treasures (including their wives and servants), 
it was not because there was some magical quality attributed to the Pharaohs' bodies. 
Rather, it was because the Pharaohs were thought to be there and to need all kinds of stufT 
in the next world/life. So it seems to me, then, that the Pharaoh example is a 
counterexample to Baker's claim. With the Pharaohs we End the closest thing to a regally 
respected body that there is to End in this world, but it becomes obvious on further 
scrutiny that the bodies themselves were not venerated. Rather, the Pharaohs themselves 
were thought to be still present in spirit with their bodies.
130
W th respect to the Queen, I will grant that she is regally respected. But were the 
Queen not present, there would be no particular regal disposition with respect to the body, 
given the background circumstances of England. Were the body wheeled into the room, 
people would not stand-save, perhaps, in disgust. Were the Queen to switch bodies-or to 
become confused with her twin as in 77^ fnnce owf fauper-then when body A was 
found in a room, people would no longer stand, unless they were confused, whereas when 
body B, the new body, was found in the room, people would stand. And it clearly is not 
because of the body that the people stand, it is because of the Queen. Now, I suppose 
Baker would agree that it is because of the Queen that the people stand to pay their regal 
respects. Such would certainly be consistent with her view &r the body has the property 
ofbeing regally respected derivatively-the body gets the property by virtue of its 
constitution relation to the Queen, but to this, my response is two-6)ld and comprises also 
the hnal two responses of the four promised against Baker's Queen counterexample.
In the counterexample as Baker outlines it, the only evidence of property 
instantiation is the behavior on the part of the people, behavior that ostensibly indicates 
the presence of some object or objects that possess the property ofbeing regally 
respected. However, ex every time the Queen is present, the body is also
present. Further, every time the Queen is present, the people stand. Now, even Baker 
would agree that the Queen's being present sufBces to explain the behavior of the people, 
namely, that they stand-indeed, it is a sufBcient condition for the people's standing-since 
without question she has the property ofbeing regally respected. Moreover, the
131
association between the body and the Queen is accidental, not necessary.^ So vdiile it is 
true that the people stand in every case where the body is present and the Queen is 
constituted by the body, this does not serve as anything more than a co-relational 
coincidence brought about by virtue of the spatial coincidence ofbody and the Queen.
The case provides no warrant to suspect that anything beyond this is transpiring.
Elsewhere Baker suggests that observed causal features of a property strongly 
suggest the existence of the property .*^  In other words, if a property has causal Matures 
or causal efhcacy, then it is a genuine property. Now, the property ofbeing regally 
respected that body is said to possess makes no diSerence in the world. It has no causal 
efhcacy. The only property relevant to being regally respected, in this example, that 
makes a difference in the world-that has causal powers and makes it the case that people 
stand when the Queen enters a room (i.e., makes causal sense of the phenomena in this 
case)-is the property ofbeing regally respected that is had by the Queen. Of course. It 
would be fallacious to say that if there are no observed causal features, then the property 
in question is not a genuine property and lacks existence. But if there are no causal 
features that suggest the existence of the property, then we have no reason to think that 
the property exists. This does not mean that the property Ails to exist, it just means that 
we have no reason to suppose its existence and to suppose its existence without 
justihcation looks at best ad hoc. Further, were Bq to have the property, it would only be
^  That a body is necessary Ar the Queen's existing is granted, but AW body is not 
necessary-the Queen could have been constituted by any number of other bodies.
[2000]: 55.
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M much extra ontological baggage, extra weight. It would not do anything and would 
serve no purpose. In the case of the Queen's body and the property it is said to have of 
being regally respected and of people rising when the body enters the room, which is itself 
given as evidence of that property being instantiated by the Queen's body, since the 
presence of the Queen is sufhcient to account for the behavior of the people and since 
there is no clear causal connection between the Queen's body and the behavior of the 
people, there is no justiâcation on tW  alone to think that Bq has the property ofbeing 
regally respected. And if we can account for the phenomena without bloating our 
ontology with property instantiation that is unnecessary to account for the phenomena, 
then we ought to do so.
This last bit reduces to two overall points. First, the case provides no justihcation 
when accounting for the phenomena for the instantiation of the property in question by the 
Queen's body. Second, one ought not to needlessly multiply properties and bloat one's 
ontology if one can help it. Thus, since the ascription of the property ofbeing regally 
respected serves no purpose, explanatory or otherwise, in the case in question, and since 
the simplest explanation is the best explanation, cgigrw we ought not to think that
the Queen's body has the property ofbeing regally respected and this last counterexample 
of&red by Baker fails.
The issue in each of these examples-i.e., the flag, the Dean, and the Queen^-is 
\\iiether or not each constituting entity does exemplij^ the property it is said to have
^ Baker provides additional examples elsewhere (cf. [99]: especially 155, for her 
Betsy Ross flag example).
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derived &om the related constituted entity. In other words, while Baker has provided an 
account of property borrowing that indeed does go both directions, it is ambiguous 
whether this aspect of her account is a beneGt or a detriment-it is either just right or it is 
too broad-and it only becomes clear which it is when one ascertains whether or not the 
propaties that are said to be borrowed, including the properties that are said to be 
downward borrowed, are in &ct possessed by the relevant objects in question. If the 
Queen's body, for example, does not possess the property ofbeing regally respected, or if 
we have no reason to think that her body possesses such a property, then, far &om being a 
positive consequence ofBaker's construal of the constitution relation, the fact that her 
view entails downward property borrowing tells against h a  view; it turns out that her 
construal of the relation is too broad and allows properties to be shared that are not in fact 
shared. I have argued that just this is the case.
3. Borrowing Primary Kind Properties
Even if constituting objects can borrow properties &om their constituted cousins, 
it remmns to be seen whether or not they can borrow any and all such properties. As was 
indicated earlier, Baker limits the type of properties that may be borrowed. She notes that 
alethic properties, identity/constitution/existence properties, properties "rooted outside 
times at which they are had", and hybrid properties may not be borrowed in any 
direction.® However, there is a special type of property, what Baker calls primary-kind 
properties, that she argues can be borrowed in either direction. There is an open question.
® [2000]: 49, and fh 47 and 48, especially regarding temporally rooted and hybrid 
properties.
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however, whether or not such properties can be shared through downward property 
borrowing even if some downward propaty borrowing is possible.™ To that end, then, in 
what follows I hrst get clear just what Baker intends by primary-kind properties and what 
it amounts to if they can be borrowed. I thai investigate and ciihque the plausibility of 
sharing such properties.
A  .BuAer f  Frew
Be&re we can ascertain whether or not primary-kind properties are borrowable we 
must Srst be clear just what primary-kind properties are and this is not as easy as it would 
seem at Erst glance. One of the foremost problems is that Baker is not always as tidy with 
her language as she could be. In a paper responding, in part, to essentialist objections 
raised by Michad Della Rocca to the constitution without identity thesis. Baker oSers an 
argument that, while interesting in its own right, is intriguing as it relates to what she says 
about primary-kind properties.^^ An extended quote E"om Baker is warranted here:
... consider this form of essentialism: for every concrete thing, there is a 
kind of which the thing fundamentally is a member. No concrete thing is 
fundamentally a member of more than one kind. As Aristotle might say, 
the kind that provides the answer to the question-'vhat is x?'-is the kind
™ Baker admits that this is a viable question. In other words, she recognizes that it 
is possible to accept the notion of having properties derivatively-especially downward-but 
deny that a thing can have a primary-kind property derivatively ([2000]: 57). This point 
has also been raised elsewhere by NEchael Della Rocca (cf [2000]: 57, hi. 52).
See Baker [1997] and Della Rocca, "Essentialists and Essentialism", JowTKzZ q/" 
fW w qp/y 93 (1996c): pp. 186-202. In the latter, Della Rocca gives an interesting 
argument, Erom an essenEalist perspective and along a Kripkean line, against the 
constitution is not idenEty view.
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of which X is fundamentally a member. The essential kind-properties of a 
thing are the essential properties that all members of its hindamental kind 
share; if a thing has any other essential properties, then other they are 
entailed by its essential kind properties, or they are not properties essential 
to all monbers of any kind.^
Baker's view here is that since objects can be Amdamentally a member of only one kind, 
they can have essential properties related only to their fundamental kind properly or 
essential properties that are entmled by no kinds whatsoever. In other words, objects will 
only possess essential properties that accompany hmdamental membership in one kind, or 
by virtue of entailments related to that kind membership, or related to no kind membership 
whatsoever. Here Baker is using the term 'fundamentally' in similar ways that she uses 
the term 'primary' in her later work. 'Primary-kind property', then, becomes the re&rence 
for what she is here calling fundamental membership of one kind. In addition, while it is 
not clearly stated, what she says here is consistent with her view that while one thing can 
fundamentally be a member of one and only one kind, that same thing can also be a 
member of multiple other kinds though not fundamentally a member of those kinds.
Elsewhere Baker allows that although Piece and David are alike with regard to 
their "atomic structure" they diSer in kind precisely because the diGkrence in kind is 
rooted in a diSerence in essential properties and, in the case in question, the diSerence in 
essential properties is rooted in a difference in relational properties. Of course, on her 
view, it is still true that Piece has the property ofbeing a statue and that David has the
^  [1997]: 618.
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property ofbeing a piece of marble-again, where this latter property is a kind propaty-or 
being a piece, but, of course, both of these are derivative and this must be why she thinks 
they dif&r in kind: "so despite the fact that David and Piece are alike in atomic structure 
they diSa in kind: the relational properties that David has essentially Piece has only 
accidentally. Hence, the needed asymmetry to make David and Piece diSerent in kind is 
secured".^
Both David and Piece bear the same kind-type properties with respect to one 
another on her view. The most important kind-type properties they share, of course, are 
the property ofbeing a statue and the property ofbeing a piece. Now they share these, 
but she suggests that David's being a piece is not essential to David, and that David is a 
statue essentially, while Piece is not a statue essentially, but is a piece essentially. The 
diGkrence in kind, then, is interestingly enough rooted in a diSerence in the modal nature 
of kind properties. Bang a statue, much like bang human, is a kind property, but whetha 
things are similar with respect to kind is determined not by possession of a kind property, 
but by how one possesses a kind property. So it looks like, Srst of all, on Baker's view 
that there is but one property-one token property ofbeing a statue-that is exempliSed by 
two difkrent individuals. One exemplihes it in such a way that it is necessary k r  the thing 
to be, that is David for being a statue, and the other object exempliGes it in such a way 
that it is not necessary for that thing to be, that is Piece 6>r being a statue. Both are 
properly so-called a statue, so in that sense, both have the kind property ofbeing a statue, 
but Baker holds that they difkr with respect to kind, and here she must mean something
^  [2000]: 178.
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like primary-kind, though that is not what she says. Instead, she just says "kind", but it is 
obvious that they do not diSer with respect to kind-they both exen^l% t/ze azTMc 
property-though, given her view, they do diSer with respect to primary kind.^*
Thus, on her view both David and Piece have the property ofbeing a statue, but 
only David is a statue in every world in which it is found, not Piece, and so is necessarily a 
statue and has the property ofbeing a statue essentially.^  ^ And so it turns out that on 
Baker's view primary-kinds entml all essential properties that are related to kinds and all 
kind-related essential properties entail a givai object's primary-kind. In other words, 
given any object whatever, said object has the sole primary-kind PK if and only if it has all 
and only the set of essential properties PK^.
While there are any number of ways one might construe the primary-kind proper^ 
that Statue has ofbeing a statue. Baker intends to wed said property inextricably to 
Statue's set of essential properties. Thus, Statue has the property ofbeing a statue in the 
actual world, Wa, and in every other possible world where Statue exists such that in all the 
worlds where Statue exists it has the property ofbeing a statue. To say that Statue has 
a  AüA/g as its primary kind, then, is just to say that Statue has Aemg a  aüAre as an 
essential property. That is one way to construe the daim. And since this is what Baker 
intends by primary kinds, the relation concerns kind properties and the ways that kind
[2000]: 178. I think that Baker has simply been sloppy with her language in this 
section. If this is not the case, then I do not know what sense can be made of her 
distinction between kinds and primary-kinds. Nevertheless, this is a confusing section and 
it need not be.
The reverse can be said with respect to the property ofbeing a piece.
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properties are exempliGed across possible worlds (or modal contexts). On this 
understanding, the relevant modality scopes properties but is not inherent in properties, 
thus saving Baker &om inconsistency with respect to those properties-namely, alethic 
properties-which she holds to be of the non-borrowing variety.
But can such properties be borrowed by constitutional cousins? I have already 
argued against any and all downward property sharing. Assuming that Baker and her 
Mends may Gnd a way to counter those arguments, I now o9er a slightly weaker thesis: 
namely, that no primary-kind properties may be shared.
B. fnmwy-ArW A-qperAgf
Now, if it were the case, for example, that the primary-kind propaty that David is 
said to share with Piece (or vice versa) is not the same property that Piece borrows, then 
Baker would have a problem. She would have a problem because, if such were the case, 
David could not, technically speaking, gift said property to Piece-David would not have it 
to give! In other words, if the property that Piece borrows is not the same property that 
David possesses, one could not plausibly hold that Piece borrowed it 6om David. But as 
we have seen. Baker is not committed to a diSerence in property here. On her view, there 
is but one property, K, that David and Piece are said to share. The diSerence in primary 
kinds that also holds between the two lies in the fact that David has K essentially while
The kind property, for example, being a statue, is borrowable, though the 
property ofbeing a statue essentially is not. If one takes David and puts David and the 
Thinker together in a room, then one has two properties, one exempliSed by Thinker and 
the bronze and one exemplihed by David and the marble, that are statue properties. We 
can say of four entities that they have the property ofbeing a statue, but we can only say 
of two of them that they are of the primary kind statue ([2000]: 178).
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Piece has it contingently. Even so, there are reasons to think that Baker has not made a 
satisfactory case for the sharing ^  either direction, but especially downward) of primary- 
kind properties. Indeed, I argue that her doctrine of primary kinds and primary-kind 
properties is metaphysically extraneous.
Part of my concern with Baker's borrowing thesis with respect to primary-kind 
properties comes &om her distinction between kind properties and primary-kind 
properties. On Baker's view, David and Piece have the same kind property, the property 
of a  fAzA/g. How Baker can then hold that David and Piece di@er with respect to 
kind when they possess the self-same property (perhaps the same token property) of Aemg 
a sAzA/g is somewhat unclear. To root the difkrence in kind in essential properties makes 
sense ifTkind membership is determined by whether or not the particular property must be 
essential in order far it, some object, to be taken to be of that kind. But this is precisely 
her claim with respect to primary-kind properties elsewhere^ not kind properties. Baker 
is perilously close to conSating her own kind/primary kind distinction.^'
Of course, as I noted earlier. Baker is simply sloppy with her language at times 
when speaking of kinds and primary kinds. When she is careful, she appears to hold that
77 [97]: 618.
This is predsely the impression one gets 6om the section alluded to earlier: "so 
despite the fact that David and Piece are alike in atomic structure they difkr in kind: the 
relational properties that David has essentially Piece has only accidentally. Hence, the 
needed asymmetry to make David and Piece diSdent in kind is secured" ([2000]: 178). 
Here she must mean something like David and Piece diSer with respect to primary kind, 
though this is not what she says. Moreover, this discussion is found after she has made 
her Idnd/primary-kind distinction, vddch makes it all the more puzzling. I will have 
something more to say about this issue in the next section.
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there is a diGerence between being a statue and being a statue wherever and Wienever a 
thing exists.^ The former is a kind property, indeed a primary-kind property, that both 
David and Piece share, vdiile the latter entails that the relevant kind is also the object's 
primary kind, which is only true 6)r David/" Even so, I have the strong sense that tlus 
distinction lacks warrant. If one has the property ofbeing a statue, that property entails 
being a piece of art, where being a piece of art itself entails existence in only art-worlds. 
That is, an object's having the property of Zwrng aprece art entails the essenüal
property of m a» art-worM; thus, one cannot have the kind property ofbeing a
statue unless one also has the property of existing in all and only art-worlds. In which 
case, since Piece exists in worlds other than art-worlds, it cannot exempli^ the property of 
being a statue-and thus is not a statue.
Kind membershq) is more restricted than Baker allows." A particular object may 
or may not have various nonessential properties that are related essentially to specrhc 
kinds and yet not be, by virtue of lacking those properties as essential properties, a 
member of that kind. In other words. Piece may well be statue-like, but does not have the 
kind property ofbeing a statue and so is not a statue. Piece might possess certain
^  [99]: 146.
For ease, I am interpreting Baker as follows: the kind property of a  fAzA/e 
is exemplihed by statues and non-statues alike, the necessary exemplihcation of the kind 
property of a  fAzA/e makes the relevant kind the primary kind of a given object and 
is true of all and only statues, and the exemplihcation of the property of a  fAzAre 
one '.y PK is an essential property of all and only statues and is entailed by an object's 
exemplihcation of Aeing a fAzAre as its primary kind.
"  For Baker's view, cf. [1997] and [2000].
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properties that are normally associated with statues and that may even be essential to 
statues-e.g., the property of existing in an art-worid-but precisely because Piece does not 
have these properties essentially (i.e., has them contingently), Piece is not a statue. There 
is a 1:1 relationship between being of the kind statue and exemplifying those essential 
properties associated with the kind statue.*  ^ So it is Air to say of Piece that it is statue­
like, but not that it is a statue.
Needless to say. Baker does not buy my argument. The crucial premise is: being a 
piece of art entails existence in only art-worlds. She would deny this premise, while 
choosing instead to afGrm that: being a piece of art entails existaice in an art-world. In 
other words, whüe I daiy that some object can be a statue, and so a piece of art, 
contingently. Baker afBrms that some object can be a statue contingently. Our 
disagreement on this score comes down to how one understands kinds and kind 
membership. While my understanding of the relationship between kinds and 
corresponding essential properties is hardly novel", it does make the addition of primary- 
kind properties metaphysically extraneous." Kind properties do all the work that Baker
"  That is to say, there is an equivalence relation that holds between exempliGcation 
of statueness and exempliGcation of a certain set of essential properties-that would 
include, but not be limited to, the essential property of existing in only art-worlds.
"  Cf Kripke [80]; Wiggins [80]; Monte Cook, "If'Cat' Is A Rigid Designator, 
What Does It Designate?" PAz/ofqp/zzcaZ 37 (March 1979): 61-64; Michael J.
Loux, Substance and Attribute (Boston, MA: D. Reidel Publishing, Co., 1978); Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, cf. (D/fcourfg on and MbTiadbZqgy); Aristotle (McKeon
[41]: cf. Cotggorfgf andAA^opAyacf).
"  Further, as I understand them, kind properties are not borrowable on Baker's 
view as they either are essential properties, entail essential properties, or both.
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employs primaiy-kind properties to do. As such, the addition ofpiimaiy-kind properties 
amounts to a needless multiplication of metaphysical layers and a needless duplication of 
metaphysical tasks. All the met^hysics can be accounted for without resorting to primary 
kinds and primary-kind properties save for Baker's borrowing thesis with respect to 
primary-kind properties. Without some real work &r primary kinds and primary-kind 
properties to do, the thesis is ad hoc.'^
4. Sorting Out Counting in Baker's World
One of the concerns that often &ces constitution theorists has to do with an 
alleged, counterintuitive multiplication of properties, like a thing's weight. Suppose, 6>r 
example, that Rodin's The Thinker weighs in at an even 7 pounds, and further suppose 
that another object, we may caU it Bronze, is spatially coincident with Thinker at some 
time. Now, if TMnker weighs 7 pounds, it stands to reason that its constituting partner. 
Bronze, also weighs 7 pounds. But if this is the case, then should not the mass of the 
objects in the space occupied by both Thinker and Bronze, S, total 14 pounds? An 
afBrmative response is admittedly counterintuitive-especiaHy when the object(s) 
occupying S are weighed and the scale shows only 7 pounds-but a negative response can 
be just as counterintuWve. Either Thinker weighs 7 pounds and Bronze has no weight at
As I mentioned earlier, however, this is consistent with many of the major 
elements ofBaker's account remaining intact. To say of Piece that it possesses many of 
its properties, though not the kind statue, because of its relation to David (and vice versa), 
makes her account, though not quite completely accurate because kind properties are not 
shared, still mainly accurate. Piece can still be said to have the property Aemg /oiW  Zy 
or whatever, derivatively while David has that property nonderivatively even 
though, at most, Piece is statue-like and is not a statue per se. Thus, this is the weaker 
version of my argument vdiere the stronger version is that there is no downward property 
sharing whatever.
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all (or vice versa) or each reo/fy only weighs 3.5 pounds, not 7. Of course, if there are 
other constitudng entities present-e.g., the collection of atomic particles that constitutes 
Bronze-the latter disjunct would not provide a sufhcient explanation; the weight would 
need to be further distributed among all constitutionally related entities in S. Is this a real 
problem for constitution theorists? There are those who would have us think so."^
As troubling as a multiplication of weight would seem, a multiplication of kinds 
would be even more troubling, but this is precisely what some argue must occur, and for 
the same reasons given above, if the constitution relation holds among, for example, a 
statue and its constituent matter. In "Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge 
to the Standard Account"*^, Michael Burke claims that the following dehnes the standard 
account of the constitution relation: "objects x and y coincide at time t just in case 1) x is 
not y, and 2) the place wholly occupied a ttby  the whole of x is numerically the same as 
the place wholly occupied at t by the whole of y".** He notes that as dehned coincidence
Burke [92] and "Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel 
Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortais, and Persistence Conditions" 
P/n&wqpAy wKf P/Knonzgno/bgicu/ TkfeorcA 54 (1994b): pp. 591-624; reprinted in and 
cited 6om Material Constitution: a Reader ed. Michael C. Rea (New York, NY : Rowman 
and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 236-272; Zimmerman [95]; Rea, "Constitution 
and Kind Membership", f 97 (September 1997a): pp. 169-193, and 
"Supervenience and Co-location", /bfqp/nm/ gwwfgr/y 34 (1997d): pp.
367-75; Baker [2000]: 176Æ I raise this issue as a means of introducing the problem of 
property multiplication for constitution theorists. In what follows, I primarily address the 
multiplication of kinds. I return to the issue of weight, etc., in the next chapter.
Burke [92].
"[1992]:13 .
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is irreûexive and ubiquitous. Moreover, essential to the standard account is that 
constitutionally related objects, e.g., Piece and Statue, diSer with respect to sort, i.e., they 
exhibit diSerent sortais. But, Burke asks, given that Piece and Statue are qualitatively 
identical, how could they possibly di@er with respect to sort? Another way of asking the 
question, what is it about Piece and Statue that makes them diSer with respect to sort?
The problem, as he sees it, is that there is no relevant diGEerence between Statue and Piece 
that can serve to ground their diSerence in sort. Hence, on the standard account, there 
must be multiple (at least two) statues present in the same space as Statue. He 
acknowledges that this is counterintuitive and takes it as an argument against the standard 
account and, by extension, constitution.*^
.B . 's  jSA e A e c d k
Baker recognizes the difhculty present in Burke's charge and oSers it as one of the 
reasons that her property borrowing discourse is so important: namely, her property 
borrowing thesis explains important ways that her view is dif&rent 6om what Burke calls 
the standard account. She notes that it is important on the standard account that Copper, 
the piece of copper, and Statue, the statue that Copper composes, do not share primary- 
kind properties. That is to say, that Copper is not a statue. Baker notes that Burke thinks 
that this is important precisely because it makes the standard account more plausible. 
Otherwise there is an uimecessary multiplication of statues in the same spatial-temporal 
extension. However, Baker contends that her view does not have this consequence.^
[1992]. See also Dean Zimmerman [1995]. 
[2000]: 169fF.
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While providing various examples in support of her theory on propaty borrowing, 
Baker states explicitly that there is but one token of any given propaty present in the 
spatio-temporal region of constitutionally related entities. It is this fact that accounts for 
Statue and Piece failing to have, far example, 2n for weight: "So not only does x really 
have H by having it derivatively, but also-and this is the other hand-if x has H 
derivatively, then there are not two independent instances o flT  .^  ^ In other words, if I 
understand Baker here, there are not two tokens of property H present, there is but one 
token of
Even so, this interpretation is troubling for "instance" can be read as "token" as I 
have done or it could be read as "exemplification". (I suppose tha^e may be other ways of 
reading it as well.) The former seems right, the latter is Sawed since there must be two 
exempliScations: two individuals possess and exempli^ the property and, indeed, possess 
that property in different ways (and exemplify it under different conditions and in 
dif&rence circumstances). On the face of it, this would create just the problems Baker 
seeks to avoid. Once again, as elsewhere, 'independent' is carrying quite a bit of weight. 
Its addition here makes it sound like there might indeed be two instances of H, but that 
they are not independent instances. The problem remains that we have nothing other than 
a generally intuitive &el for what it means, though its meaning is clearly key to the 
discussion. Baker does add an example of the type of thing she has in mind. She says that 
"the reason that derivative properties are not 'additive' is that i/Kre M io odkf: x's
[2000]: 177. CF also Baker [99]. 
[2000]: 177.
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having F derivatively is nothing other than x's being constitutionally related to something 
that has F nonderivatively. Look at it this way: if x and y have constitution relations and x 
is an F, then x is the same F as y", and also that "Piece is the same statue as David (in 
virtue of constitution relations), and Tully is the same person as Cicero (in virtue of 
identity)" It does not make sense to add the number of hairs on Cicero's head to the 
number of hairs on Tully's head in order to arrive at the total number of hairs on the head 
of the orator in the comer. In similar fashion, it does not make sense to do this for the 
qualitative properties ofDavid and Piece either.^
While this may indeed provide an adequate response to a needless multiplication of 
properties like weight and the like, it does not so easily account for a multiplication of 
kinds. In the case of weight one could indeed hold, as Baker does here, that there is but 
one weight property present, and that the number of weight properties is what is relevant 
when weighing things, not that there are two objects present. However, when one is 
concerned with counting objects, say, statues, one might hold that what is relevant is not 
the number of properties, but the number of objects. To her credit, Baker recognizes this 
distinction and moves to provide an alternative theory of counting that accords with her 
constitution view and our intuitions that there is but one statue present where Thinker is 
now present.
Baker claims that Piece is the same statue as David, and she does this by changing 
John Perry's analysis of how sortais range over objects 6om x M (Ae sam efay}/ ü
zdeMtzcaZwzf/zj/oWx wonF, which is Perry's view, to (C): x zj Ae sazzzg at r
^  [2000]: 177, emphasis in orginal.
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% zf w  X &K cowüAzüoM reizffow w ^^of f owfx zf a » F o f f/* If (C) is
true, then it fallows that Piece ü  the same statue as David and we no longer have a 
problem of multiplying statues. That is, we no longer have a case of two spatially 
coincident statues, there is but one statue and Piece and David are both it. There is but 
one property Agzzzg zz .$6zAzg exemplihed at t by both Piece and David-David exemplihes it 
independently and Piece exemplihes it in virtue of its relation to David Thus, while it is 
true that it is exemplihed in diSerent ways-David exempliSes it nondenvatively while 
Piece exemplihes it denvaüvel)Mhis does not aSect the counting of sorts and thus does 
not lead to a needless multiplication of statues there and then.
While Baker does not give a clear argument in favor of (C)-she has simply noted 
her belief that (C) is true-she has provided an alternative to those who thiidc that z/"% zf wz 
F  rzwf y zf azzF zzzzzf x zf zzot zdezzfzca/ to y, t/zezz t/zere we two Fy. Here she addresses 
what is admittedly a very important issue. She oSers a three-way classiGcation-identity, 
constitution, and separate existence^-and she asks, and seeks to address, how one is to 
use this three-way classiGcation for the purpose of counting kinds.
Baker contends that counting can be done either by using idenGty-4f two objects 
are not identical, then they count as two-or by nonseparateness-4f x and y are Fs, then
9* [2000]: 174.
^  [99]: 157. Note the ambiguity in 'separate existence'. One can understand 
separate existence as "wholly independent" or one can understand separate existence as 
"in some way difkrent than", and there are probably a host of opGons in between. Baker 
has assumed, I think, that separate existence means "wholly distinct". Clearly, then, 
consGtution is not separate existence, on such a deGniGon. But on other deGniGons 
consGtuGon may weU Gnd a home under the scope of separate existence. I will address 
this concern further in the next secGon.
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there is one F only if x and y are nonseparate (where 'nonseparate' means either 
constitutionally related or identical). Thus, when counting the number of statues present 
at the spatio-temporal coordinates of Piece and David we count but one, since Piece and 
David are nonseparate, as they are constitutional cousins.
C. CaMMorZfiave
Baker's point in all this seems to be that there is but one property a jWwe 
exemplihed (at t) by both Piece and David. Admittedly, the property is exemplihed in 
diSerent ways for David exempliûes it nonderivatively and Piece exemplihes it 
derivatively. However, Ar Aom causing a problem, this Act allows for Baker's proposed 
solution to multiplying kinds. While her proposed solution is clevo", I wish to address two 
primary concerns with respect to her method of counting.
First, as Baker attempts to respond to the charge that she is committed to the 
existence of two spatially coincident statues she is guilty of a confusion. She appears at 
Ast blush to want to count by way of property. The Act that David and Piece exemplify, 
on her view, the same property, S (where S is being a statue), appears to entail that there 
is only one statue present and they are the jo/ne statue, where sameness, here, is 
determined by exemplihcation of the numerically identical property. Now, I will grant that 
according to her view the property exempliGed by Statue and Piece is numeiicaUy 
identical, but not that the statues present are. Indeed, the objects cannot be identical on 
her viev^ they are constitutionally related. Why, then, are there not two sAtues?
Baker thinks that her counting thesis (C) somehow matches with how we count 
things; however, there is no argument. In Act, Leibniz' Law has been taken to be a
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criterion for numerical identity, which looks like a claim about how we count things-once 
Statue and Piece &il to be numerically idendcal, they fail to be counted as one object.^ 
And we count kinds by reference to the objects, or individuals, that are said to exempli^ 
the relevant kind, not by reference to property. So Wiile we have but one property, on her 
view, that is co-exenq)liGed we have two individuds that exempli^ said
^  I may have just as well have said "individual" rather than "object". Baker is 
clearly committed to there being two individuals extant in the spatio-temporal region 
occupied by Statue-Piece. I doubt, however, that anything turns on using "individual" 
rather than "object".
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property-both Piece and David.^ Now, it seam  to me that this is a paradigm case where 
there are two spatially coincident statues.
While Baker would disagree with my characterizadon of her view, I &il to see how 
she skirts this consequence. f W n z a e i t h e r  Copper exempliûes statueness, in vdiich
Though they possess it in different ways, they do exempli^ it. This is clear in 
Baker's response to a proposed counterexample of&red by Anil Gupta. Gupta suggests 
that on the supposition that Piece preexists David, so, say, in 1499 Piece exists, and David 
comes into existence in, say, 1504, that when Jones points to David in 1506 and says the 
following: "there is a statue over there that existed in 1499", then if what Baker has said is 
accurate, and we say that Piece is a statue, then Piece exists in 1499 and what Jones says 
is true. But of course the objection is that what Jones says is not true since Piece does not 
constitute a statue in 1499.
Baker's response is interesting. We have convicting intuitions and it looks like 
Baker's account cannot resolve our conVicting intuitions with regard to the truth value of 
the statement made by the person who points to Piece. However, Baker charges Jones 
with making an ambiguous re&rence. On one reading of the reference, the statement is 
true. On a diSerent reading of the reference, the statement is &lse. In both cases, it is 
misleading. Indeed there is something over t/zerg which has the property of being a statue 
in 1506 and which existed in 1499. But since Piece acquired the property in 1504, and did 
not have the property in 1499, and so did not exist and have the property of bang a statue 
in 1499, the statement is misleading.
Noteworthy in her response is the clear implication that there are two objects 
present in 1506-the object that can be ostensively referenced as Piece and the object that 
can be ostensively referenced as David-and that there appears to be a way of ostensively 
re&rring th ^  picks out one and not the other: "there is something over there, namely. 
Piece, that has the property of being a statue and that existed in 1499" ([2000]: 175). One 
thinks that one could also say that there is something over there, namely, David, that has 
the property of being a statue but \\diich 6iled to exist in 1499. There are two somethings 
over there and, interestingly, they both exempli^ the property-in 1506, at least-of being a 
statue. How it is, then, that there is but one statue is perplexing. Alternatively, if there 
really is only one statue there, one wonders in what sense are there two objects there that 
both exempli^ statueness.
Baker is correct when she says that, given the ambiguity of the statement and given 
that one construal of the statement can make the statement true, that the counterexample 
does not tell against her view. It is true nevertheless that the way she is forced to respond 
to the counterexample makes it plausible that she respond in the same way earlier in her 
Perry discussion and if she responds in that way earlier, then she is not farced, and we are 
not forced, to accept her downward property sharing-and thus are not forced to accept 
her account of how it is that we count objects.
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case it is a statue and we have at least two statues present in the same spatial-temporal 
region, or Copper &ils to exemplify statueness, in which case Copper is not a statue and 
the notion of property borrowing is problematic. Of course, Baker holds that the Grst 
diqunct is ambiguous and that there is more than one way of construing it, including the 
notion that both Copper and Statue exemplify the same property.^ Even so. Baker is 
committed to there being two individuals/objects there and then and if two objects 
exempli^ statueness, whether derivative or nonderivative, then there are two 
exempliScations of statueness-the number of properties that are present is irrelevant 
here-so the &ct that they exempli^ the numerically identical property, if such is possible, 
should not aSect the count. That is, we count by objects or individuals, not by properties; 
thus, there are two statues present and Baker is guilty of the charge of multiplying statues.
Now, Baker thinks that (C)-^ is the same F as y at t  =df x is identical to y or x has 
constitution relations t o y a t t  and Fxt [x has F at t]-accords with our intuitions with 
regard to counting most, if not all, things, notably statues, and that this thesis saves her 
&om the multiplication charge. However, she gives no argument or evidence for the 
(empirical) claim that (C) accords with our counting intuitions. She relies, rather, just on 
the intuitions themselves^, which is all the more troubling since intuitions do not provide
^  But even on this understanding ofBaker's view they must possess said property 
in diGEerent ways and one could argue, as I have done previously, that the primary-kind 
notion of being a statue is tied inextricably to the notion ofhaving that property 
essentially, ofhaving that property nonderivitively in Baker's jargon, and if a property is 
had contingently and derivatively, then it is not the primary-kind property.
^  Admittedly, the justihcation of certain metaphysical theses may at times reduce 
to intuition, but such is not always the case. Regardless of the value of arguments based 
on intuition, when there are competing intuitions such arguments are insuf&cient.
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substantial aipport 6)r a thesis of how we myhcf count. Moreova^, her entire constitution 
thesis Êies in the face of a more basic intuition that is undaiiably present-^ianiely, that 
there is but one statue in the spatio-temporal region ofDavid precisely because thae is but 
one object. Indeed, Baka's assertions hae  have a suspiciously ad hoc Savor to them and 
at the very least no one who thinks that she is guilty of double counting will buy (C), so 
she has not met the diarge of h a  critics. Even so, thae is anotha difhculty which centers 
on h a  three way division: identity, constitution, and separateness.
Second, Baka makes a great deal about the fact that constitution is intended as a 
third alternative between identic and separate existence. Now, identity is a clear 
enough relation, but Baker's notion of separate existence is anything but, and it seems to 
me that in orda to draw dear conclusions 6om the &ct that constitution must be a via 
media between these two rdations, we ought to know what the other side is. She has 
provided an intuitive sense of separate existence by pointing at two apples as a paradigm 
example, but there is an overabundance of room between identity and two spatially distinct 
^ples in a barrel for constitution to hnd a home.
What Baker needs to provide is the necessary and sufBdent criteria for separate 
existence. What that amounts to will have great eSect on whether or not her 
understanding of constitution is the only via media approach out there for constitution. Of 
course, I think it is not. To her credit, she does make an attempt at necessary and 
sufBcient criteria of a sort. She says that to count one can either choose counting by 
identity "if x and y are Fs, then there is one F only ifx is identical to y", which is Perry's
[2000]: 174.
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view, or by nonseparateness "if x and y are Fs, thai there is one F only if x and y are 
nonseparate" Wiere, and here she Gnally dehnes nonseparate and, not surprisingly, it is in 
relation to identity and constitution, where x and y are nonseparate ifT either x is identical 
to y or X is consütuüonally related to yV" Now it appears that she is no longer intent on 
deGning constitution as a via media between separate existence and identity; rather, she 
deGnes what it means to be nonseparate, and so what it means to be separate, in relation 
to consGtuGon and idenGty. In other words, the relaGons of consGtuGon and idenGty are 
used to deGne separate existence. So, far G-om Baker using the noGon of separateness to 
help make sense of the consGtuGon relaGon^"°, she deGnes it in light of the consGtuGon 
relaGon. Whether this is viciously circular or not, nonseparateness, or separateness, can 
not itself serve to help explain consGtuGon since consGtuGon is a necessary component of 
its own deGniGon.
Moreover, this is to say nothing of the problem Baker faces of showing how her 
deGniGon matches with the paradigm example of the two apples. Baker is committed to 
the view that there are but three opGons: idenGty, consGtuGon, or separateness. But this is 
only true if separateness is a very broad tent, including things which are not wholly 
distinct, either spatially or temporally or mereologically. Are two clouds which overlap
101 [2000]: 174.
Which is the implicaGon when she claims that her view is a unity amidst 
diSerence-"! want to make sense of consGtuGon as a third category, intermediate between 
idaiG^ and separate existence" ([2000]: 29)-a middle posiGon between idenGty and 
separate existence.
^"^[99]: 157.
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separate or nonseparate? How about two shadows? Two holes? How about various 
versions of Siamese twins? Baker's kind of counting introduces a troubling vagueness 
into counting that does not exist on Perry's method, and a nonvague theory of counting is 
to be preferred to a vague theory/"*
Baker's \iew, vdiile onginal, has its own set of unique problems that greatly 
inveigh against its viability as a view of material constitution. I now turn to a statement of 
my own view which incorporates some Matures similar to those found here, but none of 
the more problematic ones, e.g., downward property borrowing. I argue that one need 
not accept the negative consequences of^  far example. Baker's view in order to give a 
robust picture of the constitution relation.
If Mark Johnston's claim that constitution is an inherently vague notion is 
correct, then there is no criteria of counting that includes constitution as an element that is 
nonvague (Cf. [92]: 56).
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Chapter 5
m A^g PPbrM
1 Introduction
I am now in a position to o& r my own version of the constitution relation. In 
what follows, I Srst address two intrinsic theories of&red recently by Samuel Levey and 
Michad Rea. As these views are both intrinsio-4hat is, all properties of objects are 
determined by their parts and intrinsic relations among their parts-they are inadequate to 
account for all constitutionally related phmomena. After critically evaluating those views, 
I then ofkr my own, which, like Levey and Rea, has intrinsic Matures, but unlike Levey 
and Rea, also has extrinsic elements vdiich allows me to account for a broader set of 
phenomena. I then use my view to address several criticisms of constitution 5)und in the 
literature. Finally, I show how my version of constitution can help make sense of entities 
in both the social and religious realms in addition to garden-variety, everyday objects.
IL Compositional Principles and K-wise Arrangement: Two Intrinsic Theories
1. Compositional Principles
Samuel Levey has written a wonderful article in which he distinguishes two 
primary elements within the standard account of constitution.^ First, that the coincidence 
between distinct material objects is possible. This he calls the Doctrine of Coincidents. 
Second, that the coincident relationship between objects is ubiquitous. Levey affirms the
 ^Levey follows Burke's terminology, cf. Burke [1997].
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Grst and denies the second, but he thinks that Michael Buike has laid down a signihcant, 
and difBcult, task for the proponents of the standard account: namely, how two objects 
can coincide and still diSer with regard to sortal. He allows that the standard account 
theorist has shown tAof this could be, but they have not explained how this could be, and 
he thinks that such an explanation is essential if the standard account is to respond to 
Burke-type challenges. Even so, Levey has bigger dsh to Ay and opts to drop the sortal 
concern that Burke pushes and to ask how two coinciding objects could diSer in any 
qualitative way whatever.^
Two other important elements Aame Levey's discussion. First, he maintains that a 
thing can have two types of properties: properties that belong to its core and properties 
that supervene on its core. By 'core', Levey means, I take it, a thing's physical parts.^ 
Second, he holds that dispositional, counterfactual, and modal properties supervene on the 
core physical structure of a thing. Now, since two coincident objects share the same core 
physical structure-that is just what the Doctrine of Coincidents claims-Levey wants to 
know how they could possibly diGer with respect to any such properties. Far Aom being a 
problem merely for sortais, object coincidence is, then, a problem for any measure of 
qualitative dissimilarity.*
" [1997]: 2.
 ^Here, I disagree. For objects like dollar bills, statues and other artworks, and 
perhaps other objects as well, have properties that supervene on an object and the object's 
relations. For example, the value of a dollar bill supervenes on the structure oW how that 
structure is related within an economic community.
* [1997]: 3. If one allows Levey to Aame the question in this way, there is no way 
that two coincident objects could diAer with respect to such properties save in the extreme
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These two assumptions lead to what Levey tarns the DiSerence Thesis: modal 
diSerence only if core diSerence. Since no core diSerence, no modal-dispositional, 
etc.-difkrence; so it looks like no coincidence. This is vdiat he calls the supervenience 
problem. Among others, Levey takes this problem to be an important one 6»r constitution 
theorists, and he thinks that the supervenience problem must be answered by showing how 
it is posâble that there could be qualitadve diSerence amidst objects with intrinsic physical 
indiscermbility, which is precisely what Levey aims to show.
Levey oGers a mereological view of objects^, but supposes that while parts 
compose objects, those parts can be diGkraitly related-causahy related-and that each 
diGerent causal interrelationship of parts is sufBcient to explain a composition of those 
parts. These diGerent causally efScacious interrelational principles he calls principles of 
composition and an object's principle of composition determines all of its essenhal 
properties, including all essential properties related to its sort: "a composite object's 
essential properties are determined by those properties of its parts that are relevanGy 
coimected with its principle of composition".^ All other properties, properties unrelated to
examples he oGers. However, I see no good reason to Game the question in this 
fashion-that is, by assuming that such properties supervene in the ways that he 
describes-and, further, I see good reason to think that such properties supervene on a far 
broader subvenient set than he allows, which I shall address in the next section.
 ^Levey's mereological view does not suGer Gom some of the obvious 
problems-e.g., the bloating problem of Judith Thomson or the essentialist problem-of 
other mereologies.
[1997]: 6.
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an object's compositional principle, can only efGx:t accidental properties of a givai 
object/
Interestingly, the mereological doctrine of uniqueness, such that there is one and 
only one unique individual that is the whole of the sum of any givoi set or sequence or 
collection of parts, is 61se on Levey's view. Instead of of&ring an extensionalist 
mereology, he oSers an intensionalist one, and it is only in extensionalist mereologies that 
the doctrine of uniqueness makes sense. Even so, he can afBrm two theses &om which the 
doctrine of uniqueness is thought to follow: 1) that if two objects are distinct, they must 
diSer with respect to either their intrinsic or relational properties (this must be interpreted 
in light of the second thesis), which is a version of Leibniz' Law*, and 2) the intrinsic and 
relational properties of an object are wholly determined by the intrinsic and relational 
properties of its parts.' Levey sees no problem with the Grst thesis, and does not think 
that the second thesis leads ineluctably to uniqueness^" because, on his view, macro
 ^This, I think, is 61se. Consider, once again, the statue example and, in particular, 
that statues exist only in art-worlds. In this case, the object's relationship to an art-world 
bears on its essential properties. I will say more on this issue later.
'  Up to this point in the dissertation I have used Leibniz' Law to re&r to the 
Indiscemibility of Identicals. The version that Levey references here, however, is the 
contrapositive of the Identity of Indiscemibles. The latter states: (x)(y)((F)(Fx Fy) (x
= y)). This is the controversial version of Leibniz' Law and there are been 
counterexamples of&red against it [cf. Max Black, 'Identity of Indiscemibles" AAwf 51 
(1952)]. While Levey may well be susceptible to criticism on this point, I will not address 
it here.
'  [1997]: 5.
Levey argues that ef&rts to shore up the second thesis with a third thesis to 
guarantee uniqueness either beg the question against coincidence or against an 
intensionalist mereology or both ([1997]: 6).
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difkrence is determined by, or does supervene on, micro difkrence. It is simply the case 
that the various parts have multiple kinds of properties vdiich are suGScient to determine a 
difkrence in macro property expression.
As an example, Levey supposes a case A^ere two lumps of matter that contain 
particles of the same kind are introduced to one another in such a way as to comprise a 
sphere. Now, ex the resultant sphere can be causally explained either by
chemical properties of adherence that the particles have, such that the sphere structure 
would result, or magnetic properties that the particles have that would also cause the 
sphere to form, such that if either are present, eadi is sujBBcient for the sphere to 6)rm then 
and there, though neither are necessary. In the Erst case we have what we might call 
Chemball and in the second case, Magnoball, and, according to Levey, this is an 
example-albeit a far-fetched and p a h ^ s  merely possible worlds one^^-of coincident 
objects.
Consistent with others we have seen, Levey holds that the coincidence of objects 
explains their sharing of physical properties. Moreover, he contends that the capacity for 
any composite object to serve as, in Doepke's words, the substratum of another's 
existence is determined by the physical characteristics of the composite, but that the 
composite's own survival conditions (persistence conditions) are underdetermined by 
physical s t ructure. I t  is underdetermined, on Levey's view, because there are cases
"  [1997]: 5 A 7.
Here we agree, but for difkrent reasons. On my account the physical substrate 
underdetermines the persistence conditions of the composite in additional cases to the kind 
Levey ofkrs just when the persistence conditions of the composite are determined by
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where there are multiple, suSSdent compositional accounts that would explain dif&ring 
survival conditions, as in the case above including Chemball and Magnoball. In such 
cases, the appropriate composite object must be linked with the appropriate compositional 
principle.
Armed with his compositional principles, Levey dispatches the supervenience 
problem by noting an ambiguity in the difference thesis. The difference thesis amounts to 
two separate claims. The frst is the supervenience thesis: difkrences in dispositional or 
counter&ctual or modal properties can only supervene on core difkrences. So, 
modal-dispositional, etc.-difference only if core difkrence. This thesis he thinks is true. 
But the second thesis he takes to be 6Ise: namely, that coinciding objects necessarily lack 
core difkrences since physical indiscemibility requires a single core structure. He thinks 
this thesis is false for obvious reasons in light of his counterexample.^*
Levey offers an interesting alternative that is moderately compelling as 6 r  as it 
goes. While he has made room for constitution without identity, he has not gone far 
enough for at least two reasons. First, as previously noted, he challenges the ubiquity of 
the constitution relation, but he has not accounted for all cases of constitution. Contrary 
to Levey's view, modal (dispositional, etc.) properties do not supervene merely on an 
object's parts and intrinsic relations; in some cases extrinsic relations partly determine such
extrinsic relation(s). Here Levey would cleady disagree. 
^  [1997]. 7.
[1997]: 8.
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properties. Thus, because of catain ontological assumptions, Levey has leA out an entire 
class of objects that are constitutionally relevant.
Second, Levey maintains that 'Takeai in abstraction 6om its modal or dispositional 
properties a composite object appears as a compositional structure awaiting supervenient 
detail [. . ., but that] takai in abstraction 6om its principle of composition, however, a 
composite object does not appear as a bare physical structure awaiting detail; it 
dbgf not appear at aZt"." So, on his view, one cannot consider a composite object apart 
6om considering its principle of composition. This is because, as he says, "the manner of 
connection of core properties, for properly composite objects, is a consequence of the 
principle of composition in virtue of which the parts compose the object" and "the rest of 
the object's properties are logically constructed &om its core physical properties and its 
manner of possessing them."^  ^ Thus, if no compositional principle, then no core Matures, 
and if no core features, then no features whatsoever; hence, no composite object.
But this strikes me as analogous to what the sortal relativity theorists hold with 
respect to sorts, where identity of objects can only be understood in light of sort. Here 
Levey suggests that when asking questions related to the identity of objects^ ,^ what 
properties are essential or nonessential, for example, one has to view the object relative to 
its compositional prindple. Although he has changed hom a reference to sortal to a
"  [1997]: 8, emphasis is in the original. 
[1997]: 7.
Indeed, any question whatsoever about objects, but here I simply point out the 
rami6cations for identity, object individuation, and ostensive reference.
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re&rence to compositional principle, the change has not mitigated the basic idea that he 
introduces a relativity into the question of whether or not two objects are identical.
Indeed, given that on Levey's view compositional principles determine sortal membership, 
the diSerence between the sortal relative theorist and Levey is further blurred. Moreover, 
there is no possibility for object individuation or ostensive re&rence apart &om 
compositional principle on his Anew. One may only individuate and/or (ostenâvdy) refer 
in accord with compositional principles.^'
I o9er no further argument related to this issue here save to note that Levey is 
forced to Gnd room for constitution by using what amounts to a relative view of identity 
(etc.) because of a confusion addressed above in my Grst criticism: namely, he has cast the 
supervenience net too narrowly. If he expanded the subvenient component to include 
extrinsic relations he would have no need to turn to relative identity to fund his view of 
constitution-a price which is too steep to pay.^^
2. K-wise arrangement
An even more promising picture that accounts for Burke-type counterexamples to 
the standard account is oSered by Michael Rea.^ One optional response for the co- 
locationist that provides an adequate explanation of quahtative discemibility with "intrinsic
And here, I take it, Levey is making a metaphysical point as opposed to an 
epistemic one.
I made clear at the outset that I would not countenance any relative picture of 
identity, though it is noteworthy that by oSering this theory Levey has countered the 
claims of sortal relative theorists that their view erases the need for a theory of 
constitution.
^  [1997d]
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indiscemibility", according to Rea, is to endorse a \dew of objects \^iere objects of a kind 
K exist just when the constituent matter is arranged K-wise. That is, when a mass is 
present at some time in some place and that mass is arranged K-wise, then a K is present 
at that time and place. ^  As the primary example when explicating his view, Rea uses the 
case of Socrates and the lump of stufTthat constitutes his body. In this case, since the one 
mass is Socrates and we are concerned with kinds, it is arranged H-wise far the sortal 
/wmon, and since Rea re&rs to Socrates' constituting matter as a lump rather than a body, 
it is arranged L-wise for the sortal The intrinsic lump-determining properties 
supervene on the mass arranged L-wise, and the intrinsic human-determining properties 
supervene on the mass arranged H-wise. Now, of course, there is quite a bit of overlap 
between the set ofL-supervenient properties and the set of H-supervenient properties such 
that properties like mass and extension are shared and so exemplified by both objects. In 
other words, Socrates, who is not identical to Lump, exemplihes the H-properties and 
Lump exemplihes the L-properties, but there is a large set of properties where H and L 
overlap that are exempliGed-same token exemplihcation-by both Socrates and Lump, 
which accounts &r similarity in mass, place, smell, shape, and so on. But not every 
property inL is also in H, and vice versa. Lumps are not typically the sorts of things that 
have bdiefs nor are they the sorts of things that can exemph^ humanness^ (unlike 
humans, in both respects), so now we can make sense of two divergent intuitions: co­
located objects share many, but not all, properties. Thus, according to Rea, "multiple
Admittedly, Rea's view is close to that oGered by Levey. 
^  Contra Baker.
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objects Gil a given region just in case there is matter in that region which is arranged in 
more than one object-constituting way at once".^
In critique, I simply note that while there is something of worth here, similarly to 
Levey, this account will not work in every case. For example, in the case of a statue what 
Rea has oSered is a necessary condition, but is not itself sufdcieat across worlds. 
Indiscemibly related masses and indiscemibly arranged masses would not always net the 
same sortal instances. In this world a mass arranged S-wise would indicate the 
instantiation of an S, a statue, because of certain other &atures about this world that are 
also essential-namely, that the actual world is an art-world-but that same mass with the 
same S-wise arrangement in another possible world that is not an art-world would not 
sa-ve to instantiate an S. An adequate picture of constitution must account for this 
discrepancy.
HL Material Constitution: The Emergence of Objects
I am now in a position to put Gesh to my own account of the constitution relation. 
Following what has become standard procedure, I use as my paradigm example a statue, 
Rodin's TTze TTrrntgr, which I name Thinker, and the marble hunk that constitutes it, which 
I name Hunk. As I have already noted, my view bears some similari^ to several of the 
current options regarding constitution-e.g.. Baker, Levey, Rea-but it difkrs in rather 
important ways Gom each. In what follows, I lay out my view in the clearest manner 
possible. I do not always note when a similarity arises between my view and that of
^  [1997d]: 372.
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another; rather, I will leave it to my reader to do that in the light of the discussion of the 
previous pages.
1. Material Constitution: Formally Stated
By way of reminder, I tease out several differences in properties between 
coincident objects using the example of a statue, say, one of Rodin's statues, the Thinker. 
Now suppose that Thinker is composed of a hunk of marble (I do not actually know the 
physical make-up of the Thinker, but it could be marble) which I will caU 'Hunk'. The 
question before us is this: is Hunk identical to Thinker, that is, are Hunk and Thinker the 
same thing? T h e p r r / M O a n sw e r  is yes. It looks like 'Hunk' and 'Thinker' both refer 
to the same object. Nevertheless, if we can End some feature that differs between Hunk 
and Thinker, if we can hnd something that is true ofHunk that is not also true of TWnker, 
then we will be forced to conclude that Hunk and Thinker are not identical.
In fact, it will be obvious by now that I think that Hunk and Thinker are not 
identical. I think this because there are things true ofHunk that are not true of Thinker, 
and vice versa. Suppose, for instance, that Rodin took the as yet unformed Hunk and set 
it on his table at time t. Then, at time tl, Rodin shq)ed Hunk in a particular fashion, and 
created Thinker. It is true, then, that Hunk existed at time t, but Thinker did not exist at 
time t. Further, suppose at time t2 that a very small piece of Thinker falls to the floor and 
is swept into a garbage bin. It looks Hke Thinker still exists-after all, the missing piece is 
not even noticeable-howevo". Hunk no longer exists. Hunk is a particular piece of 
marble, and cannot survive any loss, or addition, no matter how slight (in terms of macro, 
though not micro, change). After the loss of the small piece &om Hunk, we now have a
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difkrent hunk of marble which we could call 'Hunk* '. But these diSering features are all 
temporally tainted, so I will of&r some non-temporally laden features that diSer between 
Hunk and Thinker.
One such example concerns the different origins ofHunk and Thinker. It is true of 
Thinker that it was created by Rodin, but this is not true ofHunk. Hunk, after aU, was 
created by some complex geological process. One might argue, however, that this 
example sneaks temporally tainted concerns back into the picture. While I admit that I do 
hot Gnd temporally relative identity very satis^ing, this example is consistent vnth such a 
picture. For we can simply stipulate that, under some very extraordinary conditions,
Rodin was present at the "accelerated" creation ofHunk, and that, simultaneous to 
Hunk's creation, he 6shioned Thinker. With this stipulation, then, we can see that while 
both Hunk and Thinker were created at the same time, both came into being as a result of 
a dif&rent creative process, i.e., had different origins.
Hunk and Thinker also differ in terms of their modal properties.^ For example, if 
Hunk were to be smashed with a sledge hammer, it would still exist; however. Thinker 
would not survive such a smashing. Hunk and Thinker have different persistence 
conditions. They also differ with respect to essential properties. Hunk can exist in nonart- 
worlds while Thinker can not. It would appear, then, that Hunk and Thinker are distinct 
objects, though they co-exist both spatially and temporally at time t, and so are not
^  In 6ct, Allan Gibbard has provided an example where the only difference is a 
modal difference (cf [1975]).
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identical. Even so, it is fairly clear that they must bear some relation to one another, and 
that relation is constitution.
An accounting of the constitution relation is then called for, especially since it is 
such a misundwstood, and yet ubiquitous, relation. To wit, constitution is recursively 
deSned as hallows:
% constitutes y at time t
1) % exists; and
2) y exists; and
3) X is not identical to y; and
4) X is in K-circumstances; and
5) the parts of x are K-arranged, x is not (and could not be) a K, and y  is a
K; and
6) X and y are spatially coincident and every part of y is a part of x or is
constituted by a part ofx.
These six criteria provide the necessary and sufBcient conditions for the constitution 
relation.^ The purpose, and justiûcation, for the Grst three is apparent. There can only be 
a constitution relationship between objects if at least two objects exist and they are not 
identical. The haurth condition accounts for the importance of extrinsic relations to 
constitution. Extrinsic relations are important because they can make a dif&rence in
^  I re&ain &om calling it the material constitution relation because I, like others, 
do not wish to preclude the possibility of immaterial constitution relations in my deGnition. 
Nevertheless, I am here in no way committed to any more than material constitution 
relations.
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objects, including sorts of objects: e.g., a lump of stufT can only constitute a statue in an 
art-world. However, as I will soon make clear, the notion of K-circumstances is a broad 
one. I have intentionally left it that way so as to provide a more inclusive theory of 
constitution.
The hfth condition concerns the intrinsic relations of an object. It is not enough 
for X to be in K-circumstances, it must also bear the intrinsic arrangement of a K. 
Moreover, since any object can serve as an instance of one and only one K, this condition 
explicitly states that x is not a K, which precludes both the possibility that x is a K already, 
making the posit of y explanatorily extraneous, and denies the possibility of Ks 
constituting other Ks-i.e., Ks cannot constitute Ks. For example, a lump of stufT must be 
S-arranged, and must not itself be an S, in order to constitute an S (i.e., statue). However, 
objects may participate in more than one K-arrangement. In other words, the constitution 
criteria allow for some z to be constituted by x where x is also K'-arranged, in addition to 
being K-arranged, and z is a K \ This, in turn, allows for L eva 's example of constitution 
with X as the constituting agent of both magnoball and chemball and also far Doepke's 
trees of constitution where the same x can be said to constitute both y and z-e.g., the 
same x may be in a P-wise (person) and B-wise (body) arrangement.^
The sixth condition necessitates the spatial coincidence of x and y and accounts 6)r 
the possibility that not all constituting partners share all and only the same parts. Take, for 
example, my body and the collection of molecules that consdtutes my body. My body has
^  Of course, since each of the conditions is itself necessary, x must also be in P- 
circumstances and B-circumstances.
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various organs as parts-e.g., heart, liver, lungs, etc.-but the collection of molecules does 
not have those same organs as parts. Even so, the collection of molecules does serve to 
constitute my organ-parts; thus, satisi^dng the second half of condition six.
All six conditions lead to what I call the Emergence Thesis: Where x is K-arranged 
and in K-circumstances but is not a K, then there is a y such that y is a K and x constitutes 
y. Constitution is transitive, irreûexive, and asymmetric.^ K-properties supervene on K- 
arrangement (including parts) and K-circumstances which explains (just is) what Baker 
terms upward borrowing. This explains the similarity of x and y with respect to most 
properties-e.g., mass, shape-but not with respect to other properties-e.g., belief value, 
sort. My view, then, can be accurately construed as an object emergence theory. When x 
is an F, but is in K-arrangement and K-circumstances, then there i s ay  such that y is a K 
and has an additional set of properties, P, including causal, modal, temporal, and the like, 
standardly associated with Ks and not true of Fs. While the presence of the properties 
suggests that a K has emerged, the emergence of y as K is what expWns the presence of 
the new set of properties-the set of properties is epistemically prior while the emergence 
of the K-object is metaphysically prior-and the placement of the F-object in K- 
arrangement and K-circumstances is what explains the emergence of the K-object.
^  While in agreement on the irreflexivity and asymmetry of constitution-though 
her property borrowing borders on symmetry-Baker and I disagree on the transitivity 
issue. I hold that constitution is transitive, following Doepke ([1982]: 20) while she holds 
that it is not. It is worth noting that she does not provide an argument for intransitivity 
and one wonders how such an argument would go to show that while the collection of 
molecules constitutes Socrates' body and Socrates' body constitutes Socrates, the 
collection of molecules does not constitute Socrates. On this issue, see Baker [99].
170
With respect to Thinker and Hunk, I have already shown that both exist and that 
they are not identical as Rodin exits his shop after creating Thinker. Further, since Hunk 
is in the actual world, and the actual world is an art-world. Hunk is in S-circumstances, 
allowing for the emergence of Thinker. In addition, whüe Hunk is not an S (Hunk is, 
rather, a hunk or piece or mass) Hunk is in S-arrangement-Rodin has seen to that-which 
also allows 6)r Thinker's emergence. Finally, every part of Thinker is also a part ofHunk 
or constituted by a part of Hunk, satisi^ing the sixth condition I now turn to a more 
complete explanation of my version of the constitution relation along with a defense of 
said relation 6om some of the more standard criticisms.
2. Material Constitution: Explained and Defended
The hrst issue is a familiar one.^ Namely, that the constitution theorist must 
provide some account of why it is that the constituting and constituted objects share so 
many of their properties, or are as similar as they are, if they are not identical. Obviously, 
if they are identical, one can easily make sense of their similaiity-^hey are the same thing. 
If they are not identical, but instead are related by virtue of constitution, then what 
accounts for their vast similarity becomes more dif&cult to explain, but an explanation is 
wanted. The hip side of course, as we have seen, is the concern raised by Michael Burke
^  This issue is addressed throughout the literature. For some specihc examples, 
see Baker [2000]; Doepke [1982]; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity" AAwf 
101 (1992): 89-105, reprinted in and cited 6om Material Constitution: a Reader ed. 
Michael C Rea (New York, NY: Rowman and Littleheld Publishers, Inc., 1997): pp. 44- 
62; Thomson [1998]; Burke [1992]; Zimmerman [1995]; and David Lewis, On the 
Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1986): 252.
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in light of the Standard Account: assuming that a satis&ctory explanation of similari^ is
&)und, how, then, is the constitution theorist to explain the dissimilarity that 
constitutionally related objects have with respect to one another? I address both concerns 
with respect to general properties, like mass, color, etc., and spedal properdes, like kind.
i. General Properties: Mass Objection 
The similarity concern can, I think, be discharged rather quickly. Take as an 
example a case where there are two co-located objects, say. Thinker and Hunk. Now, 
suppose that Thinker weighs 7 pounds. So 6r, all is well and good, but intuitively we 
expect Hunk to weigh 7 pounds too. If that is the case, then there should be a combined 
mass in the spatio-temporal region of Thinker-Hunk of 141bs, or so the objection goes. 
But clearly, the mass in that location is just 7 pounds. What gives?
Well, as I noted in an earlier chapter^, the constitution theorist has some options. 
He or she could hold either that Thinker weighs 7 pounds and Hunk has no weight at all 
(or vice versa) or each reoZ/y only weighs 3.5 pounds, not 7. Of course, if there are other 
constituting entities present-e.g., the collection of atomic particles that constitutes 
Hunk-the latter digunct would not provide a sufBdent explanation; the weight would 
need to be further distributed among all constitutionally related entities in the spatio- 
temporal region of Thinker-Hunk. None of these options is very inviting.
A satis&ctory response to the mass objection bears on the similarity concern. 
Some constitution theorists argue that the similari^ between constitutionally related 
cousins is explained by the fact that they share almost all, though not quite all, of their
^  C f Chapter 4, § 4.
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properties.^ However, on this view, one is left wanting an explanation 6)r the two objects 
sharing almost all of thdr properties. Indeed, explaining the vast similarity of two objects 
by pointing to the fact that they share most of their properties seems a bit 
disingenuous-what explains the near qualitative indiscemibility is predsely what is at 
issue. That they share most of their proparties is not in question; what explains that 
sharing of properties, apart 6om identity, is.
Rather than the sharing of properties, what the near qualitative
indiscemibility of Thinker and Hunk-and hence, that they share the same mass, but that 
the region where they are spatially located does not increase mass by a factor of 2, or any 
other n (accounting for more than two constitutionally related entities)-is the fact that 
Thinker and Hunk spatially overlap one another completely and so share all of the same 
parts.^  ^ That they share all of the physical properties associated with those parts, and 
many other properties associated with those parts, then, is not a surprise, nor is the &ct 
that the mass of the spatial region occupied by Thinker-Hunk is a scant 7 pounds-they 
share the mass, the same token, not just the same type.^^
Thus, both the vast similarity of Thinker and Hunk and the 6c t that the spatial 
region of Thinker-Hunk does not have a mass of 2n, or any otha- needless doubling of 
properties, is explained by the 6 c t that they share all and only the same spatial extension
^  This is Baker's view.
On the assumption that properties are not parts of objects. If such is the case, 
then this refers to all and only spatially extended parts.
^  This is similar to a response ofkred by Dean Zimmerman ([95]: 89).
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and, along with it, complete part overlap. However, this 6ct does not account for the 
dissimilarity concern: namely, how two spatially co-extensive objects can diSer with 
respect to any property, most notably kind properties. It is to this issue that I now turn,
ii. Special Properties: Dif&rence in Kind
Changing our example, take Socrates and his constituting lump of matta".^ Since 
Socrates is a human being and if sortal properties ^pervene on microphysical structures 
(parts and their relations), then we have the odd consequence, although it is a 
consequence that Baker would embrace, that Lump, Socrates' constituent lump of matter, 
is a human being as well, albeit a rather odd sort of human being. I say odd, because 
Lump does not have the persistence conditions that a human being has. Now, coupling 
this with other facts of humans ^ d  bodies, when I inadvertently chop ofT my Gnger, say, in 
a rather gruesome wood shop accident, not only do I cause harm to myself but I have 
killed another human being, namely. Lump. Moreover, I take it that I have also created a 
third human being, thus putting myself in the position of Creator of the new lump-human. 
Lump*. Further, were my intentions of a particular sort, I may well have committed 
murder when I chopped off my Snger and killed Lump.
The aforementioned is, admittedly, rather counterintuitive, but there is another 
option: we can deny that Lump has the persistence conditions of a lump and suggest that 
Lump now has the persistence conditions of a human being. But if such is the case, the 
following is a consequence: there is nothing co-located with Socrates that has the 
persistence conditions of a lump, though there are things co-located with Socrates. But all
I borrow this particular example 6om Rea [1997d].
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of the things co-located with Socrates have the persistence conditions of a human being, 
including the lump, the body, the aggregate, etc. ?*
All of the above seems rather &r-fetched and counterintuitive, but these sorts of 
consequences are precisely vdiat Burke thinks the constitution theorist is committed to. 
The consdtution theorist is so committed, on Burke's view, because there is no relevant 
fact of the matter concerning constitutionally related objects that serves to allow for any 
qualitative dissimilarity, including difkrence in sort.
If true, this assumes, as Baker says, "that the nature and identity of a thing are 
determined wholly by the nature and identity of its parts".^  ^ With this assumption it does 
become diGBcult to see how two objects that consist of all and only the same spatial 
extension (parts) could diG&r with respect to kind, but I will argue in the next section that 
kind membership is sometimes determined by relations that are external to an object and
^  [1997c]: 368. Rea includes an example related to beliefs held by Socrates and, 
by constitutional inference, his body. He points out that in addition to the rather 
counterintuitive consequence that bodies, or lumps, have beliefs, it turns out while a belief 
held by Socrates (at t) might be true, that same belief held by Body (at t), might be false. 
This is odd because "they" must be the same (token) belief; thus, the same belief must 
have dif&rent truth-values.
[2000]: 183. Baker adds a second assumption: "if x and y consists of the same 
atoms, then they have all the same parts" ([2000]: 183), which is necessary if properties 
are parts and is problematic, on her view, since same-token properties can be possessed in 
diSerent ways, allowing for dissimilarity among objects exemplifying same-token 
properties. I also have a problem with this second assumption-though it is not necessary, 
on my view, to motivate Buike's concem-because things can have the same atoms 
without having the same parts. For example, if at time t my body and I have the same 
collection of atoms in common, then clearly, at that time, my body and the collection of 
atoms have the same atoms in common. But if this is the case, then by the above principle 
I am committed to the view that the collection of atoms has as its parts a heart, a pair of 
lungs, etc. But it is obvious that the collection of atoms does not have a heart or pair of 
lungs as a part. Thus, the principle is false.
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so external to the sum of the thing's parts and their interrelations-e.g., an external relation 
to an art-world is essential in order for an object to be of the kind statue.
Thus, where Dean Zimmerman has argued that constitution is committed to the 
view that the physical construction of a thing does not in every case determine kind 
membership, he is correct, because kind m em ba^p  is determined by a thing's essential 
properties, which in turn are sometimes (partly) determined by its relational properties, 
and these are not fully detemuned by a thing's physical construction. This is not 
necessanly true of all objects, but since it is true of some, constitution is committed to the 
\iew as Zimmerman describes.
This consequence is also 6ced by non-constitution theorists. Statues are cases 
where there are physical indiscemibles-e.g.. Thinker and Hunk-that differ with respect to 
kind and, there&re, with respect to survival or persistence conditions. Moreover, the 
subvenient physical states are insufBcient to account for these différences because they are 
the same subvenient physical states. This raises what might be called the grounding 
concern: namely, %tiat grounds the difference in kind. And here I answer, again, that the 
essential properties of a thing determine its kind membership (and by extension its 
persistence conditions). Thus, the difference in kind between physically indiscernible 
objects like statues and their constituent partners is explained by the 6ct that they differ 
with respect to their essential properties. Though they do share a host of properties, they 
do not share all properties, and chief among the properties that they do not share are their 
essential properties. But that is not unusual, far one would not think that hunks of marble 
need to be related to art-worlds, nor to a particular shape, in order to exist, though just
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this Act is true of statues. Moreover, one would not suppose that a particular set of 
atoms is essential 6)r a given statue to exist, though just this is the case for collections of 
atoms.
Thus, while the request for some distinction to ground a diSerence in kind between 
an F and an F-shaped constituting matter-where there is no intrinsic diSerence between 
the given x and y-is justified, the request is made in such a way as to give priority to a 
particular kind of required dif&rence as a grounding diSoence: namely, some sort of 
intrinsic distinction. However, there are other possible ways that the F and the F-shaped 
thing can be diOerent that would serve to ground their difkrence in sort—a difkrence in 
essential properties.^
Suppose that the parts of some object bear essential, intrinsic relations to one 
another just when, say, a lump is present, but bear a nonessential, intrinsic relationship to 
one another, though an essential form or structure, just when a statue is present. Now, at 
some time t that same collection of parts has both sets of properties and relations, but the 
properdes and reladons are instantiated relative to the instantiadon of the related object-in 
much the same way as Levey's example where pardcles have chemical bonds and 
magnedsm. When the chemical bonds are present, the chemical object obtains, and when 
magnetism is present, the magnedsm object obtains, and when both obtain at the same 
dme, both objects are present there and thoi. And dirther suppose that when some x has
^  Of course, there are other opdons. Mark Johnston mentions several, including 
common pracdce of distincdon within a linguisdc community, difkrence in bare 
pardculars, difkrence in formal substrata, difkrence in haecceides and the like ([92]).
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nonessentially related parts, but parts that are essentially related to some given structure, 
then X is a statue^, and x is a lump just ^ e n  x has a nonessential relation to structure and 
an essential relation to parts, and when both are instantiated, then two objects are present 
there and then: the lump and the statue.^
This example should help to explain the diSerence in kind, and difference in other 
properties, between multiple coincident objects 6om within an intrinsic hamework of 
properties and parts. However, there are objects for which an intrinsic accounting of 
essential properties is insufhcient. Contrary to what I will call the intrinsic principle-fbr all 
y and x and F, if y is a paradigm F and x is intrinsically exactly like y, then x is an F^-there 
are objects which are intrinsically just alike but are of different kinds. If the intrinsic 
principle concerns only spatial parts, then the example given above of a statue and a lump 
is sufddent to serve as a counterexample to the principle since the two objects are 
differently related to their parts. But suppose the intrinsic principle also accounts for 
relations that are intrinsic to an object. In other words, suppose the intrinsic principle 
accounted for both the parts of a thing and the relations among those parts. Then the
Of course, on my view this is incomplete and should include other requirements: 
e.g., art-wodd, origin, etc..
^  This example could be enlarged to include other entities present in the same 
spatio-temporal region: e.g., the collection of molecules, collection of atoms, etc.
Mark lohnston argues against the principle in "Constitution is not Identity", 
while Harold Noonan argues in favor of it in "Constitution is Identity". Lynn Baker 
agrees with lohnston in denying the pnnc^le, but for difkrent reasons. She offers an 
example that she thinks is sufScient to show that the principle is false: "suppose that 
something, call it 'A', with a microstructure exactly like David's spontaneously coalesced 
in outer space light years away from any comparable mass, now David is a paradigmatic 
statue and A is intrinsically exactly like Da^nd, but A is not a statue" ([2000]: 30 hr 11).
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example above would not be an ob\dous counterexanq)le to the principle. Except, the 
example is incomplete.
The parts of x and the essential relation those parts hold to a particular form or 
structure, though not to the collection of parts itseL  ^is not sufScient to guarantee the 
existence of a statue. Statues, like Thinker, also possess essential extrinsic relations, e.g., 
to an art-woiid. In order for Hunk to constitute Thinker, Hunk must be Statue-arranged 
(formed in the appropriate way) awf found in Statue-circumstances. Whatever Statue- 
circumstances includes, it deSnitely entails that the world in question be an art-world-4.e., 
a world where the appropriate intentional states, social structures, etc., that are necessary 
for an artistic community to exist, abound. The piindple is false, then, because intrinsic 
sameness does not entail identity, nor even sortal similarity, no matter the intrinsic scope.
It turns out that in some cases, though I suppose not all cases, extrinsic relations are 
essential for kind membership, as is the case with statues.^
C. owf j'wpervemgncg
There is much confusion over the relationship between constitution and 
supervenience as is evidenced by the prolihc litoature on the subject.*  ^ Some people think
^  And not only statues. Consider the following example &om Aristotle's ethics. 
Generosity is an essential elemait of a virtuous character. A virtuous person, then, must 
be a generous person. However, generosity itself is reliant on extrinsic relations: one has 
to have the means to be generous-the Gnancial means and the opportunity to act 
generously-whidi are extrinsic both to the act and to the character. So, the means to be 
generous is an essential requirement for generosity and generosity is an essential aspect of 
virtue; thus, a virtuous person must bear cafain extrinsic relations in order to be virtuous.
Johnston [1997]; Baker [1999] and [2000]; Harold Noonan, "Constitution is 
Identity", AA/Kf 102 (1993): pp. 133-146; Zimmerman [1995]; Rea [1997d], etc..
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that constitution is a relation among properties rather than objects, and so confuse it with 
supervenience* ,^ while others simply seek to use the commonly held supervenience thesis 
as a foil to discredit constitution thinking that constitution is inconsistent with 
supervenience. In this section, I will brieûy address this latter point and in so doing mark 
out clear territory for constitution apart 6om supervauence.
According to Michael Rea, the doctrine of microphysical supervenience is the 
claim that "intrinsic qualitative properties supervene on microphysical structure"*^-where 
that structure is simply the total set of the parts of an object and the relations of those 
parts. The &e8 of constitution argue that this doctrine is eminently plausible and, as such, 
oSers a considerable challenge to the doctrine of spatial coincidence.
The Erst avenue of response &>r the constitution theorist is simply to deny the 
doctrine of microphysical supervenience-intrinsic qualitative properties do not supervene 
on microphysical structure. The problem with this is two-fold. First, supervenience is a 
plausible and widely held theory while constitution is less so on both counts. To deny it in 
favor of constitution, then, is a non-starter as it would convince none that remained 
unconvinced already. Moreover, such a denunciation 6ils to take saiously the charge 
levied by the foes of constitution. To deny the phenomena across the board, where such 
phenomena are taken to be counterexamples to the view, especially when such phenomena 
have behind them a faidy intuitive philosophical thesis, namely, supervenience, is at best 
specious. If the constitution theorist is to emerge unscathed 6om the supervenience
See Baker [2000]: 34 Ei 20. 
*" [1997d]: 367.
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dd)ate, he or she must meet the alleged counterexamples (charges) head on. Even so, the 
doctrine of supervenience, as stated, is ambiguous and dari^ing the doctrine may well 
shed some light on the subject, and may allow the constitution theorist to deny one version 
of supervenience while allowing for another.
The ambiguity lies in the manner of supervenience expressed in the doctrine. For 
the doctrine of microphysical supervenience
DS: intrinsic qualitative properties supervene on microphysical structure 
may mean
DS^ : intrinsic qualitative properties locally supervene on microphysical structure 
or it may mean
intrinsic qualitative properties globally supervene on microphysical 
structure.*^
Now, DSkcg is 61se because there are high level properties that an object, such as a statue, 
might have that do not supervene in this 6shion on the local microstructure of the 
constituting object or the local microphysical properties. For example, essential to an 
object's being a statue is that it be related in various and sundry ways to an art-world, and 
these art-world-type properties are not reducible to the localized microphysical properties 
o^ e.g., the piece of marble. Thus, constitution M inconsistent with but is 
false, so such inconsistency should not be a problem for the constitution view.
For literature on the local-global supervenience distinction see Jaegwon Kim, 
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Essavs (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993).
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DSgiob* on the other hand, can account for high level properties like those 
exhibited by statues since it does not deal with localized intrinsic characteristics but 
global-world-wide-4ntrinsic characteristics, and as sudi is compatible with constitution.
In other words, to say that a statue has the property S essentially whereas the piece of clay 
6ils to have property S essentially is just to say that there is no possible world in which 
Statue exists without S but there are possible worlds in which Piece exists without S. But 
this is consistait with saying that there are no two wodds which are exactly alike with 
regard to the distribution of microphysical components (and their reladons), but which 
difler with respect to vhether or not an object has S. DS^^w requires the latter, but only 
the latter, and so is consistent with constitution.
But suppose the &e of constitution is unmoved. Ultimately, in order for one to 
show that constitution is inconsistent with the doctrine of microphysical global 
supervenience one has to show that constitution implies the existence of two
possible worlds vhich do not diSer with respect to their microphysical properties 
(including all relations), i.e., that are microphysically indiscernible, and yet in one of those 
worlds there is an object x that has F and in the other world there fails to be an object x 
that has F But such an argument has not been of&red as yet, and is likely not 
krthcoming.^^
See also Baker [2000]: 185 passim. Michael Rea argues in a similar 6shion, 
though 6)r different purposes. A corollary to this view: essential properties supervene 
globally though not (always) locally.
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IV. Material Constitution Applied: Baseball and God
One of the questions 6cing the constitution theorist concerns the extent to which 
the constitution relation is found in the world. Some, like Levey, argue that while 
constitution does End a home as a relation among coincident objects, there are few (if any) 
such objects in fact. I have used a statue, Rodin's The Thinker, and its constituting 
matta", a hunk of marble, as an example throughout this dissertation to show that 
constitution obtains as a relationship in at least one kind of everyday, garden-variety 
object. However, constitution can be used to make sense of the relations among many 
other types of objects and their related compositional parts: e.g., objects at the quantum 
level, molecular level (say, objects of chemistry), standard everyday objects beyond 
statues, social entities, and religious entities, like God (concerning both external 
relations-God and world-and intrinsic relations-^he Triune three and one). While I have 
neither time iK)r space to address each of the aforementioned areas, in what follows I will 
Eesh out the relation in two additional areas. In so doing, I will show that constitution is a 
useful relation at the social entity level with a baseball example (the New York Yankees), 
and at the religious level with an example concerning the existence of God.
1. Social Entities: Baseball
A similar line of argument as that used to tease out the relationship between 
Thinker and Hunk can be used for social entities, say, the New York Yankees (the team), 
and the collection of individuals that make it up. Suppose that the Erst coach of the 
Yankees, we will call him Wilbur, is at a New Yorjc ballpark observing a collection of 
individuals a day before selecting, and thereby forming, the very Erst Yankees team.
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Wübur observes the ensemble of individuals (at t), we can name this ensemble of 
individuals Group, and returns the next day (at t l)  to observe Group again. Finally, aAer 
much thought, Wilbur decides to sign every last one of the recruits, i.e.. Group, to the 
team and does. It appears, thai, that Group exists at t, but that the Yankees does not 
exist at t. Suppose, further, that at some later time, say, t2, Wilbur realizes that he has 
overstepped cetain budgetary constraints and so is farced to cut a player &om the team. 
Now it is true that the Yankees exists at t2, but &lse that Group exists.^
Moreover, it looks as though Group and the Yankees have diSerent origins. On 
the one hand, it looks like Group was created by a process that culminated in the gathering 
of a collection of interested recruits desiring to try-out for the soon-to-be new team. On 
the other hand, the Yankees team was created when Wilbur made his selections for the 
team roster. One can even imagine a scenario where both Group and the Yankees were 
created at the same time, but via difkrent processes. In addition. Group and the Yankees 
diSer in terms of modal properties. If the Yankees were to be disbanded and Group went 
west to try-out for the Dodgers, the Yankees would not survive, though Group would. In 
other words. Group and the Yankees have diQerent persistence conditions. Finally, Group 
and the Yankees have difkrent essential properties for the Yankees can only exist in sport- 
wodds, worlds where there are sports and, hence, sports' teams, while Group could exist 
in worlds without sports, so nonsports-worlds. Even so. Group and the Yankees are
^  To make this easier to see, we can imagine that one of the players died, rather 
than was cut 6om the team.
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remarkably similar, and the reason why Group and the Yankees are so similar is that one 
constitutes the other.
Looking to our criteria, both a G (Group) and a Y (the Yankees) exist^ ,^ satis^ing 
the hrst two criteria. Further, I have shown that G and Y are not identical, Üiough they 
are quite similar. Moreover, it is dear that G is in Y-drcumstances. Whatever Y- 
circumstances might amount to, it certainly indudes existence in a sports-world, as we 
have seen, and the world in question is a sports-world. In addition, we can safely assume 
that inso6r as is necessary, G is Y-arranged. Here the import ofY-arrangement is less 
dear. This criteria may be satished vacuously by virtue that there is no spedSc 
arrangement of G that must obtain in order for Y to emerge. While this may be, I think 
that there is a likely Y-arrangement that G must be in so that Y may emerge: namely, the 
arrangement necessary to held a baseball team.** Finally, it looks like G and Y share all of 
the same parts. Each individual that is a part of the collection that is called Group is also a 
part of the Yankees in virtue of the fact that Group composes the Yankees. Even so, 
there may be parts of the Yankees that are not also parts of Group but, per our earlier 
discussion, this need not prove a problem. To see why this is so, consider examples of a 
person and of the Ship of Theseus.
Of course, there is some debate whether or not social entities have real, 
ontological being. However, I am here concerned to show only that if they do exist, they 
are constitutionally related to their compositional "matter" and that my view can 
adequatdy describe that relationship.
** For example, G must consist of some pitchers, outûelders, inheld players and a 
catcher.
185
A person and the collection of particles of which she or he is composed do not 
share all of the same parts, nor does the Ship of Theseus and the collection of wood cells 
that make up the ship. Takethe Ship of Theseus. The boards that make up the ship are 
parts of the ship, but the boards are not parts of the collection of wood cdls that make up 
the ship. Similarly 6)r the person and the collection of particles that composes him or her. 
The heart and lungs are parts of the person, but not of the collection of particles. 
Examples abound in the social realm as well. Take the Battle of the Bulge. The various 
skirmishes and events that make up the battle are also parts of the battle, but are not parts 
of the collection of persons and their actions that compose the battle. Similarly, the 
United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives are parts of the 
United States Congress, but are not parts of the collection of persons who make up the 
United States Congress.
Nevertheless, the shi^ and the collection of wood cells are similar in every respect 
as if they had the same, and only the same, parts, and this holds true for each of the above 
examples. Why? Because the "additional" parts had by the ship are only extant in virtue 
of certain sub-sets of the collection of wood cells which are, as Frederick Doepke argues, 
interrelated in ways e&ygMrra? to the existence of the 'additional' parts" .
That is, the presence of the "additional" parts can be wholly explained in terms of 
accidental structural characteristics within the collection of particles or wood cells or the 
collection of persons that are necessary for either a heart or a board or a House of 
Congress to be present, respectively.
^Trederick Doepke [82]: 16.
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This works in similar 6shion 5)r Group and the Yankees. Since G and Y share all 
of the same parts or, if Y has some x as a part that G does not also have as a part, then x 
is constituted by the parts of G, G and Y satis^ the sixth and Gnal criteria. Thus, 
constitution, as I have dehned it, serves to explain the relationship between social entities 
and their constituents.
2. Religious Entities: God
Not only is the constitution relation useful when explaining the relationship 
between ev^day, garden-variety objects and the more nefarious, though no less 
ubiquitous, social entities like baseball teams, it is also useful, even promising, in order to 
provide an intelligible response to some of the more sticky areas in religious discourse. 
Here I deal with but one such problem area that is related to the Divine: the relationship 
between God and the cosmos.^
For centuries, the Christian, monotheistic tradition has sought to clari^ the 
relation between God and world with little success. While various theories rose to the 
fbre&ont at one time or another, none has achieved the status of orthodoxy and served to 
provide a complete explanadon of the Divine-cosrnos symbiosis. At hrst glance, the 
constitution relation appears to fare no better. However, on the assumption that God
^  In the Greek, cosmos means world or universe. In other words, all that is a part 
of the natural order. I will use the words 'cosmos', 'world', and 'universe' 
interchangeably to refer to the natural order-the realm of everyday experience and natural 
sdence.
Further, in this section I am assuming something like a Western picture of the 
Christian God. As will become clear, however, the picture I o8er is not in every case a 
classically accepted (or more generally "orthodox") picture of the Divine.
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exists and is somehow related to the world, one can use constitution to provide an 
intelligible explanation of the relationship between God and world while keeping an 
appropriate tension between the classical notions of immanence and transcendence. On 
the constitution view, God is a constituted entity with the universe as the constituting 
entity. To put it in language consistent with the emergence thesis: there is some U such 
that when U is G-arranged and in G-circumstances, a G emerges.
In accordance with the criteria for my version of the constitution relation, it is 
apparent that a U exists, and hirther, ex that a G exists. Moreover, since we
are attempting to provide an explanation that keeps the tension between immanence and 
transcendence, the U and the G are not identical. U is G-arranged and in G- 
circumstances, though just what these include is admittedly unclear. G-arrangement 
obviously entails the appropriate structure that would allow the emergence of the G 
Analogously to what one might take to be a constitution relationship between the brain 
and the mind, one might suppose that the constituting U must possess (exempli^) a 
minimal level of structural and/or material conq)lexity. Further, given that the G- 
arrangement is global, across the entire univase in the case where U is taken to constitute 
a G, it may well be that in this extreme case there is no distinction between G-arrangement 
and G-circumstances. In any event, depending on one's view of God^, diGkrent
Were U and G identical, pantheism (full immanence and no transcendence) 
would result.
The emphasis here is not on 'view of God' but instead on what God's nature 
actually is. The problem is an epistemic one. While we may not have suGBcient 
justiScation to determine just what the nature of God is, however, I show that constitution 
can make sense of some of the more prevalent pictures, making it all the more useful and
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circumstances may be relevant. One might assume, for instance, that the Divine is a mere 
social construct, in which case the presence of intensional agents would be included as a 
necessary G-circumstance. On a classical picture of God, however, the presence of 
intelligent agmts is not a necessary prerequisite of God's existence and so would not be 
considered relevant to the G-cârcumstances in which the U must Gnd itself in order for the 
G to emerge.^
Finally, the G has the sum of the parts of U as its parts, and, if any additional parts 
remain for the G-some of \\dtich I will outline later-then U, or some portion of U, 
constitutes those parts as well.^ This is consistent with the Divine notion of immanence. 
Given that U includes all physical parts whatsoever and G shares all such parts with U, 
there is no portion of the natural world in which God is not to be found at ah. According 
to the Doctrine of Presence, God is present throughout the natural order. In accord with 
my view of constitution, the G has ah the parts of U as parts. Therefore, every part of the 
universe is also a part of God. It does not fbhow that every part of God is a part of the 
universe, though every part of God is constituted by parts of the universe. Thus, the 
notion of transcendence is also cared for. God is an emergent entity on God's constituting 
object, the universe. There are some parts of God that are not also parts of the universe.
promising as an explanatory relation with respect to the Divine and the natural order.
^ Whhe the criteria of G-arrangement and G-circumstances are admittedly 
sketchy, this is an epistemic conundrum and not a problem for the metaphysical picture I 
am oSering here.
^ As I understand it, this commits me to a naturalized view of God which, 6 r  from 
negative, I take to be a positive outcome.
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As a quick example, the Holy Spirit is a part of God though not a part of the universe. In 
addition, there are some things true of God that are not also true of the universe. For 
example, it is true of God that God is worshiped among Christian congregadons as the 
wholly Other, one \\ho transcends the parameters of the natural order, this is not true of 
the universe. All such ramihcadons are consistent both with the Doctrine of God and with 
my version of the consdtudon reladon.
There are certain properdes that are related to classical doctrines which are 
attributed to God that are not obviously consistent with the picture on oSer here. I will 
address two of them: God as a necessary existent and God as creator. One of the 
properdes that God is said to have is the property ofbeing a necessary existent. But on 
my view, if G exists, then there is some x such that x is aU  and x is G-arranged and in G- 
drcumstances. So that, if G is a necessary e^dstent, then so too must U always exist and 
be a necessary existent. Moreover, not only must U exist, U must always be G-arranged 
and in G-circumstances. While this is admittedly counterintuidve on its face, and 
apparaidy inconsistent with a classical picture of God, I do not think this midgates against 
the usefulness of my consdtudon picture for explaining the reladonship between God and 
the natural order.
First, I will address the counterintuidve nature of claiming that the universe is a 
necessary existent. While this may go against certain beliefs held dear by various religious 
communides, it does not obviously go against either modem science or our best modal 
intuidons. To be sure, not all contemporary scientidc models necessitate the existence of 
the universe. Some do-e.g., oscillating universe theory-and some do not-e.g., big bang.
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Moreover, there is no prindpled way to prove scientlGcaily whether the universe in &ct 
possesses such a property or not. Modal claims are always beyond the ken of science. 
Therefore, the claim that the universe is a necessary existent is consistait with modem 
science.Nor  is it necessarily out of sorts with our modal intuitions. Tme, it does come 
close to equating physical modality with metaphyâcal modality, but no more so than does 
a Kripkeah analysis of modal language starting, as it does, 6om the actual world. On a 
Kripkean analysis, possible worlds are not "real" entities existing somewhere in logical 
space. They are, rather, ways the actual world might have been. To say, then, that God is 
a necessary existent is just to say that this world, the actual world, cannot fail to be in G- 
arrangement and G-circumstances. While I admit that I cannot see my way clear to à 
proof that this is the case, I also have grave doubts about the viability of arguments to the 
contrary. Further, the burden of proof is not on me. Recall that I am opo-ating under the 
assumption that God exists and is a necessary being, and am merely showing how both can 
still be true on my picture of the constitution relation. This I have done.^
While such a claim is not veritable according to scientihc method, it is assumed 
by certain scientihc theories. Were the theory(ies) that assume U as a necessary existent 
to prevail among the going contemporary theories, this would indeed bode well for the 
plausibility that U is in &ct a necessary existent. However, it would not guarantee such as 
there is always the possibility that some further scientiGc model might emerge that is 
preferred and does not assume U as necessary existent.
^  This may well come down to a difference among intuitions (modal and 
otherwise). My guess is that those who hold that God exists and is necessary, and that 
God is constitutionally related to the universe, will not 5nd this consequence too difBcult a 
pill to swallow. Moreover, I am not here trying to persuade any other (e.g., atheist, foe of 
constitution, etc.).
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Second, the classical doctrine of creoAo does appear to be inconsistent
with a universe that necessarily exists. Developed so as to deny a Platonic dualism within 
early Christianity, creotro ex MzArA) holds that God (zeates the natural order out of 
nothing; thus, no matter pre-exists the creative act. But vdiy should we think that the 
doctrine of creoAo ex m/n/b is true? First, on some interpretations, it does not accord 
with Holy Scripture. Take, for example. Genesis 1:1, "In the beginning when God began 
to create the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless void and darkness covered 
the face of the deep while a wind &om God swept over the 6ce of the waters".^ Here it 
looks as though there was formless matter prior to God's creative act. On this reading, 
creation just is God's act of forming the recalcitrant matter-not Unlike the Platonic 
picture. On the one hand, if one were to bring crgofzo ex wWo in line with this 
interpretation, one could argue that what God creates out of nothing is &»rm, not 
substance. On the other hand, one might think that if creotro ex wMZo does not accord 
with Holy Scripture, so much the worse for crea/zo ex mAzZo.
Now, suppose we simply discard the doctrine-^here are a number of Christian 
communities that do not afGrm the doctrine either because they deny it or they do not 
know it exists-we are still not out of the woods. Whether or not Christian communities 
afhrm crezzfzo ex zzzM/o, the vast m^ority aSBrm that God is creator and one assumes that
^  The New Oxford Annotated Bible: With the Apocrvnha fNRSVI. edited by 
Bruce Metzger and Roland Murphy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991): 
Genesis 1:1, optional reading (a).
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a creator must precede his or her creation, which is impossible on my view of God.^ On 
my view, the best we can hope for is eternal concurrence-^nutual existence throughout 
time. But as we have seen, there is more than one way to interpret a creative act. When 
Rodin created The Thinker, he did so by sculpting the marble, not by creating the lump of 
marble. The same could hold true far God. God would still be considered the creator of 
the form of the natural order, without pre-existing matter altogether, if the act of creation 
is taken to be the act of giving structure or form to matter vdiich is unkrmed, rather like 
the Platonic notion.^' Thus, the Christian view of God as creator is consistent with a 
constitution view of God's relation to the natural order.
V. Conclusion
Whüe Levey and Rea oSered important elements for a robust picture of 
constitution, neither extended his view far enough to account for all constitutionally 
related phenomena. Missing &orh both views were the external relations necessary to 
account for the constitution relations of^  say, statues and their constituent lumps of matter 
or basd)all teams and their related collections of individuals. I oSered a view that 
accounts for both kinds of relations when assessing the essential properties of objects; 
thus, providing a robust theory of constitution that is broad enough to account for the 
wide-ranging, constitutionally related phenomena in the world.
Not all creation doctrines require God's precedent existence. It is even easier to 
see how constitution comports with theories lacking such a requirement.
^ Of course, this does leave open the question of what G-arrangement and G- 
circumstances would amount to on this picture, but that is, as I have said, a dif&rent 
matter.
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Chapter 6
When asked how many statues are present in the space now occupied by Rodin's 
most patrons o f the arts would answer that one statue is present, and they 
would be correct. When asked how many objects are present in the same space, most 
patrons of the arts would again answer that one object is present, and they would be 
wrong. In &ct, there are at least two objects present in that space: Thinker and the hunk 
of marble that composes it, or Hunk. There are likdy more than two objects, but there are 
at least two.
That such a conclusion strikes many as countointuitive is undastandable.
Humans like to comprehend their surroundings, and few things are more (or as) intuitively 
evident to us than how we parse and count objects in the world. Even so, as we apply the 
technical identity relation to objects, we End that where we often counted but one object, 
more than we initially expected are present. We know this because objects, like statues, 
have diSerent properties than their constituent cousins. Statues and the stuff out of which 
they are made share many of the same properties, but not all of the same properties. Thus, 
statues, like Thinker, and the stuff out of which they are made, like Hunk, cannot be 
numerically identical. In this dissertation, I argued that another relation obtains between 
such objects: namely, constitution.
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In Chapter 2 ,1 looked at several of the puzzles that give rise to mataial 
constitution: the Ship of Thesais, Tibbles-Tib, and Lumpl-Goliath. I argued that the Ship 
of Theseus does not rmse the problem of material constitution, at least not how Michael 
Rea states the Ship of Thesais puzzle. Both Tibbles-Iib, restructured to be about Tibbies 
and its body, and the Lumpl-Goliath puzzles do raise the problem. In addition, both 
preclude various attempts at resolution of the problem. The Tibbles-Body puzzle 
ultimately precludes resolution by either denying the existence of garden-variety objects, 
the existaice of Tib-like objects, or the transitivity of identity. The Lumpl-Goliath puzzle 
precludes resolution by favoring perduring objects over enduring ones; thus, the fbur- 
dimensionalist is in no better position vw-d-vM the problem of material constitution than is 
the endurantist. \\%h the problem thus motivated, I turned in the ensuing chapters to 
evaluate various accounts of the constitution relation, which is the relation I &vor to 
resolve the problem of material constitution.
In Chapter 3 ,1 addressed two statements of the constitution relation. The Grst, 
oSered by Frederick Doepke, is an attempt to explain the relation between macro objects, 
like ships, and the collections that compose them, whether the collection of planks or the 
collection of wood molecules, and to answer the challenge of the eliminitive reductivist 
account of the relation between such objects. I argued that Doepke's account is 
incomplete, and that his argument against the reductivist fails to End its mark, even though 
the reductivist must ultimately appeal to the existence of constituted objects to counter 
Doepke. I then considered the mereological statement of the constitution relation oQered 
by Judith Jarvis Thomson. While Thomson's account is complete, it commits the
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constitution theorist to the existence of a host of questionable ontological entities called 
hisions. I took Ockham's razor to her account and argued that a statement of the 
constitution relation that allows for a more parsimonious ontology is pre&rred if such is 
available.
In Chapter 4 ,1 o@ered an extended treatment of one of the more interesting, and 
novel, statements of the constitution relation to come out in recent years. Lynne Rudder 
Baker offers an account of the relation based on the sharing, or borrowing, of properties 
between constitutionally related objects. The twist she oSers is that property borrowing 
goes both directions: bottom-up and top-down. I argued that top-down borrowing is 
unwarranted, especially for what she calls primary-kind properties, and that her uniSed 
view of constitution ultimately dies the death of a thousand qualif cations.
In Chuter 5 ,1 looked at two intrinsic theories on offer of late prior to stating my 
own view. Both of the intrinsic theories have valuable components, but ultimately 6il to 
provide a sufSciently robust picture of constitution that can account for all constitutionally 
relevant phenomena. In order to account for paradigm cases of constitutionally related 
endties, like statues and the stufF that composes them, I argued that one must make room 
for the exemplif cation of essential properties that are based on an object's external 
relations. Thus, I offered an account of constitution that makes room for the extrinsic 
features of an object to play a role. Further, I showed how my account explains both the 
similarity and dissimilarity that obtains between constitutionally related objects, and 
argued that constitution, as I defne it, is consistent with supervenience. Finally, I used my 
account of the constitution relation to make sense of garden-variety, everyday objects, like
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statues, as well as not so garden-variety objects, e.g., social endties, like basdiall teams, 
and religous entities, like God. Ultimately, I found that constitution is indeed a 
ubiquitous relation that may help us to understand the relationships between a great many 
things: persons and their bodies, minds and brains, the three and one of the Holy Trinity, 
etc..
The overall structure of my argument, and hence dissertation, has been to motivate 
the problem of material constitution and the need for a statement of the constitution 
relation to resolve the problem. Once the need for the constitution relation was 
motivated, I looked at Gve of the more important and/or recent attempts at oSering a 
picture of consdtution and found them all wanting; thus, highlighting the need for an 
additional statement of the relation. I concluded by arguing for a statement of constitution 
that accounts far the vast and diverse phenomena that exemplihes it in the world.
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